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The Praxis of Quotation in Transitional Latin American Literatures traces Latin 
American literary pragmatism through the figure of quotation. My first chapter 
analyzes Costa Rican author Yolanda Oreamuno’s novel, La ruta de su evasión, and 
its characterization of the choteador(a), a person who practices the art of choteo. I 
conclude that Oreamuno defines the latter, a form of Central American wit that hinges 
upon quotation, differently from her Caribbean counterparts, such as Jorge Mañach, as 
a politically sterilizing discourse and a form of collusion with an authoritarian regime. 
In my second chapter, I study Mexican author Rosario Castellanos’s Oficio de 
tinieblas, and its appropriation of historiography to reconstruct the character of the 
gossip. I propose that Castellanos democratizes this role, revealing this character to be 
potentially any member of civil society, while she represents the state of political 
emergency as one in which gossip is suspended. In Chapter three, I turn to Peruvian 
author Mario Vargas Llosa’s El Paraíso en la otra esquina, and its depiction of the 
revolutionary feminist Flora Tristán. The novel transcribes, translates and adapts 
selections from Tristán’s vast corpus of writing, and attributes to Tristán feelings of 
shame, guilt and also pride about these writings. I question whether quotation 
functions as a form of narrative voice. Ultimately, I argue that the novel theorizes a 
conflict between quotation’s potential to solicit either empathy or political cooperation 
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with its quoted subject, offering the latter as the valid choice. Finally, my fourth 
chapter turns to the novel, Dora, in which Peruvian author José B. Adolph transcribes 
the memoirs of Dora Mayer de Zulen. These are memoirs in which Mayer analyzes the 
literature of Pedro Zulen, in order to prove Zulen’s status as a messiah of the 
indigenist movement, and also to prove that she and Zulen were married in the eyes of 
God. I argue that the novel stages a confrontation between the hermeneutic strategy of 
Mayer and the philosophy of Zulen; ultimately embracing Zulen’s perspective that the 
possibility of a correct reading depends upon the political saliency of the message that 
one reads for. In each chapter, I describe the conditions for the possibility of the use of 
quotation, the existence of the original text as a material support, and the author’s 
ability to recur to that text. 
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          INTRODUCTION 
THE PRAXIS OF QUOTATION 
 
 
The possibility of considering quotation a praxis appears superficially to hinge upon 
another, intuited possibility: that of considering quotation an ethically significant act. 
This a priori is a fact of everyday life, for we widely understand that quoted material 
can be proprietary and that malappropriation can be injurious. This understanding, in 
turn, gives rise to indignation in the face of cases of plagiarism, and poignant feelings 
about the proliferation of malicious gossip. The practical dimension of quotation, and 
of literature that quotes, is most readily intuited when we recognize that some forms of 
quotation can do real, literal harm to others.   
 In this dissertation, the harm that quotation can do to others is often in 
evidence. Yolanda Oreamuno’s novel La ruta de su evasión describes how its main 
character Gabriel attempts to overthrow his tyrannical father through subvocalization, 
or reading out loud: In a moment of synesthesia, he perceives his father to be a set of 
letters, which he then pronounces; But Gabriel is not only a participant in a regime of 
quotation; he is also a victim of it. Later in the novel, his classmate and rival Elena 
humiliates him by subvocalizing his own thoughts.  
 Rosario Castellanos’s novel Oficio de tinieblas deconstructs practices of 
quotation in a Chiapan colonial community anthropologically, and challenges the post-
modern conceit that gossip is often mobilized by the subaltern as a means of 
resistance. She posits, instead, a less academically salient but more plausible idea: 
That socio-politically vulnerable members of society are also more vulnerable to 
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gossip. Her narrative links a humanistic view of gossip with a catholic one: Gossip is 
an inversion of “good news” both in the sense that it doesn’t have a rational referent 
and in the sense that it disgraces others.  
 Mario Vargas Llosa, in his novel El paraíso en la otra esquina, imbeds 
quotations from the texts of the 18th century French feminist and socialist Flora Tristán 
inside of her interior monologue. He thus represents a practice of self-quotation at the 
same time that he enacts a practice of real quotation. In his novel, quotation is 
represented as a form of auto-agresión, because Tristán’s tendency to quote herself is 
synonymous with her penchant for aggressive self-criticism; She calls her own prose 
poor, immature and inaccurate. In this way, the novel represents and enacts a vicious 
attack on the same archive that it plumbs for its narrative. 
 Finally, José B. Adolph’s novel, Dora, quotes directly from the memoirs of 
Dora Mayer. To be clear: While portions of Castellanos’s novel are adapted from 
Chiapan historiography, and portions of Vargas Llosa’s novel read like creative 
translations of Tristán’s memoirs, José B. Adolph’s novel actually contains long 
passages that are lifted, word by word, from Dora Mayer’s memoirs. This language, 
the very language that Adolph reuses, did do real literal harm to someone: Mayer’s 
prose centers on the man she claimed she lost her virginity to. They were not meant to 
defame Zulen, but they exposed his family to derision. And so Adolph’s appropriation 
of this language also threatens to renew this injury.  
 The potential of quotation to do harm, however, is not proof of its practical 
dimension, but a symptom of it. In this dissertation I explore the practical dimension 
of quotation by examining its conditions of possibility: the contingencies on which it 
 12 
 
rests. In doing so, I intend to denaturalize the production of quotational literature, and 
of literature in general.  
 To understand the limits of quotational literature it is useful to return to an 
ancient genre of the same: the cento. The cento is an original poem or narration that 
one composes by taking and rearranging lines from other compositions. Scott McGill 
has identified Ausonius, a writer of centos from fourth century France, as one of the 
earliest theoreticians of the genre. In a forward that Ausonius wrote to accompany his 
Cento Nuptialis, he prescribes some rules for the genre:  “(The cento) is a poem 
compactly built out of a variety of passages … to place two (whole) lines side by side 
is weak.” He then compares the cento to the Greek stomachion:  
 
 … you may say it is like the puzzle which the Greeks have called stomachion. 
 There you have little pieces of bone, fourteen in number and representing 
 geometrical figures. For they are quadrilateral or triangular, some with sides of 
 various lengths, some symmetrical, either of equal legs or equilateral, with 
 either right or oblique angles: the same people call them isosceles or equal-
 sided triangles, and also right-angled and scalene … by fitting these pieces 
 together in various ways, pictures of countless objects are produced: a 
 monstruous elephant, a brutal boar, a goose in flight ... and numberless other 
 things of this sort, whose variety depends on the skill of the player. But while 
 the harmonious arrangement of the skillful player is  marvelous, the jumble 
 made by the unskilled is grotesque. This prefaced, you will know that I am like 
 the second kind of player. (McGill, 3) 
 
 This passage underlines the original relationship between quotation and poesis. 
Ausonius compared the cento with the stomachion, first, as a genitive act. They both 
populate the world with vibrant forms. But, Ausonius also suggested that the cento 
compares with the stomachion because it uses ideal forms: lines measured out in 
halves or wholes, instead of geometric figures, identified by their angles. This 
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suggestion provides us with insight into one possible phenomenology of quotation; it 
hints at a givenness of quotation for Ausonius, who says of the cento, “Tis a task for 
the memory only, which has to gather up scattered tags and fit these mangled scraps 
together into a whole.” (2)  
 But today in Latin America, literary genesis through quotation is not a task for 
memory in the same way. Many of the novels that this dissertation discusses describe 
or perform quotation as a form of reading, an act that is mediated by text and its 
material supports. Both José B. Adolph and Mario Vargas Llosa do this through direct 
quotation. So does, in a less obvious way, Sergio Ramírez, who wrote the novel La 
fugitiva based on the life of Yolanda Oreamuno, and attributed quotations from 
obscure texts by Oreamuno to different characters in the novel. And it is significant 
that in Oreamuno’s own novel, her characters are incapable of experiencing a 
recognition of one another except as a type of reading.  
 This difference is politically important. Ausonius is self deprecating, but only 
to make a point: That the success of a cento hinges on the ability of its writer: Ability, 
for Ausonius, determined whether the writer’s creation was harmonious or monstrous. 
But for Ausonius ability was a virtue, it flowed from the writer’s access to a realm of 
pure memory, or ideal forms. The authors in this dissertation are also concerned with 
their ability. However, they exploit the philological record; and for them ability 
therefore is synonymous with contingency. Because a return to the philological record 
is a turn to material resources, and because the option of returning to the philological 
record also introduces the option of working against a contemporary elan that would 
seem to suggest the right lines.  
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 The chapter in this dissertation that represents every stage of this difference is 
the fourth, which is about how José B. Adolph quotes Dora Mayer quoting Pedro 
Zulen. Dora Mayer believed that her ability to explain the meaning of literary figures 
that appeared in Pedro Zulen’s texts was made possible by the fact that these were 
ideal forms. She believed that their a-priori status meant that she could analyze them 
and then use them to prove as categorically true or false claims that she had made 
about Pedro Zulen: That he was in love with her, that they had had sex and that la 
Asociación Pro-indígena was the organization through which indigenous rights in Peru  
would be redeemed. 
 José B. Adolph, in contrast, insists that his ability to write his quotational novel 
is a contingency. His narration includes long direct quotations and lovingly rewritten 
passages. His narration proceeds non-chronologically; but each part of it is dated and 
corresponds to the date of a real publication or diary entry. More than this, however, 
José B. Adolph has selected content for his novel that is not suggested by a 
contemporary elan. For instance, while Mayer’s account of debates between Pedro 
Zulen and Juaquín Capelo about the usefulness of a mythological historical imaginary 
to indigenous liberation politics make for broadly interesting reading, her own 
reflections about the essential role of La Asociación Pro-Indígena in the unfolding of 
history are, frankly, quaint. José B. Adolph therefore also makes the decision to depart 
from a contemporary elan.  
  
Contingency and Cooperation  
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The decision to depart from a contemporary elan to select content for a quotational 
novel presses the reader to either agree to cooperate with the political project of the 
source material or not. How or whether a quotational work of literature can press this 
issue, is already at the heart of the best criticism about a different genre of quotational 
literature: the testimonio. Rather than explore questions of propriety, this criticism, 
examines the extent to which testimonio solicits political cooperation with its subjects. 
As an example, we may turn to criticism on Me llamo Rigoberta Menchú y así me 
nació la conciencia. 
 In 1982, Me llamo was published under the name Elisabeth Burgos, the 
Venezuelan psychoanalyst and anthropologist who recorded, transcribed and edited 
the testimony of Guatemalan activist Rigoberta Menchú. However, since 1985, and 
following a reclamation issued by Menchú, it has been published underneath the 
Guatemalan author’s name. Nevertheless, Menchú has expressed ambivalence about 
the creation of this book, describing Burgos as the author of Me llamo, but qualifying 
that statement by saying that Me llamo is the book that she, Menchú, would have 
written if conditions had allowed. 1  
                                                
1 “Lo que sí efectivamente es un vacío en el libro es el derecho de autor, ¿verdad? 
Porque la autoría del libro, efectivamente, debió ser más precisa, compartida, 
¿verdad?... Por un lado es también producto del desconocimiento de hacer un libro. Se 
necesitaba un autor y ella es autora.” Menchú quoted by Stoll. Stoll, David, and 
Elisabeth Burgos-Debray. Rigoberta Menchú Y La Historia De Todos Los 
Guatemaltecos Pobres. Madrid: Unión Editorial, 2008. It is this contingency that is 
often at the heart of controversies about testimonial literature, and not the difficulty of 
ascribing authorship. Authorship, it turns out, even in the case of testimonio, is rarely 
difficult to ascribe; merely time consuming. In the case of Me llamo Rigoberta 
Menchú, for instance, it takes time to specify what Menchu said, what Burgos 
recorded, and what Burgos transcribed, and also to disclose that certain parts of 
Burgos’ recordings have never been publically reviewed. But none of this is difficult. 
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 In 1999 Robert Stoll published Rigoberta Menchú and the story of all poor 
Guatemalans, in which he states that Me llamo narrates some events that either did not 
happen or did not happen to Menchú. In 2004, John Beverley published a rebuttal of 
Stoll, Testimonio, On the Politics of Truth, which hypothesizes that the inclusion of 
content that was not witnessed or experienced by Menchú, could be explained by 
differences essential to discursive conventions in Indigenous narrative and European 
literature. Namely, that while truth claims made in the latter are bolstered by 
specificity, truth claims made in the former are bolstered by inclusivity, by their 
general relevance to their subject’s community. It is therefore tenable, Beverley says, 
that Menchú included events experienced by others as a matter of propriety, rather 
than property.  
 But in Testimonio John Beverley misrepresents at least one aspect of Robert 
Stoll’s argument, and obscures Stoll’s one progressive criticism (of Menchú’s 
readers): That audiences that assumed that Menchú was telling the truth in Me Llamo 
Rigoberta Menchú had enjoyed her testimonio as though it were an autobiography. 
Consequently, while some members of Menchú’s readership were inspired to behave 
                                                                                                                                       
If anything, the context of the interpersonal relationship in which this book was 
written can serve as a mnemonic tool. The casual reader is sophisticated enough to 
absorb and keep these details in mind. Contingency, however, challenges cultural 
ideas about how writing is supposed to follow the acquisition of consciousness. One 
anticipates that when a person acquires political consciousness this may lead to 
unprecedented expressions, expressions that the speaker had not been capable of 
before, and that are therefore original. But Menchú compartmentalizes the event of Me 
llamo Rigoberta Menchú’s composition within the greater context of her political 
career, even as she exploits the opportunities that it opens up for her. (Stoll, Chapter 
13).  
 
 
 17 
 
philanthropically towards indigenous Guatemalans, they never achieved real political 
identification with Menchú or indigenous guerilla fighters. In this way, Stoll, as much 
as Beverley, criticizes the naivety of Menchú’s readers, and their lack of cooperation 
with the text. He also gestures at a discomfiting fact that consumers of global literature 
often ignore: That literature can foment empathy without soliciting political 
cooperation; and that empathy is not a valuable substitute for cooperation.2  
 Without a doubt, these controversies about Me Llamo Rigoberta Menchú are 
not as important throughout Latin America as they are in the US. In Mexico, for 
instance, the most recognized name in testimonio writing is Elena Poniatowska; and 
her novel, Hasta no verte Jesus mió (1969), had already been the subject of academic 
debate for almost a decade before Me Llamo Rigoberta Menchú was written.3 Yet the 
controversies surrounding Menchú’s testimony suggest a question about the novels 
                                                
2 This is also a valid criticism of cognitive hermeneutics.  
3 Hasta no verte Jesus mió is an historical novel, told in the first person, adapted from 
first person testimony given by Josefina Bórquez to Poniatowska. The superficial 
differences between Bórquez and Poniatowska came to be seen as emblematic of the 
differences between testimonio writers and their subjects. To many it appeared that 
Poniatowska, a young, attractive white woman with international ties used Bórquez’s 
poverty to adorn the writing. But Poniatowska’s other testimonios came to be seen as 
emblematic in a different way: They demonstrated the role that accident could play in 
the composition of testimonio. In the case of Nada nadie. Las voces del temblor, for 
instance, Poniatowska, and also members of the writing group that she led for women 
in the 1980s, found their interview subjects by canvassing the streets in the immediate 
wake of the earth quake. It is notable, now, in retrospect, how many testimonio authors 
have stressed the role that accident played in the composition of their books. Elisabeth 
Burgos has posited that her interviews with Rigoberta Menchú occurred because 
Menchú found herself, unexpectedly, bored and unoccupied in France, waiting to go to 
Scandinavia to participate in a conference. The composition of all literature can be 
considered contingent. But, the role of accident in the composition of testimonio has 
become a trope. And it can offset the perception that an author has inserted themselves 
where they shouldn’t be.  
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that appear in this dissertation that I wish to confront: To what extent do they foment 
empathy or solicit political cooperation with their quoted subjects? 
 Rosario Castellanos’s Oficio de tinieblas is a predecessor of the testimonio. It 
exploits the testimony inscribed in Chiapan historiography in order to give voice to 
historical persons whose lives were destroyed in the caste wars that took place in 
Chiapas during the later half of the 19th century and that reportedly involved the 
crucifixion of an indigenous child. It cannot solicit empathy from its readership, 
because it inculpates that readership. It begins with a verse from El libro del consejo 
or Popul V(v)uh, which has been repurposed to explain Spanish domination in Chiapas 
within an indigenous religious framework: “Los del Daño, los de la Guerra, los de la 
Miseria / vosotros que hicisteis el mal lloradlo.” Gil Iriarti posits that this quotation 
specifies that the novel’s omniscient narrator possesses an Indigenous point of view. 
But it also stands as a speech act that homogenizes the novel’s readers by inculpating 
them.  
 Mario Vargas Llosa’s El Paraíso en la otra esquina transcribes the written 
testimony of Flora Tristán. This includes her testimony about the abuse she suffered in 
her marriage, her experiences with the French legal system and the misery in which 
she encountered proletariat women who were living outside of the institution of 
marriage. But Vargas Llosa sacrifices opportunities to solicit empathy from his 
readership and insists instead upon describing, as accurately as possible, the political 
platform of his subject. Is this the same as soliciting cooperation? It is not,. It cannot 
be. Because Flora Tristán’s 18th century radical feminism, which attempted to conjure 
– almost mystically - the female socialist messiah, is not serviceable to a 21st century 
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readership. But by closing off even the possibility of cooperation, through the 
selection of a subject as politically irrelevant as Tristán, Vargas Llosa is that much 
more successful in betraying an aesthetic of world literature, and liberating his 
readership from their empathetic duty to his text.4  
 Sergio Ramírez’s La fugitiva fulfills many of the generic requirements of 
testimonio. His novelization of Yolanda Oreamuno’s life is based in part on testimony 
that he really did collect from women who knew Yolanda Oreamuno. The effect is 
operatic: A contrapunteo of voices of multiple women, who loved or were in love with 
Oreamuno, and who deeply empathized with her. The most heartbreaking element of 
La fugitiva is its protagonists’ fight to maintain contact with her son, after her divorce. 
Ramírez exploits this part of Oreamuno’s personal narrative as a literary parable: The 
son represents Central American writers who are huerfanos de madre in a literary 
sense, as they have been deprived of the memory of their region’s literary matriarchs. 
But Sergio Ramírez has supplanted Oreamuno’s political criticism, her confrontation 
with Tican insularity, with his own: A confrontation with the commercialization of 
Central American transsnationality.  
 This replacement is one of the things that ultimately led me to expunge La 
fugitiva from the central place that I originally anticipated for it in this dissertation. It 
no longer gets its own chapter, and is instead addressed in an afterward to my first 
chapter, which is about Yolanda Oreamuno.  
                                                
4 And it is also worth noting that Poniatowska’s recent work, especially Leonora, is 
extremely reminiscent of El Paraíso. Leonora is a creative biography inspired by the 
art of its subject, British-Mexican painter Leonora Carrington. It functions much in the 
same way as the half of El paraíso en la otra esquina that is based on the paintings of 
Paul Gauguin does: presenting ekphrastic language, rather than actual quotation. 
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Sayings become quotations: Building worlds  
 
She said or they say. Quotations or sayings. This dissertation is about the first. But the 
topic of sayings has imposed itself at various stages of writing. When the working title 
of the dissertation was “the ethics of quotations” someone asked if I worked on the 
ethics of sayings (or dichos).5 I am sure that they did not mean the ethical usage of 
sayings, but the ethical messages that sayings are believed to insist upon. The belief 
that dichos are essentially speech acts, by which we exhort a certain kind of behavior 
or conjure a best possible reality is widespread. It is reflected in exams, of a type that I 
discuss later in this introduction, that test proverb fluency by requiring that the exam 
taker translate proverbs as sentences that begin with “It is best…” or “one ought…”.  
Let’s keep the speech act status of sayings in mind, as we consider the meaning of a 
difference between quotations and sayings.  
 A prospective comparison of quotations with sayings conjures debates about 
the standing of oral versus written language. Do quotations receive scriptural privilege 
because of a hierarchy of senses that privileges the visual over the aural? Goth Regier, 
in his seminal history of quotation, Quotology, argues that verbal culture constructs 
itself dialectically, by facilitating a continual and imperative transformation of sayings 
into quotations, and of quotations back into sayings. Returning, in fantasy, to a time 
before the first Roman histories were written, he describes the original labor of the 
                                                
5 Unknown respondent. "'Piedra que Rueda': Reimagining Proverb Literacy and Social 
Mobility for the 21st Century" The Johns Hopkins University Program in Latin 
American Studies Spring 2014 Conference: Mobility and Exchange. The Johns 
Hopkins University, Baltimore MD (April 11, 2014) 
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historian: This person was tasked with imagining scenes in which popular sayings 
were first uttered: In other words, he was tasked with taking units of language that 
were essentially formal, and imagining them as literal: Once this formal unit of 
language had become a literal statement, describing reality, it was then a candidate to 
be written down as a quotation. (It could then begin to be memorized, and 
reintroduced to oral culture.)6 This transformation reveals the diegetic, or world-
building dimension of the paremiologist’s labor.   
 Two vignettes from the recent history of paremiology reinforce this idea: 
Piaget’s introduction of the proverb test, and structuralism’s invention of a framework 
called the Great Chain of Being to explain how proverb usage works.  
Early during the twentieth century, having unsuccessfully attempted to 
describe how people succeed at interpreting proverbs, a number of pyschologists 
reversed their approach to the problem and attempted to describe how people fail. 
They were led by Jean Piaget, who in 1922 tested proverb comprehension in children 
between the ages of 10 and 14 to see when proverb fluency became concrete. Piaget’s 
original study required subjects to match proverbs, which they were told were 
sentences that meant some thing, with statements that meant the same thing. They 
                                                
6 “The Rhetorica ad herennium (first century BC) defined a sentential as “a saying 
drawn from life, which shows concisely either what happens or ought to happen in life 
… Quintilian taught that “the oldest type of sentential, and that which the term is most 
correctly applied, is the aphorism, called gnome by the Greeks.” He gives an example 
from Domitios Afer: “Princeps, qui vult omnia scire, necesse habet multa ignoscere.” 
(50). “Macdonnel compiled his Dictionary to help readers understand foreign phrases 
the in vogue, Latin proverbs like “Stultitiam simulare sapientia summa est” (to assume 
the garb of folly is, in certain situations, the most consummate wisdowm) and a 
counterquotation from Horace, Sapientia prima est, stultitia caruisse” (The first step to 
wisdom is th be exempt from folly) (100).  
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were then asked to justify their matches during a conversation with a clinician. In 
recent years, this study, summarized in “The Language and Thought of the Child” 
(1926), has garnered a fair amount of attention from modern paremiologists, especially 
in cognitive studies.7 
 What remains to be elucidated is the narrative aspect of Piaget’s work: His 
hospitality before the voices of his child-subjects. Piaget records the children’s 
justifications for their “false” matches and attempts to trace the source of these errors. 
Certain voices and personalities rise from the text. For instance, “Mat,” a girl of 
twelve, is eloquent and confident, and apparently one of Piaget’s favorite subjects. She 
matches the proverb, “White dust will ne’re come out of a sack of coal,” with the 
sentence, “Those who waste their time neglect their business,” and justifies the pairing 
by explaining that, “People who waste their time don’t look after their children 
properly. They don’t wash them and they become as black as coal…”8  
 Justifications like Mat’s constitute brutal deconstructions of traditional 
proverbs, as they separate, with almost surgical precision, each proverb from its a-
priori meaning and resituate it within a fantasy. Jean Piaget called this process 
synchronism: a fabrication of points of encounter between sentences that the child 
encountered in accidental proximity to one another. He named the child’s egoism the 
source of this syncretic labor. And by egoism he did not mean something pathological, 
                                                
7 See Richard P. Honeck’s A Proverb in Mind.  
8 “Xy,” a pessimistic girl of twelve, pairs the proverb, “To every bird his own nest is 
beautiful,” with the sentence, “Insignificant causes may have terrible consequences,” 
and justifies the pairing by explaining, “A bird builds his nest very carefully, whereas 
if you do things carelessly, it may have terrible consequences.”8 Piaget, Jean. The 
Language and Thought of the Child. 139 
 23 
 
but something healthy: The child’s critical blindness to accidental, casual or random 
event. What he called faith. Here, and in anticipation of his later work, The Child’s 
Conception of the World, Piaget posited this blindness as a condition of her 
originality. He observed that when confronted with her errors, she resisted correction, 
and defended her syncretic belief.9   
 After Piaget, there was an explosion in the use of proverb tests in clinical 
settings. Forensic pyschologists used them to diagnose the mental age of suspected 
“idiots.” And for decades, it was debated what typified a schizophrenic approach to 
proverbs. (Some researchers are still shamelessly administering proverb tests to 
schizophrenics.10)  
 But it was Piaget alone who traced, in The Child’s Conception of the World, 
the ability to quote proverbs as an emergent competence, inside of an emergent moral 
framework. For Piaget, the stage at which children used proverbs bizarrely was a 
necessary intermediate stage in their moral development, at which point they were 
given to imagine a specific person, in a specific scenario, using a proverb. In other 
words, children understood proverbs as though they were quotations. Piaget thus 
locates the child at the same point where Regier locates the early historian.  
                                                
9 Originality here should not be considered in a vulgar sense, which tends to link 
originality with individuality. In fact, the originality of the child predates the child’s 
individuality. Originality, Piaget argued, can be observed through holistic observation.  
Three things must be observed: Idiosyncrasy (error, failure to meaningfully 
communicate with the adult), resistance to correction, and repetition among 
individuals of the same age range.   
10	  Kiang M1, Light GA, Prugh J, Coulson S, Braff DL, Kutas M. Cognitive, 
neurophysiological and functional correlates of proverb interpretation abnormalities 
in schizophrenia.	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 This trajectory was enacted again in structuralist criticism: Before WWII, there 
were a number of paremiologists working in present day Poland, Hungary and Russia 
whom the North American paremiologist Wolfgang Mieder would later bring to the 
United States. Their work was in the service of a greater project: the defense of minor 
cultures from foreign imperialism and nativist jingoism. For them, a structuralist 
philology promised to justify the existence of minor cultural artifacts, including 
folkloric artifacts such as myths, legends, and lyrics, by explaining them based on 
universal narrative structures. They also theorized that they could reconstruct partially 
forgotten cultural artifacts, such as pre-Christian narratives, using these structures as a 
scaffold.  
One of the structures that these scholars identified was the Great Chain of 
Being. This was a continuum of generic categories, or spheres of being, to which most 
elements of a proverb were theoretically mappable: For instance, meteorological, 
temporal, animal, political. The community theorized that when a person interprets a 
proverb they map elements belonging to one category of being onto elements 
belonging to another. For instance, to use the proverb “His bark is bigger than his bite” 
to say “North Korea will not attack the US” one would transfer-map elements 
belonging to the animal category of being onto ones belonging to the political.11  
According to this theory, what made proverbs transparent to a member of a 
civilization, but not necessarily to someone who merely spoke the language of that 
                                                
11 Alternatively, I could interpret the proverb, “His bark is louder than his bite,” with 
another proverb: “a lot of thunder brings little rain.” In this case, I would be transfer-
mapping elements belonging to the animal (low) category onto elements belonging to 
the meteorological (high) category. 
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civilization (We are surprisingly bad at interpreting proverbs in languages that we are 
fluent in but not native to ) was the accessibility to them of particular diegeses, or 
imaginary worlds. Members of different civilizations imagine different imaginary 
worlds, containing different spheres of being, comprising a particular great chain of 
being. And they assign more or less status to elements from these spheres depending 
on whether they understand them to be closer to the divine or to the profane.   
Incredibly, scholars working in the field of cognitive studies have cited the 
GCB as a valid concept as recently as 2005. See for instance, Richard P. Honeck’s “A 
Proverb in Mind”. However, as far as I know, none of these 21st century scholars 
address the original application that structuralists imagined for the GCB: The defense 
of vulnerable ethnic groups through the description of particular diegeses. The CGB 
doesn’t really have the practical application that paremiologists originally imagined 
for it. We can’t really use it to reconstruct a lost cultural artifact, or generate a new one 
that is authentic. But this scholarship, considered in light of its original aims, can 
inform our understanding of what motivates the decision to select a saying and to turn 
it into a quotation.  
Certainly one motivation can be something formal that was already in the 
original discourse. For instance, a piece of meta-discourse, a self-quotation, e.g.: “I’d 
say…”, might prompt a person to begin to quote from there. But another motivation 
can be a quoting subject’s world building prerogative; the fact that they intuitively 
recognize, in a saying, or a quotation, a self-contained diegesis.  
The novels that this dissertation analyzes begin and end quotations in radical 
places, upsetting the great chain of being, and upending that cosmology. Take, for 
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instance, Yolanda Oreamuno’s La ruta de su evasión and its appropriation of the 
Aztec word, tzintzunzan. At the time that Oreamuno wrote, the vindication of folkloric 
artifacts was central to the aesthetic of her contemporaries. But Oreamuno was 
radically skeptical, not about the value of this project, but about its feasibility and how 
its success could be measured. La ruta is a portrait of urban, bourgeoisie life: It depicts 
a vicious, mocking kind of quotation, by which people undermine one another. Her 
only nod to indigenismo or costumbrismo is her decision to have her character Gabriel 
quote Nahautl at the end of his life. But the word that he samples, tzintzunzan isn’t 
defined in the novel. Oreamuno asserts the sterility and miniscule scope of the kinds of 
indigenous diegeses that her contemporaries were capable of creating of intuiting.   
Take also Mario Vargas Llosa’s El Paraíso en la otra esquina. In one of the 
later chapters, La ciudad monstruo, the author breaks with the conventions of 
quotation that he has established up to this point in the novel. Whereas he has, so far, 
only sampled smaller portions of Tristán’s texts, switching rapidly between the second 
and third person narrative voices as he does so, in this chapter he samples almost the 
entirety of a chapter from Tristán’s Paseos en Londres: Prostitutas. This is an 
empathetically invested chapter whose existence partially undermines my overall 
claim about the novel: That it liberates its readership from their empathetic duty. 
Vargas Llosa’s text corresponds to Tristán’s nightmare vision of London, which 
Charles Dickenson called too grotesque to take seriously. 
And there is also Sergio Ramírez’s La fugitiva, which takes a quotation that the 
literary community has already assumed as a proverb, and turns it back into a 
quotation. Specifically, Oreamuno’s assertion that (in Costa Rica) “Al que pretende 
 27 
 
levantar demasiado la cabeza sobre el nivel general, no se la corta. ... Le bajan 
suavemente el suelo que pisa, y despacio, sin violencia, se la coloca a la altura 
conveniente”, has commonly been embraced, and reused, as a lapidary statement that 
describes Tican political sterility. Ramírez takes this statement, changes it slightly, 
writes it down again, and attributes it to a different character, in a different situation: 
Manuela Torres who is based on the singer Chavela Vargas.                                                              
 
Lapidary Praxes                                                                                                                            
 
Today, we still do not know how we interpret proverbs. We know that we do not 
simply memorize them. And we know that linguistic fluency alone does not empower 
us to interpret them. We also know that we are able to recognize multiple 
interpretations of a proverb as simultaneously correct, while definitively choosing just 
one interpretation as preferable.12 By proving that some people do map elements of 
proverbs onto elements from imaginary scenes, cognitive studies can give us insight. I 
believe that cognitive studies will fail to give us a complete, or particularly meaningful 
understanding of this process, however, because of one aspect of proverbs, or sayings, 
that it cannot recognize: At the same time that participants in verbal culture are 
interpreting sayings, they are also transforming them back into (and sometimes this is 
                                                
12 In 1973 the North American performance scholar Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 
surveyed 80 Texan university students about the meaning of the proverb, a rolling 
stone gathers no moss. Individually, the students identified three main responses that 
they considered valid. Collectively, however, they expressed an overwhelming 
preference for a single response: That this proverb exhorts mobility. This episode is 
discussed by Wolfgang Mieder.   
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happening for the first time) quotations. This is not a process that exists in the mind, 
but on the page, and it is therefore beyond the scope of those who study the production 
of meaning in language in the mind.  
In his introduction to his expansive treatise on Mexican paremiology “El 
Hablar Lapidario”, Herón Pérez Martínez elucidates how paremiology accommodates 
the nonhuman, or philological dimension of the humanities: “La relación del vocablo 
“lapidario” con el discurso es muy antigua y tiene que ver, desde luego, con el arte 
latino de grabar inscripciones en piedras. … En efecto, una de las acepciones más 
tempranas de la palabra latina lapidarius es la que designaba lo escrito sobre una 
piedra como los epitafios” (50). The word lapidary, both in English and in Spanish, 
means “concise.” (Though it is not as common a word in English as it is in Spanish.) 
Lapidary speech, then, is concise, usually formulaic speech. But its root, lapidarius, 
has a wealth of resonances. The epitaph is writing about the dead, and also, dead 
writing: words that have been fossilized. It is writing that either refers to or speaks for 
that which is either inhuman (stone) or post-human (corpse).      
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CHAPTER 1 
 
SCENES OF LANGUAGE VIOLENCE FROM YOLANDA OREAMUNO’S  
LA RUTA DE SU EVASION 
 
Costa Rican author Yolanda Oreamuno’s novel La ruta de su evasión (1948) tells the 
story of a respectable bourgeois family living in San José and its members’ attempts to 
escape their patriarch’s subtle but brutal regime of emotional terror. Within this 
milieu, the character with which the novel is overwhelmingly concerned is the 
family’s youngest son, Gabriel. Intercalated chapters represent scenes in which 
Gabriel struggles to develop his capacity for speech. In one of two scenes that I 
discuss in detail in this article, Gabriel attempts to develop a critical discourse about 
his father. In the other, he attempts to hold a dialogue with a sexual partner. These 
scenes are invariably representations of failure. Gabriel never realizes his discursive 
goals and ultimately self destructs as a speaking subject. At the end of the novel, he is 
reduced to repeating a single word, which is supplied with no referent by the narration: 
tzintzuntzan. At the same time, Gabriel’s recession as a potential speaking subject is 
always reinforced by the emergence of other empowered speaking subjects. Into the 
space left by his silence or unintelligible utterance these figures introduce their own 
exploitative or abusive discourses. It is a trajectory that suggests as the central conflict 
of the novel the threat of imposed linguistic isolation. This is not linguistic 
isolationism, a silence maintained by the female members of Gabriel’s household that 
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scholars have already productively explored as constituting a space of dissensus.13 
Gabriel wants to speak in a public situation with and at other denizens of the capital 
who are not members of his family. He is preempted from doing so by actors whose 
public speech is already formed and continues to form itself at his expense. 
 This central conflict in Oreamuno’s novel is foreshadowed in her earlier 
critical essays, which she published in Repertorio Americano between 1937 and 1948. 
Here, the author announces her intention to disengage from an autochthonous Latin 
American literary mode that, for many, was a form of praxis: folklore. At the same 
time, she also critiques choteo, a form of Central American wit, as a form of language 
violence: language that affects material harm on a target. Extant scholarship takes a 
first step towards synthesizing the content of Oreamuno’s novel with that of her 
essays, emphasizing the ways that its personal narrative modes and characters’ 
discourses contrast with the modes and discourses that she criticized. For instance, 
Oreamuno’s apologists and detractors alike concentrate on her use of interior 
monologue and the way that this shifts the focus of the narrative away from elements 
of a folkloric Costa Rican landscape and onto elements of a psychological landscape, 
allowing her to condemn the repressive practices of the bourgeoisie. This synthetic 
labor appears uneven, however, due to the challenge of envisioning the vertiginous 
path that Oreamuno’s disengagement from folklore and her confrontation with verbal 
violence actually take. For instance, she does not completely excise folkloric elements 
                                                
13 On linguistic isolationism in the work of Oreamuno, see Janet Gold: “These stories 
show women who survive, who confront loneliness, isolation, fear and death; and 
from their inner resources they create what they need to sustain themselves” (Gold, 
“Feminine” 195).   
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from her fiction. At key moments she represents her characters as being in contact 
with extreme incarnations of folkloric elements, which threaten them with 
annihilation. Moreover, whereas in her essays Oreamuno adopts a comedic tone to 
critique the Tican instinct to cajole, in her fiction she portrays this activity as having 
deadly consequences for her characters.  
 
Forms of Linguistic (In)hospitality  
 
When La ruta de su evasión was published in 1948, Oreamuno was best known as a 
contributor to Repertorio Americano. Between 1936 and 1948 she published a total of 
twenty-three pieces in what was for almost forty years one of Latin America’s most 
important forums for cultural criticism and literary expression. Oreamuno’s earliest 
pieces for Repertorio Americano include flattering reviews of male authors’ work, 
short stories for children, and above all, reflections on the Latin American landscape 
as something approximating what Lezama Lima called gnostic space, which does not 
“passively await insemination by a world-historical Idea or Spirit without 
collaboration” but “contributes to the intrusion of the Spirit” (Morse 88). This space 
has the power to conceive discourse. Or so Oreamuno wrote in her very early essay, 
“40º sobre cero” (1937). It posits that “el deseo de escribir” is “una situación impuesta 
por el paisaje” and “un proceso del ambiente” and not simply the manifestation of a 
“necesidad de exteriorizarse” (137). It also uses language to a synesthetic effect, 
creating surrealistic portraits of Latin American landscape using a verbal palette made 
up of light and dark, warm and cold, loud and quiet.  
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 However, in her essay published two years later, “El ambiente tico y los mitos 
tropicales” (1939), the writer parodies her own prose from “40º sobre cero” and 
introduces a negative concept of Costa Rican exceptionalism with ramifications for 
her view of Costa Rican discourse. She characterizes Latin American landscape proper 
– that is something like Lezama Lima’s masterfully monstrous landscape - not as 
having collaborated in the creation of Costa Rican culture, but as having bracketed 
that process. First, she describes this greater landscape as marginalizing Costa Rica: 
“Se acabaron al norte los grandes acantilados en donde el agua puja mugiente todos 
los días, los inmensos desiertos arenosos y hostiles, los pavorosos fríos … Sólo más al 
Sur… comienza nuevamente la sensación de aridez, de impotencia ante la naturaleza, 
de lucha recia y viril con lo imprevisto” (18). She then turns a bitter eye upon Costa 
Rican landscape in its particular dimension: it is “un cromo delicadamente lindo” (18). 
This tableau, in contrast with Lezama Lima’s imago, penetrates but does not 
impregnate. The Costa Rican psyche remains intellectually, as well as discursively, 
sterile. 
 According to the novelist Fabián Dobles, some readers felt that Oreamuno 
indulged in environmental determinism in these essays (Dobles 321). However, “El 
ambiente tico y los mitos tropicales” affects too sardonic a tone to be taken seriously 
as a work of environmental determinism. To begin with, it takes a mocking view of 
those “grandes naciones” (10) whose intellectual accomplishments proceed from an 
epic struggle with their own wilderness. In her essay, Oreamuno renames these 
accomplishments “grandes pecados” (10): Costa Rican culture, on the other hand, 
languishes “virginal,” (9) sinning infinitesimally when it does sin: “Cometamos todos 
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los días infinitesimales pecados” (9). Moreover, Oreamuno’s paisajismo is actually a 
pretext to model a new aesthetic of monotony that is not simply realistic but darkly 
surrealistic. Here she does away with the palette of light and dark, warm and cold, 
loud and quiet that she employed in “40º sobre cero”. Instead, Costa Rica is 
monochromatic: the color of the environment is “negro” (6).  It is monoclimatic: 
Neither the country of “cero lluvia” (14) or “lluvia bajo cero” (14), it is the country 
“(donde) llueve nueve meses al año de la manera más desesperante del mundo” (15). 
Finally, Costa Rica is monolingual: “Indios, hay unos tres mil que viven en el interior 
de la Republica … y, aunque algunos hablan dialecto, todos hablan español” (15).  
 In Oreamuno’s consideration, Costa Rica’s monolingualism is not reducible to 
the nation’s ethnic homogeneity. She is interested in a form of discursive 
monolingualism that is the gift of bourgeois enterprise. It is the work of maintaining, 
first, an optimal environment for commerce, and second, an optimal environment for 
the exercise of what she calls “demoperfectocracia” (21), a cosmetic form of 
democracy that disguises the chatter and gossip that constitute the real prerogative of 
Costa Rica’s bourgeoisie class. (The connections drawn by Oreamuno between gossip 
and democracy call to mind the work of her contemporary, the fascist philosopher Carl 
Schmitt. 14) This labor consists partially in the neutralization of presumptive 
excellence. In Costa Rica, “Esta no necesidad de lucha trae como consecuencia un 
                                                
14 Oreamuno’s criticism of the bourgeoisie echoes Donoso Cortés, as quoted by Carl 
Schmitt: “According to Donoso Cortés, it was characteristic of bourgeois liberalism 
not to decide in this battle but instead to begin a discussion. He straightforwardly 
defined the bourgeoisie as a “discussing class,” una clase discutidora. It has thus been 
sentenced. This definition contains the class characteristic of wanting to evade 
decision. A class that shifts all political activity onto the plan of conversation in the 
press and in parliament is no match for social conflict” (59).    
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deseo de no provocarla ... Al que pretende levantar demasiado la cabeza sobre el nivel 
general, no se la corta. ... Le bajan suavemente el suelo que pisa, y despacio, sin 
violencia, se la coloca a la altura conveniente” (19). Today, this quote has taken on an 
almost lapidary quality,15 but it originally refers to something specific: on the one 
hand the efforts of the press who bury good ideas in bad writing, and on the other, the 
tendency of the average Costa Rican to entertain himself by devising criticisms that 
would be inscrutable to their object should they ever get back to him or her. This 
activity employs a device that Yolanda Oreamuno identifies as choteo:   
 
 Además de la ignorancia deliberada y entrenada (diría yo), conocemos las 
 sutiles vertebraciones del choteo. El choteo es una arma blanca, ¡blanca como 
 una camelia!, que se puede portar sin licencia y se puede esgrimir sin 
 responsabilidad. Tiene finísimos ribetes líricos de agudo ingenio; sirve para 
 demostrar habilidad, para aparecer perito, para ser oportuno, filosófico y 
 erudito. Afecta características distintas: el empirismo sociológico, y empirismo 
 freudiano. Además, contra tan fina y elegante arma no hay defensa. Usted la 
 ncuentra esperándole en la boca de su mejor amigo, en la mano de su 
 colaborador, en el periódico matutino y en el vespertino; en todas partes. Y lo 
 que más: usted es corajudo, sutil y llama “al pan, pan y al vino, vino” si la sabe 
 usar con acierto. Tiene la ventaja indudable de que usted no necesita respetar a 
 nada ni a nadie, y que no se requiere mayor profundidad para su ejercicio. Creo 
 que es el único tecnicismo verdadero de que podemos alardear, y sus 
 “profesionales”, los sólos expertos en que abundamos. (Oreamuno, Ambiente 
 21) 
  
                                                
15 A version of this quotation appears in Ramírez’s La fugitiva. However, in Ramírez’s 
novel it is the character Manuela Torres, based on the real life Chavela Vargas, who 
speaks this quote: “Cada vez que he regresado a Costa Rica ha sido para arrepentirme 
una y otra vez. Qué país. La ley del serrucho. Si te alzas más alto que los demás 
pendejos, no te serruchan el piso, te serruchan las piernas para dejarte al mismo nivel” 
(Ramírez 232).  Ramírez also recycles this quote in an interview about his novel: “Yo 
quería hacer énfasis en la novela en que se trata de una sociedad patriarcal muy 
conservadora, que pretende reducir a la mujer a un lugar, que cuando intenta sobresalir 
le serruchan el piso o le cortan las piernas” (Bérmudez).  
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Choteo is a device explored exhaustively by the Cuban cultural critic Jorge Mañach. 
In his essay “Indagación del Choteo” (1928), Mañach describes it as “un hábito de 
irrespetuosidad” (14); habit, standing in opposition to action, and disrespect standing 
in opposition to respect, literally, “re-spicere: volver a mirar” (15). Choteo therefore 
has the potential to be “un vicio de óptica mental o de sensibilidad moral” (15) that 
manifests itself in a failure to act.  In this case, the choteador does not recognize the 
myriad authorities that make themselves apparent to the virtuous man and calls him to 
action. These are not just institutional authorities, such as the church or government. 
Nor are they the obvious domestic authorities, such as the household patriarch. The 
marginal and the meek, children for instance, have authority as they call upon men to 
provide care. Likewise, great scholars have authority as they call upon men to study. 
Insofar as this is the role usually played by choteo, Mañach believes that it is primarily 
a toxic phenomenon. Choteo will be redeemed, Mañach asserts, only when it 
represents a selective disrespect for illegitimate authority. For this to occur, for choteo 
to become a kind of verbal praxis and not just a form of cruelty, the choteador will 
have to be made sighted and sensible. His optical and sensible disorientation will have 
to be corrected.  
 There is potentially a difference in the way that Mañach, as opposed to 
Oreamuno, defines choteo in a national context. While the choteador of Costa Rica 
employs medical, literary, sociological and Freudian empiricism and is published in 
the papers, the choteador of Cuba is heard on the streets and tends to employ crass, 
even obscene language. For this reason we might imagine that in the first part of the 
twentieth century choteo in Costa Rican and choteo in Cuban were merely homonyms, 
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Costa Rican choteo being analogous to English wit or Brazilian esperteza and Cuban 
choteo being something else altogether. However, Oreamuno’s description, which 
emphasizes the deadening potential of the device, returns us to an originally negative 
judgment about it that exists in Mañach’s work. Granted, this is a negative judgment 
that contemporary scholars have largely overturned: Roberto González Echevarría and 
Román De la Campa deconstruct this judgment in a way that allows us to redeem 
choteo as a constituent of Caribbean festivity and polyphony.16  However, Mañach’s 
original investigation insisted that the victory of choteo in Cuba attested to the 
spiritual solipsism, egotism or autism of the Cuban subject and did not bode well for 
the development of an objective, altruistic or truly hospitable sensibility. This is a 
judgment that remains clear in Oreamuno’s work: “(El choteador) sería inofensivo, si 
no le faltase, como antes anotara, el simplista sentido de projimidad” (17). For 
Oreamuno, as for Mañach, the fault in the choteador is one of senseless self-
involvement. The fact that Oreamuno identifies instances of choteo in the press, which 
supposedly performs a documentary function, is only indicative that she believed that 
written and oral culture in Costa Rica were in fatal collusion. The verbal sins that the 
everyday Costa Rican committed on the street were patterned off of, reproduced, 
supplemented, or provided an alibi for those that appeared in print.  
                                                
16 Roberto González Echevarría argues that Mañach fails to include realistic examples 
of choteo in his study. These would support the claim that choteo is closely related to 
González Echeverria’s concept of fiesta: “The strongest link of the practice of choteo 
with the festive is through its thrust to freedom and its association of sexuality with 
death” (140). Román De la Campa contrasts Mañach’s choteo, what he calls a 
“passive mimesis” (112), with another form of choteo that is an “interesting and 
innovative form of mimicry” related to Édouard Glissant’s notion of diversion (97). 
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Yolanda Oreamuno’s conception of Tican monolingualism constitutes part of 
her vision of a hospitable Costa Rica. Here, Oreamuno employs the word hospitable 
(acogedora) sardonically. Costa Rica is hospitable in the sense that it physically 
receives people from all over the world: political refugees and exiles. However, this 
capacity to physically receive, the physically inviting and even seductive aspect of 
Costa Rica, is predicated upon its spiritual infertility:   
 
 Costa Rica acogedora recibe con los brazos abiertos a los emigrados políticos 
 de toda América, a los víctimas de ‘X’ y ‘Z’ tiranía. Los periodistas le hacen 
 una visita, le toman el pulso, y si ven que el señor insiste en su innata rebeldía, 
 se le ignora suavemente, y suavemente pasa también al anonimato definitivo. 
 Grandes figuras políticas, literarias, revolucionarias y demagógicas han pasado 
 tiempos de destierro en Costa Rica, y de su estado no existe más… que el 
 nombre en las listas de inmigración. (Oreamuno, Ambiente 20) 
 
Consequently, to speak of a language of hospitality in Oreamuno’s work is really to 
speak of a brand of contraceptive language. 
Oreamuno believed that the persistence of costumbrismo as a literary mode in 
Costa Rica in the 1930s was a sign of the sterility of the cultural landscape. This is the 
central idea expressed in “Protesta contra el folklore” (1944), Oreamuno’s most 
infamous article. Here, she expresses her exhaustion - “literariamente, confieso por mi 
parte, que estoy harta, con mayúsculas” (96) - with what she calls alternately folklore 
or costumbrismo. In its ideological dimension, this is literature that corresponds to “el 
imperativo histórico (de cada nacionalidad) de lanzar la verdad dolorosa que penan, 
respectivamente, el indio, el cholo, el campesino, el mestizo y el criollo” (Oreamuno, 
“Protesta” 94). In its aesthetic dimension, this is literature that accomplishes verbally, 
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via transcription, what the casta paintings of old accomplished visually, voicing the 
races of Latin America: “el léxico se hincha con palabras de atl, istl and chua …” 
(Oreamuno, “Protesta” 94). Oreamuno is explicit about the source of her exhaustion. It 
stems from her feeling that she has read the absolute best that the genre has to offer 
and that she is ready now to read a new kind of fiction that treats explicitly the 
psychological realities of urban life in Latin America, including bourgeois life, as it 
has been inspired by Yankee economic imperialism. 
In truth, “Protesta contra el folklore” is a short, straightforward piece of 
writing, yet the chastising responses that it provoked provide an object lesson in the 
kind of discursive (in)hospitality that preoccupied Oreamuno.17 Shortly after its 
publication an erroneous rumor spread that it contained a protest against folklore 
based on the idea that Costa Rica itself did not have either enough folk or folk practice 
to write about. Costa Rican writer Fabián Dobles attests to the existence of this rumor 
and calls it fallacious. In reference to a critique that appeared in El Tiempo - 
“(Oreamuno) rehúye (el folklore) por estimar que … en Costa Rica no hay material 
suficiente” (Dobles 321) - Dobles says, “Nos negamos a creer que … haya sido otra 
cosa que una desviada interpretación del periodista al expresarle la escritora su 
posición subjetiva enfrente del movimiento novelístico costarricense.” (321) However, 
in a moment that now appears key and hints at the importance that such a rumor might 
have had for a young writer’s reputation, Dobles didn’t defend Oreamuno in any 
                                                
17 “Given the high esteem accorded costumbrista writing in Costa Rica since the 
nineteenth century, and the number of writers who practiced it, many Costa Ricans 
considered (“Protesta”) an affront. Subsequent literary historians, however, have 
recognized the literary possibilities of urban existence” (Gold, Reading 216).    
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straightforward way. Rather, Dobles, a close contemporary of Oreamuno who 
competed in the same literary competitions (Dobles, as the author of the novel Aguas 
Turbias, would have shared the Rinehart prize with Oreamuno had she accepted it for 
her novel Tierra Firme.18) asserted that even though this was not her meaning, for 
Oreamuno to have written an article that had even the potential to be misinterpreted in 
this way was “peligroso”. (Dobles 322).This condemnation precedes a passive 
aggressive dismissal of what he understands Oreamuno to have wanted to do in her 
own writing. Dobles: “Hemos de advertir que respetamos que una escritora, cualquiera 
que ella sea, juzgue que debe hacer ‘novela psicoanalista y socialista’. He aquí un 
problema individual que solo el propio interesado debe resolver” (322).19  
 Beyond asserting that her psychological approach to literature was unpatriotic, 
Oreamuno’s critics maintained that it was derivative and underwhelming. Writers 
Seymour Menton and Abelardo Bonilla both claimed that La ruta de su evasión, as 
well as Tierra firme, manifested the influence of James Joyce. Menton: “Sus dos 
novelas, Tierra firme (inédita) y La ruta de su evasión (1949) … reflejan la influencia 
de Joyce en la penetración del subconsciente” (Urbano 178). Bonilla: “Sus primeros 
ensayos revelan la influencia de Mann en el tema del tiempo y la del Proust en el 
tratamiento de los temas del recuerdo. Más tarde fue Albert Doblin el autor que la 
                                                
18 Ann Gonzales discusses the six Costa Rican novels submitted to Farrar and Rinehart 
in 1940 as marking the year as a “watershed” moment in the history of Costa Rican 
literature (38).  
19 Dobles’s tone is echoed in the writing of his and Oreamuno’s contemporary, 
Seymour Menton, who consistently portrays Oreamuno’s psychologically focused 
approach to literature as anti-Tico: “Contraria a la reserva natural de los 
costarricenses, Yolanda Oreamuno expone los pensamientos y los sentimientos más 
íntimos de sus personajes” (Menton 29). 
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impresionó y finalmente prevaleció Joyce, cuyas huellas son palpables en ‘La ruta de 
su evasión’” (Bonilla 354). Bonilla specified that this was a frustrated manifestation, 
for Oreamuno was tragically unable to use interior monologue the way that Joyce was:  
 
 Se empeñó a retar a la vida y en superar, en el campo de las bellas letras, lo 
 que la vida no quiso darle. Y en esta empresa fue más allá de sus posibilidades. 
 En su primera obra de fuerza, la novela, ‘Tierra firme,’  se revelan sus grandes 
 condiciones y también sus limitaciones. La primera parte – sus recuerdos de 
 infancia, lo vivido y lo cierto – es excelente… La segunda parte, en la que se 
 aparta de su campo y ensaya la aventura conceptual, es muy inferior, como lo 
 es literariamente su segunda novela, ‘La ruta de su evasión. (Bonilla 354)  
 
These assertions aggravated the Costa Rican playwright Victoria Urbano, one of 
Oreamuno’s greatest devotees, both because Oreamuno routinely asserted that she had 
never read Joyce and because Urbano did not believe that Menton, at least, had ever 
read Tierra firme (Urbano 178). The novel had shared a prize for first place in the 
Hispanic American Writers Contest run by the New York publishing house Farrar & 
Rinehart, but Oreamuno had refused to let Farrar & Rinehart publish it and later 
denied knowledge of its fate.20 Quotes like Menton’s and Bonilla’s therefore suggest 
that some of Oreamuno’s harshest critics possessed only second hand familiarity with 
her novels. Meanwhile, their assertions constitute a masculine criticism that Oreamuno 
demonstrates sensitivity towards in a brief but intense correspondence that she 
exchanged with Victoria Urbano after the publication of La ruta de su evasión. Here, 
Oreamuno emphasizes the dichotomous responses her experiment in psychological 
fiction received from female and male audiences. Oreamuno: “Es curioso, pero la 
                                                
20 Lilia Ramos provides a succinct summary of this event. (168) Luz Ivette S. 
Martínez speculates about the current whereabouts of the novel. (58)  
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respuesta mejor a mi libro la he recibido hasta ahora de mujeres” (Urbano 191). 
Urbano accounts for this dichotomy in her 1968 monograph, Una escritora 
costarricense: Yolanda Oreamuno. Relying heavily on the work of her colleague, 
Costa Rican intellectual Lilia Ramos, she anticipates postmodern feminist critiques 
and judges that Oreamuno’s use of psychological narrative techniques such as stream 
of consciousness is justified by the inherent value of the project they successfully 
support, which is the verbal extraction of a tortured feminine subjectivity that achieves 
an unassailable opacity. Both Urbano and Ramos’s apologetic writing respond to a 
discourse about La ruta de su evasión that these women perceived as damaging to 
Oreamuno’s career.   
 
The Novel as a Whole: Relaying Discourse  
 
La ruta de su evasión is comprised of twenty three chapters. Some of these resemble 
short fiction. They tell self-contained stories from the perspective of a single character. 
Others possess a more novelistic quality. They refer to one another and their 
subdivisions correspond to shifts in perspective among multiple characters. The 
fragmented composition of the novel produces a phenomenon of “soledad en que (los 
personajes) están inmersos y … falta de solidaridad colectiva.” (Martínez 66) 
However, if it is true that the novel’s characters live immersed in a “mundo aislado 
con sus problemas particulares” (66), this does not preclude their feeling empathy for 
one another. Empathy, and ultimately an individualistic embrace of survival replace 
“todo ideal que les sirva (a los personajes) de aliciente para superar sus circunstancias 
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particulares” (67), thus marking the narrative as distinctly and self-consciously 
bourgeois. While this article focuses on the disintegration of Gabriel as a speaking 
subject, the novel as a whole can be summarized as a cycle of verbal disintegrations 
and integrations that propel empathy and engender survival; a sort of verbal, emotional 
and libidinal relay race.   
At the beginning of the novel, Gabriel is living at home with his father, Don 
Vasco, his ailing mother, Teresa, and his two brothers, Roberto and Álvaro. The 
brothers’ discourses and sexuality are dictated by their father, who prioritizes his sons 
according to their birth order. He has prepared his eldest, Roberto, to replace him as 
patriarch and has strategically neglected the other two. Roberto therefore speaks with 
authority and ridicule, although his discourse, which is stilted and over-determined by 
his obsession with healthy eating and physical fitness, is absurd. Roberto is also 
allowed to marry and bring his wife Cristina home with him. Alvaro, on the other 
hand, as the youngest brother, is laconic and is limited to expressing his sexuality 
through compulsive masturbation. Gabriel exists somewhere in between, a bookish 
young man who uses his literacy to spar with Roberto but who has difficulty speaking 
to his peers. The only interlocutor he has is his mother’s maid Aurora. However, 
Gabriel seems to disdain Aurora and resent that she understands him. Teresa herself 
speaks little but has a rich interior monologue.  
Of the three brothers, only Roberto survives his upbringing. After Cristina dies 
in childbirth, he begins to speak with acumen. He confronts Don Vasco, accuses him 
of terrorizing the family, then leaves the house forever. Alvaro, however, never 
acquires any proper discourse or sexuality and Gabriel eventually unravels, his 
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attempts at self-expression giving way to gibberish and finally muteness. His 
sexuality, which he attempts to express first to a student colleague, Elena, is frustrated, 
and he later capitulates to be with Aurora. Meanwhile, Teresa’s capacity for outer 
speech declines until the narration is confined to her interior monologue. Because 
Teresa has insight into her children’s experiences her discourse comes to resemble an 
omniscient narration. Teresa’s interior monologue disappears shortly after her death 
midway through the novel and her point of view is replaced by that of Aurora, who 
becomes a true protagonist. Aurora retains a clear memory of Teresa’s advice for 
constructing a happier life beyond the walls of the Vasco household. The novel ends 
after she witnesses Gabriel’s suicide, at which point she feels that she is able to apply 
these lessons.   
The novel largely neglects the perspective of Don Vasco. Consequently, he 
does not appear as a protagonist of the cycle described above but is completely 
identified with the environment, or house, where it takes place. Vasco is power 
demoperfecto. Although he possesses some stereotypically and even folklorically 
machista vices – he gets drunk and is also a philanderer – his most important 
characteristic is his empiricism. He is self-consciously and intelligently cruel and his 
cruelty always supports the project of maintaining bourgeois and patriotic 
respectability. It fortifies the household as a sovereign space, it procures the labor of 
the households’ female members and it assures its own uneven reproduction in his 
sons. Additionally, Don Vasco’s cruelty is an outlet for his own considerable 
creativity. On a day to day basis, he enjoys the creature comforts of bourgeois life, yet 
he also creatively contrives to turn those comforts into terrifying symbols for his 
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family. For instance, he provides better care for his dogs than for his children, a 
gesture that terrifies Teresa, who interprets it as a sign of the children’s disposability. 
Don Vasco’s representation of repressive, sterilizing power is further suggested by the 
fact that he engineers the exile of his friend Esteban, who is his wife’s only full 
conversational partner.  
Subsequently, I will present two scenes of linguistic violence from La ruta de 
su evasion. Both depict the linguistic sterilization of the character Gabriel. The order 
in which I present them reflects the order in which they are sequenced in the novel. 
The first is about a metaphorical readership. Gabriel will attempt to read his father in 
order to locate him in one of San Jose’s brothels. However, his reading will prove a 
futile activity. In order to explicate this scene I will introduce a new figure of 
language: subvocalization. The second scene is, in contrast, about the end of 
readership. Gabriel will be forced to put down a book and talk to a sexual partner. In 
this scene we will return to the figure of choteo. I will argue that Gabriel is subjected 
to a radicalized, perfected form of choteo identified with the automation of middle 
class, educated women. I will end this discussion by specifying the consequences of 
this sterilization.  
 
Scene 1: No, no quiero ir allí 
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In this scene, Gabriel practices a type of language that I understand, metaphorically, as 
a form of subvocalization. The term subvocalization has been appropriated from 
literacy studies. It is a figure cut from that field.21  
In literacy studies, subvocalization is the technical term that refers to what we 
commonly call ‘reading under one’s breath.’ This is different from ‘reading out loud.’ 
While reading under one’s breath means to speak, the person who reads under their 
breath does not speak to anyone else. A literal example would be a reader moving 
their lips, their mouth or even their throat muscles as they read, while not producing 
any audible sound. Furthermore, literacy studies has traditionally posited 
subvocalization as a rudimentary type of reading. On the one hand, pedagogues have 
encouraged subvocalization assuming that it belongs to an interstitial stage in the 
development of true literacy. On the other, pedagogues have discouraged and even 
punished subvocalization in order to ensure that this stage gives way to the next. 
According to this model, true literacy emerges as pupils’ subvocalizations are 
transformed into an interior monologue and is only fully accomplished as this interior 
monologue – occasionally considered an advanced form of subvocalization in its own 
right – becomes subjectively indistinguishable to the pupil from her own bare 
thoughts. The fluent reader, the critical reader, is a mind that is able to direct itself 
towards the meaning of the text she reads as a pure object. This philosophy has given 
                                                
21 The term subvocalization was originated in this context by Edmund Huey in 1908. 
Although, he originally refers to it as “inner pronunciation” or “inner speech.” Also 
related, is what Huey calls “word sound”: “The fact is that meaning is part and parcel 
of word-sound and word-utterance, as these ordinarily occur in reading and thinking.” 
(164). 
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way to certain harms. It has inspired some truly brutal pedagogical techniques, 
including techniques such as gagging the reader to prevent subvocalization.22  
The scene begins with an interpellation. Gabriel’s older brother, Roberto, calls 
to him, “Gabriel, ve a buscar a papá” (9), and Gabriel responds, not verbally, but 
physically by starting to walk. This physical response is a total physical response. A 
narrator states that Gabriel walks without thinking, empty of thought, “Camina mucho 
rato. Vacío de pensamientos” (10). At the same time, the narration conducts a 
phenomenology of the total physical response.23 First, between its utterance and 
Gabriel’s corresponding movement, the phrase “ve a buscar a papá” seems to 
reverberate. This is effected, above all, through the repetition of the line within 
Gabriel’s inner monologue. Gabriel thinks, “Gabriel, ve a buscar a papa, eso fue todo. 
¿Por qué yo y no él?” (9). Most importantly, this interpolating phrase is suggested as 
having special content. For, although Roberto does not tell Gabriel which way to go to 
look for their father, Gabriel thinks that Roberto’s voice seems to signal without 
mentioning this content, “Tiene su voz una nota y su gesto una intención que parecen 
señalar crudamente el camino sin mencionarlo. ¿Por qué pienso esto? ¿Por qué pienso 
que es eso?” (9). 
                                                
22 “It is a common myth that subvocalization – or more technically, covert speech 
behavior – retards reading proficiency. Some teachers have attempted to prevent 
subvocalization by taping lips or filling the mouths of pupils with marbles, by 
wrapping the tongue around a pencil and so forth. However, such efforts to inhibit 
subvocalization are futile, for the speech musculature still responds during silent 
reading even when so inhibited” (Corsini 258).  
23 Total physical response is a pedagogic concept. Conceptualized by James Asher, the 
total physical response represents the interiorization through movement of a language 
first encountered outside the body (Asher 3 - 17).   
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For Gabriel, the way to go will mean speaking realistically about the power 
structures that exist in his home. Specifically, Gabriel will have to describe his father.  
This is determined when, after walking for some time, Gabriel gets in a taxi. At 
this moment, Gabriel is mute. It is the driver who must speak first and ask him where 
he wants to go: “Toma un coche, y cuando el chofer pregunta la dirección, su turbada 
cara es para el experto la mejor respuesta. Lo mira. Repite la pregunta” (12). 
Gabriel responds, “No, no quiero ir allí” (12). 
This response interrupts what would have been a natural discourse between 
Gabriel and the cabbie. Effectively, the cabbie has asked Where do you want to go? 
and Gabriel has replied, No I don’t want to go there. There is a critical non-
correspondence between the interrogative where and the referential pronoun there.   
Only the effect if not the sense of Gabriel’s response can be appreciated upon 
comparing the original phrase “no quiero ir allí” with the subsequent clarifying 
statement that Gabriel proffers, “Dije mal. Si quiero ir ahí, pero no soy yo él que 
quiere” (12). Gabriel does not want to go “allí” but does want to go “ahí.” He wants to 
go, but it is not him who wants. The negation and the affirmation cancel one another 
out and we are left only with the deictic and subjective twinnings: allí/ahí and yo/él. 
These twinnings stand in for an implicit desire which is also a destination: The father’s 
desire and the brothel where he fulfills it.   
This is not yet an integrated discourse that anticipates Gabriel’s 
subvocalization.   
The cabbie offers to take Gabriel to a brothel, but Gabriel has not the slightest 
clue as to which of San José’s brothels his father might have retreated to. The cabbie 
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therefore elicits a description of Don Vasco from Gabriel for the purpose of 
determining, based on the man’s character, which brothel they should try first.   
The nature of this exchange belies Victoria Urbano’s claim that Oreamuno’s 
“literatura urbana” (Urbano: 56) does not configure human misery within economic 
relationships, for there is a strong economic dimension to this exchange. First, both 
Gabriel and the taxista are strongly concerned with the idea that speech can be 
quantified as insufficient, sufficient or excessive within an economic schema. Gabriel, 
for instance, is worried that he will say too much: “Otra vez estoy diciendo más de lo 
necesario… Mis palabras salen por si solas. Esto es lo que menos quería decir, y lo he 
dicho” (13). Meanwhile, the cabbie needs Gabriel to describe his father in enough 
detail so that he can be sure to avoid the right brothels long enough to take all of 
Gabriel’s money: “Después de todo es un buen negocio; toda la noche rodar… Lo 
llevaré primero allí en donde seguramente no está. Si lo conociera… Si me lo pudiera 
pintar” (13). In this way, storytelling is configured as an economic loss for the 
storyteller and as an economic gain for his listener.  
Additionally, Gabriel worries about the impropriety of his speech. That is both 
the possibility that in describing his father he will say something inappropriate and 
that he will express a thought that is not proper to him, Gabriel: “¡Maldita sea! Ya me 
pierdo, estoy diciendo cosas que no entiende nadie. Y siento que diré cosas peores” 
(12). This worry intensifies as Gabriel senses that the inquiries of the taxista are 
provoking him. When the taxi driver asks Gabriel, “¿Cómo es su padre?” (13), 
Gabriel’s inner voice responds, “¿Qué cómo es él? ¿Qué tendrá que ver esto con que 
lo encontremos? Nunca había pensado antes cómo es él. Lo he sentido. Algo así como 
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un peso encima. Pero no lo recuerdo. Veo la casa… Pero no él. Sé como es. Veo las 
palabras con letras que corresponden a su fisonomía. Pero no puedo ver su cara” (14).  
Here is the crux of the problem: the words with the letters that correspond to the 
father’s physiognomy. Gabriel’s inner voice reflects upon these: “Palabras, palabras 
de consonantes y vocales, sonidos, oídas dentro, formuladas afuera” (14).  
Two things are happening for Gabriel at this moment. Both involve a struggle 
of perception that is, basically, a struggle to bring into focus a figure against its 
background. This is taking place both on the level of Gabriel’s imagination of his 
house and on the level of his discourse about his father. Gabriel must constitute the 
figure of his father by recognizing in him the qualities that he is as yet only able to 
recognize in the house. Though he knows, preternaturally, that these qualities are 
already his father’s. For Gabriel, this is a literary experience. These qualities are 
subdivided into words and letters. Bringing them from the house and into the father 
will be like hearing the words on the page, a subvocalization. 
This is the fullest, most complete reading of Don Vasco that Gabriel comes to 
express:  
 
 Es arrogante, violento, le gusta que le obedezcan. Se hace obedecer. Es… 
 ¿Cómo le dijera…? Es vanidoso. Se preocupa mucho de su propia persona. No 
 se preocupa nada de los demás. Nunca ha dicho a qué sitios va ni nadie se 
 atrevería en la casa a preguntárselo. Ni cuando regresa. Creo que le preocupa 
 mucho, muchísimo, lo que los demás, que no son de la familia, piensan de él. 
 Me parece que siempre está tratando de aparentar lo que no tiene, lo que no es. 
 Con los extraños es muy generoso, muy cortés; con nosotros es duro, i
 mplacable. No tiene compasión de nosotros. Nunca demuestra nada. ¡Es cruel! 
 ¡Oh! ¡Es muy cruel! (14) 
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The question is whether Gabriel is able to interiorize this reading and become an 
accomplished reader after this subvocalization.  
Gabriel is able to internalize the content of this reading with mixed success:  
On the one hand, he feels alienated by his own words: “Nunca me las hubiera dicho ni 
a mí mismo” (15). On the other, he now judges that the words are sufficient: “Nada 
sobra. Es así” (15). The sufficiency of Gabriel’s speech is proven by his acquisition of 
a distasteful but realistic idea of his father. “¿Pero es que para hacer una pintura 
realista de él debo recurrir a ideas tan desagradables?” (15). 
In this way Gabriel comes to partially repair his subvocalization, transforming 
it into a genuine reading.  However, the majority of the chapter that opens with this 
scene actually takes place after these linguistic accomplishments. What concerns us, 
then, are their consequences, which include an apparent and paradoxical self-betrayal 
on the part of the now speaking subject, Gabriel.   
As the night wears on, Gabriel begins to express what originally he could not 
stand to read in his father: a sadistic misogyny. This expression is at first practiced. 
The first time that Gabriel visits a cantina during his search, he thinks to himself about 
the women there, “Yo no vengo a golpear, vengo a buscar a mi padre, debieran 
saberlo, no quiero que estas mujeres piensen que vengo a golpearlas; no le pegaría a 
alguien atado … ellas están atadas” (19). However, later in the evening, Gabriel does 
sleep with and beat a prostitute: “¿Era eso tocar? ¿Era eso golpear?” (24). Later on, 
this expression is articulated. In the last cantina he visits, Gabriel issues a discourse 
that is properly his father’s: “¿Para qué sirve el cariño? Que se me … odie … y respete 
… así es mejor … Siempre se lo digo … Como a ti … Es … una idea… mía” (25). 
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Confirming that Gabriel is now a quoting, rather than a speaking subject, at the end of 
this vignette there is a shift in subjectivity. In a nearly singular instance, Don Vasco 
appears as a protagonist and it is through his ears that we hear Gabriel. Don Vasco 
recognizes the appropriation of his own discourse and becomes enraged. However, his 
rage does not stem from a feeling that he is being mimicked. Rather, Don Vasco feels 
that, along with words that might have been his, his philosophy has been appropriated: 
“¡Y ese imbécil se permite exponer como suya la idea del respeto!” (26). His 
subsequent punishment of Gabriel, whom he drags out of the cantina and back home, 
can be taken as a sort of anti-pedagogy. Don Vasco has preempted Gabriel from 
interiorizing a philosophy from which he, Don Vasco, derives power.  
 
Scene II: Te voy a contestar todas las preguntas que probablemente intentas hacerme 
 
This second scene portrays the development of a sexual relationship between Gabriel 
and his schoolmate, Elena Viales. Educated, outwardly articulate and sexually 
assertive, Elena is a foil for all of the female characters that belong to the Vasco 
household. More importantly, Elena has been suggested by critics as an avatar for 
Yolanda Oreamuno herself. Victoria Urbano, alluding to Yolanda’s practice of signing 
her work simply “YO” wrote, “Con el personaje de Elena tenemos ya una visión 
completa de ese YO interior de la autora que actúa en el mundo de sus ficciones” 
(145). Urbano also believed that Elena was an aspirational figure in a general sense: 
“La única que parece luchar por su libertad es Elena” (145). More recently, Herbert E. 
Craig, writing on the history of the psychological novel in Latin America after Proust 
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has posited that if Elena was supposed to be an aspirational figure, she still invokes 
Oreamuno’s internalized chauvinism towards Latin American women, “(Elena’s 
father)… was of French origin and very wealthy. Dissatisfied with the submissiveness 
of Hispanic women in general and of his criolla wife in particular, he raised Elena as a 
free spirit and he encouraged her whims. Here we can see one aspect of Oreamuno’s 
critique of timid women, but also a facet of her own personality, which struggled to be 
free” (Craig: 103).   
A close reading of Elena’s discursive practice, however, supports a very 
different understanding of the character. Elena is the novel’s most accomplished 
practitioner of choteo. She calls a spade a spade, encountering the discourse of others 
with radical objectivity and yet with zero respect. As a choteadora, Elena stands as an 
unparalleled destructive force in the novel and chief agent of the linguistic sterilization 
of Gabriel.   
We first meet Elena when she interrupts Gabriel as he is reading: “¿Qué lees?” 
(110). Gabriel then reflects on the harm these words have caused: “Como ya nadie 
aquí le habla, por estar habituados a su silencio, Gabriel la mira con la sorpresa de 
quien ha sido despertado en la profundidad de un sueño. La sorpresa tiene grados ... 
como en las quemaduras, quemadura de tercer grado. La de tercero, es porque ella no 
lo conoce” (111). 
Gabriel does not respond to Elena’s question aloud. Instead, his inner voice 
responds by formulating its own questions, “Debe de ser de segundo curso, porque las 
mujeres nunca pasan del segundo curso, a menos que sean muy feas … aunque sean 
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inteligentes no pasan de ahí, les da miedo. En medicina, porque el profesor de 
anatomía hace preguntas ofensivas” (113).  
 At the same time that Gabriel’s inner voice formulates these questions, Elena 
states that repeating oneself is a liability of women. She tells Gabriel that she will not 
repeat herself. Instead, she repeats Gabriel’s thoughts for him: “te voy a contestar 
todas las preguntas que probablemente intentas hacerme: estudio medicina, estoy en el 
cuarto curso; no me dieron miedo en el primero las preguntas de los profesores … les 
di yo miedo a ellos” (114).  
In this way, Gabriel’s inner voice pairs with Elena’s outer voice in a curious 
fashion. Whatever Gabriel thinks to himself Elena later articulates. The result is a 
redundancy on the level of discourse similar to quotation. Gabriel’s interior 
monologue reappears inside of Elena’s direct discourse, but Elena’s monologued 
dialogue (to invert a phrase used by Urbano, monólogo dialogado24) also mirrors 
subvocalization. Subvocalization, as we have seen in the case of Gabriel, is a 
discourse that represents a skip: The elimination of a moment of necessary encounter 
between the subject and the content of his discourse. Elena’s monologued dialogue 
also represents a skip. Yet this is not a skip necessary to the production of an 
ontological subject predicated upon the content of his discourse. Rather, this is a skip 
necessary to the production of a social subject. By cold reading Gabriel, Elena takes 
the upper hand and deprives Gabriel of the chance to emerge as a conversational 
subject. 
                                                
24  Urbano uses this term to refer to Oreamuno’s use of the second person to create 
interior monologue for her characters.  
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At this point, Elena invites Gabriel to conduct an autopsy with her. Gabriel 
silently consents and the two move to a private autopsy bay that Elena’s father has had 
built for her in their home. Here, Gabriel and Elena find a body already laid out for 
them but covered by a sheet. As Elena invites Gabriel to see the body and folds backs 
the sheet Gabriel thinks about peeling a fruit. The body is revealed to be that of an 
Indian woman.  
The autopsy itself is narrated entirely by Gabriel’s inner voice, which uses the 
future tense. “En ese vientre entrarán su bisturí y el mío, y se encontrarán sobre la 
misma herida que ya no va a sangrar... En esta inútil violación, el olor corrompido de 
la india muerta llegará directamente a su nariz que no ha de notarlo, y a la mía que 
insistirá por encontrar, no el olor del cadáver, sino el olor de ella”  (119). Here, the 
future tense represents the dispersal of Gabriel’s desire for Elena. With the body 
present, this is a triangulated desire. “(Elena) estará a un lado y yo al otro, y entre los 
dos, quedará el vientre de la muerta, su vientre de seguro fértil” (120). 
During the autopsy, Gabriel chooses to dissect the woman’s skin. His interior 
monologue explicates this choice:  
 
 Yo prefiero mirar de cerca esta piel melosa … quiero mirar en la célula la 
 reacción del sol y adivinar en cada poro el pueblo de su nacimiento; si la 
 quemó la sol de altura o la doró bochorno de costa, quiero ver si es india de 
 casta noble, porque entonces tendrá el poro fino, y no faltará ni sobrará una 
 sola capa en su piel perfecta, y la grasa debajo será blanca … y suave. (120)  
 
Inscribing inherently insignificant subphenotypical traits in a mythic historical 
narrative, this explication parodies a folkloric discourse. Elena will in short order 
extract this discourse from Gabriel.  
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 After the autopsy, Elena takes Gabriel into her salon, where she offers him 
what she preternaturally knows to be his first glass of whiskey. She tells him not to 
dissimulate this. Then she tells him something unprecedented: As a scientist, she is not 
able to think or speak the way that she knows that he is able to think and speak. That 
is, she is not able to think or speak abstractly. “Puedo entender (el pensamiento 
abstracto) pero no puedo llegar a él por mi misma” (126). Elena uses this confession 
as a pretext to exhort Gabriel to model abstract thought for her. What was he thinking, 
for instance, as they were performing the autopsy?  
It is under these conditions that Gabriel repeats himself, or his own interior 
monologue. At the same time, he tries to challenge Elena’s preternatural knowledge of 
him:  
 ¿Recuerdas que te dije yo escojo la piel? Habrás que saber que lo hice porque 
 esperaba encontrar allí el síntoma de alguna curiosa enfermedad. Estabas 
 equivocada … Pensé que la piel tenía un color prieto, y que bajo ella, la grasa 
 sería más blanca … yo escogí la piel; no para encontrar allí la rara enfermedad 
 ... sino para mirar en el grano de esa piel la casta, y en el color de esa piel el 
 pueblo de su nacimiento. (128) 
 
Here Gabriel probably comes closest to assuming the role of a proper speaking subject 
who is able to exteriorize his thoughts. This is true even if the tiresome way in which 
his interior monologue now reappears inside his direct discourse hints at some 
persistent organic pathos. And Gabriel will try to leverage the momentum he acquires 
during this exposition to finally overwhelm Elena. The chapter ends as Gabriel, having 
adopted some of Elena’s candor, her “descaro” (127), threatens his colleague with a 
passionate kiss: “Voy a besarte” (135).  
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 Elena, however, deflects and deflates this threat. Before he can make such 
declarations, she tells him, “Tienes que saber cuál es tu deseo. Y yo te lo voy a decir 
para que te familiarices con él” (134). His project, she affirms, is not to kiss but to 
humiliate her. “Tu deseo no era besarme, o si lo era, por encima de este estaba el de 
humillarme” (134). Furthermore, Elena clarifies that Gabriel has sabotaged his project 
by speaking before kissing. “(Humillarme) lo conseguías con la palabra más que con 
el gesto. Por eso hablaste. Oye esto, Gabriel, y no lo olvides nunca: casi todo lo que es 
verdad es silencio. Casi todo” (136). In this way, Elena not only affirms that she 
remains closer to the source of Gabriel’s discourse than does Gabriel himself, but also 
asserts her own non-proficiency in abstract thought as the source of her superiority and 
greater power.  
 Elena, far from representing a complete vision of Yolanda Oreamuno’s YO 
interior, has no interiority. She is supplied by the narration only with a direct 
discourse patterned off of the interior monologue of Gabriel. However, this is not the 
imitation by one who is less powerful of someone more powerful. Nor is it the 
imitation of one who mimics or cajoles as an act of resistance or dissension. Nor is it 
even the verbally violent act of one who seeks to humiliate another through mocking. 
Rather, Elena, as mimic, is the blunt tool of a larger, sterilizing verbal violence.  
In fact, Elena Viales appears as a sort of Frankenstein’s monster, pieced 
together and animated by a single, masculine, human creator: her father, Fernando 
Viales, is a perfect representation of the “emigrado politico” that Oreamuno wrote 
about in “El ambiente Tico”, who is neutralized by means of indiscriminate toleration. 
He is a French expatriate whose radical positivism has flourished, unchecked, in Costa 
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Rica acogedora. Viales claims that Elena is his sole and intentional creation. She has 
no mother, he claims. She is a “criatura transitoria,” (218) or intermediate species, that 
he alone has created as part of a process of preparation for the emergence of a final 
creation which will be “un tipo nuevo de mujer consciente” (218). She possesses in 
part the capacity to be useful and happy that that late species of woman will possess in 
full.  
Adolfo Castañón has described succinctly, but accurately, the wholly 
inappropriate relationship that Fernando Viales has with his daughter. Castañón 
suggests that Mr. Viales’ dedication to Elena’s formation as a scientist constitutes a 
form of intellectual grooming that parallels sexual grooming: “Elena Viales, la joven 
rica, estudiante de medicina, ha sido educada, modelada por su padre, don Fernando, 
como una obra de arte de la mentalidad emancipada; es una hija dizque superior a 
cualquier hombre y prometida implícitamente al incesto” (220). Castañón’s invocation 
of incest is supported by the way that Elena and Gabriel’s relationship ends. In a key 
moment coming late in the novel, Elena’s father approaches Gabriel and invites him, 
explicitly, to have sex with his daughter. However, he requests that Gabriel refrain 
from asking Elena for her hand in marriage. He tells Gabriel that the capacity for even 
partial happiness, for even rudimentary usefulness, that he has instilled in Elena is not 
yet so ingrained in her that it could not be sabotaged by the sensibilities that marriage 
and the reproductive duties entailed by the institution imply.  
This scene hints at the fetish of cuckoldry, which is treated throughout La ruta 
de su evasión as a sadistic rather than a masochistic perversion. For instance, earlier in 
the novel, Gabriel’s own father, realizing that his friend Esteban and wife Teresa are 
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in love, invites Esteban to visit the household on a weekly basis to hold talking dates 
with Teresa. The dates are proposed as a type of conversation therapy for Teresa. By 
speaking regularly with Esteban, whom Don Vasco judges to be level-headed, free of 
any neurosis, the neurotic Teresa should learn confidence and psychic poise. Of 
course, the subtext of this invitation is that Gabriel’s father wishes to torture both 
parties by forcing them into poignant proximity. We shouldn’t consider that this act 
has any masochistic overtones because Don Vasco feels no love for his wife and is not 
jealous of his friend. Moreover, he can be confident that by lending their conversation 
his seal of approval, it will be neutralized; and in fact, the neutralization of Esteban’s 
conversation is symbolically echoed in his eventual exile from Costa Rica. Similarly, 
when Elena’s father invites Gabriel to have sex with his daughter, the stipulation that 
the relationship should have only a recreational aim ironically ensures that it can never 
become a source of true jouissance. Elena, far from occupying a space of productive 
struggle, dwells in a netherworld of perfected, penetrating but ultimately sterile and 
sterilizing physical and conversational intercourse.   
 
Consequences of Language Violence 
 
We have now witnessed two scenes of verbal violence. In the first, the character 
Gabriel proffers a critical direct discourse about his father without developing a 
corresponding interior monologue. This results in his self-betrayal and in an anti-
pedagogic disciplinary action enacted by the father. In the second, the character Elena 
Viales draws Gabriel’s interior monologue out from him or exposes it before him, 
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with monstrous surgical precision. Both these instances represent dysfunctional forms 
of discourse on a formal level as they work to de-sequence the temporality, spatiality 
and subjectivity of discourse that makes it productive. Here thought does not precede 
discourse, speech can exist outside of the speaker before it has to be found within, and 
an aggressor can impose herself between another person and his own speech. 
However, the dysfunctionality of Gabriel’s discourse is also proven by his ultimate 
destiny in the novel. In the end, he sets up house with one of his family’s domestic 
servants, Aurora. Yet this is not a proper elopement. The unmarried, cohabiting couple 
does not pretend to carry out the typical, productive operations that would sustain a 
household and that, in the absence of a formal contract of marriage, most fully signify 
defiance. Only Aurora works. Gabriel, meanwhile, disappears into a reverie in which 
there resounds a single utterance: the Aztec word Tzintzuntzan. The word is not 
supplied with any referent inside the diegesis. Extra-diegetically it is the name of a 
Michoacán town and the name of an Aztec hummingbird deity (Urbano: 202). But 
these facts are not provided by the text of the novel: "Que quiere decir esta palabra que 
se me mete ahora en el pensamiento? ... Averiguaré qué quiere decir. Más tarde" 
(314).25 In the text, the phrase is a sort of artifact discourse, part of a verbal landscape 
rather than a proper discourse. Gabriel repeats this word seventy-four times before 
                                                
25 Gabriel promises repeatedly to look the word up but never does. This fact suggests 
and underscores the idea that the folkloric is displaced from the present. It is relegated 
to an archive constructed in the past and is accessible only in a future that, at least for 
Gabriel, doesn’t exist.  
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Aurora finally concedes to shoot him in the head. Gabriel, before death, becomes a 
sort of costumbrista, a solipsistic appropriator of local color. Here, in the end, 
Oreamuno tips her hat at her folklorist contemporaries, maybe throwing them a bone 
or maybe making fun. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 AFTERWARD 
SERGIO RAMIREZ QUOTES YOLANDA OREAMUNO  
             
Sabía ponerse siempre en singular, ser ella. Desde muy niña, me decía, se afligía al 
imaginar que podría llegar a ser una mujer insignificante, perdida en la chatura del 
ambiente, ser parte del plural, extraviarse en los vericuetos de la medianía. Por eso 
mismo firmaba con una A las dedicatorias de sus libros, sus cartas, las acuarelas y 
óleos de pequeño formato que pintó. La A de Amanda, pero también la primera letra 
del alfabeto. (171) 
 
    -  Marina Carmona in Sergio Ramírez’s La fugitiva  
 
  
 In La Fugitiva Sergio Ramírez calls Yolanda Oreamuno, Amanda Solano. He 
replaces Yo with Am. Yolanda used to sign her work with her initials, which happen to 
spell out both the first syllable of her first name, and the Spanish first person singular 
pronoun, yo. A bold gesture by a female writer prioritizing her own ego. Ramírez 
translates this prefix as Am, or Ama. A is the first letter in the alphabet. Am is the 
English first person singular conjugation of the verb to be. Ama is the Spanish third 
person singular conjugation of the verb to love in Spanish. A frequent criticism of La 
Fugitiva is that it only gives voice to those who knew Yolanda, Amanda, Oreamuno, 
Solano and never to the woman herself. But at the moment that Ramírez translates her 
name he quotes her. 
 The last page of the novel proffers a disclaimer, “Esta novela es una obra de 
ficción. Todos los personajes y situaciones han sido inventados y se deben a la 
imaginación del autor”, which Stephen Henighan cites when he calls, “the relationship 
between history and fiction in La fugitiva … problematic.” But, as in the case of 
testimonio, this relationship is once again not complicated. Ramírez’s disclaimer is not 
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a theoretically informed reflection on the way that diegetic fiction, in describing its 
subject, changes it. It is a relatively strait forward speech act: With it the author 
preemptively dismisses any legal charge that might be brought against him for injuring 
a real person, or their descendants.    
 Ramírez has good reason to be concerned. In 1992, he was sued by Ramiro 
Gurdian for defaming the Gurdian family in his novel Castigo Divino, which had been 
produced as a telenovela in Colombia and has been proximadamente para salir in 
Nicaragua before the claim. Castigo Divino tells the story of Oliverio Casteneda, a law 
student who seduced three, and may have murdered two Nicaraguan debutantes in the 
1930s. Ramírez’s novel is, like many novelas policiacas, an indictment of positivism. 
Castaneda is either a coldblooded Don Juan, or, potentially, a victim of a civil 
conspiracy. Gurdian was a descendent of one of the families whose daughter, and 
honor, was skewered by Casteneda.  Gurdian, an hacendero referred to 
euphemistically as a “businessman” throughout the 1980s by the New York Times, 
had also organized anti-Sandinista protests from the US while Ramírez was vice-
president.26 
Still, Sergio Ramírez addresses the mendacity of the novel, and specifically, 
the Latin American novel, in two long essays: Mentiras verdaderas (2001) and El 
viejo arte de mentir (2004); which he samples in his monograph, Señor de los tristes, 
Sobre Escritores y Escrituras (2006).27 Taking his cue from Mario Vargas Llosa, 
                                                
26 See Stephen Kinzer’s “Managua Journal; At Home, the Sandinistas Face a 
Businesslike Foe” in the New York Times, Published: July 29, 1988  
27 Ramírez, Sergio. Señor de los tristes : Sobre Escritores Y Escritura. San Juan, P.R.: 
Editorial de la Universidad de Puerto Rico , 2006. 
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Ramírez says that diegetic fiction is unnatural to Latin America. Consequently, Latin 
America remains partial to “la Historia con mayúscula”, a kind of diegetic fiction that 
would replace the crónica or the nueva historia in republican Latin America, after 
novels were decriminalized. 28 This is “Historia (que) se vuelve dramática para las 
vidas privadas cuando es capaz de afectarlas, quiéranlo o no los protagonistas, que se 
ven obligados a moverse, y a cambiar sus destinos, no como ellos quisieran, sino como 
el phatos de la vida pública quiere.” (73)29  
Here, Ramírez is also clearly in dialogue with Mario Vargas Llosa, who, in his 
1998 essay, La verdad de las mentiras, affirmed that people write and read novels so 
that they can live the lives that they are not reconciled to not having lived.30 But 
Ramírez fruther proposing that the novel appears in Latin America at a relatively late 
date not as a kind of text that imagines an alternative private life for people, but as one 
                                                
28 Although Ramírez doesn’t say it, it is clear that he is informed by Vargas Llosa, 
who described colonial Latin America as a world devoid of diegetic fiction: “Los 
inquisidores españoles … prohibieron que se publicaran o importaran novelas en las 
colonias hispanoamericanas con el argumento de que esos libros disparatados y 
absurdos —es decir, mentirosos— podían ser perjudiciales para la salud espiritual de 
los indios. Por esta razón, los hispanoamericanos sólo leyeron ficciones de 
contrabando durante trescientos años y la primera novela que, con tal nombre, se 
publicó en la América española apareció sólo después de la independencia (en 
México, en 1816). Al prohibir no unas obras determinadas sino un género literario en 
abstracto, el Santo Oficio estableció algo que a sus ojos era una ley sin excepciones: 
que las novelas siempre mienten, que todas ellas ofrecen una visión falaz de la vida. 
Hace años escribí un trabajo ridiculizando a esos arbitrarios, capaces de una 
generalización semejante. Ahora pienso que los inquisidores españoles fueron acaso 
los primeros en entender” (Vargas Llosa, La Verdad de las mentiras). 
29 This sentence appears originally in Mentiras Verdaderas and then is sampled, in a 
different context, in Senor de los tristes. The difference is that in Mentiras Verdaderas 
Ramírez compares imaginative fiction with fantastic fiction. This distinction, 
apparently, is less important to him in the latter text.  
30 “(Las novelas) se escriben y se leen para que los seres humanos tengan las vidas que 
no se resignan a no tener.” (Vargas Llosa)  
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that defines private life, by demonstrating how an interrupting phatos31, or being 
spoken, frustrates or radically affirms it. Examples of frustrations abound: Revolution, 
Migration and Persecution ad nauseum. Examples of affirmations are more ephemeral 
and therefore more intriguing to speculate about (Ramírez doesn’t give specific 
examples): perhaps la novela de dictador is one, because in it, all of the ascendant 
politician’s desires are fulfilled, although usually, with unforeseen consequences.  
 In either case, Ramírez says, the pressure exerted on, or the removal of 
pressure from the volition of characters, inside of an historical context, defines the 
novel form in Latin America.  
 
 Sometimes there is a fine line between appropriation and accident. Literary 
critics writing about La Fugitiva have used the same words as those writing about 
Mario Vargas Llosa’s El Paraíso en la otra esquina, which is the topic of Chapter III. 
Specifically, the word paraíso. Nathalie Besse: “Al leer esta novela nos percatamos de 
que Amanda Solano cristaliza elementos de la vida y de la personalidad del mismo 
Sergio Ramírez, es decir que aquel tiempo huido en busca del cual sale el escritor 
puede ser su propio paraíso perdido: el de las grandes aspiraciones sociales … la 
«utopía compartida» (Ramírez 1999: 14).” 
 This is very similar to what Efraín Kristal writes about the concept of paradise 
and the way that characters in El Paraíso reflect elements of Vargas Llosa’s failures: 
“In The Way to Paradise”, (Vargas Llosa) presents his fanatical protagonists with … 
                                                
31 From the Greek phemi. See page 189 of Joseph H Greenberg’s Universals of Human 
Language. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1978.  
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greater empathy and less distance from his own … political experiences. Indeed, there 
is a clear parallel between Vargas Llosa’s fictional account of Flora Tristán’s 
courageous but failed attempt to launch a political movement … and his 
autobiographical account, A Fish in the Water (El pez en el agua, 1993) (Kristal, 135; 
See also 137 for details).32  
 But extant criticism on El Paraíso did not necessarily influence criticism on La 
fugitiva. Ramírez begins his own novel with an epigraph by Proust that invokes 
paradise: “Los verdaderos paraísos son los paraísos que hemos perdido. El tiempo 
recobrado”. And Ramírez’s situation is, superficially, very similar to that of Vargas 
Llosa. Both lost the election for the presidency of their respective countries prior to 
writing these novels. Both authored political memoirs to process their losses: 
Ramírez’s is titled Adiós Muchachos (1999). And both Paraíso and Fugitiva take a 
step back from Peru or Nicaragua, and represent foreign milieus: France and Costa 
Rica.  
 In this criticism, which evokes criticism on El paraíso en la otra esquina, 
Ramírez’s readers cope with, try to explain, the absence of a beloved character from 
La Fugitiva: Nicaragua. When La Fugitiva was published, some readers were 
alienated by what they perceived as Ramírez’s retreat from Nicaraguan politics: “(La 
Fugitiva’s) emphasis on Costa Rican history attracted adverse commentary. Defending 
this trait of the novel in an interview … Ramírez stated: “El lector debe disponer de 
                                                
32 Sabine Koelman concurs with both Dieter Oelker and Efraín Kristal: “El Paraíso is 
not only a fictionalized double biography but also an “autobiographical fiction” (for 
Vargas Llosa) representing the various facets of the ‘Utopian desire’ and its 
frustrations.” (Koelman, 245)  
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elementos fundamentales de la historia de Costa Rica. No es un paisaje abstracto. 
(Henighan, 170)33 Readers conflate the trajectory of the narrator with that of the 
Nicaraguan dissident, who time and time again, retreats to Costa Rica.  
 In his own perspicacious reading of La Fugitiva, Henighan argues that 
Nicaragua is still here: The novel is constructed as a biography inside of an 
autobiography, allowing Ramírez to stage an intimate confrontation between 
Nicaraguan and Costa Rican identity. The narrator is Sergio Ramírez, a famous author 
who has written a novel titled Tiempo de fulgor. When he goes to Costa Rica to 
interview a girlhood friend of Yolanda Oreamuno, Gloria Tinoco, he recognizes 
himself in the Nicaraguan domestic worker that staffs her household:  
  
 The complicity between these two Nicaraguans who belong to opposite sides 
 of the social gulf cleaved by transnational capital relegates Nicaraguan 
 nationality to the status of a secret code. The woman … (who) has been 
 transnationalized as cheap labour, and the famous man who appears on 
 television and has been transnationalized as a cultural celebrity, share a husk of 
 national identity that they can admit to one another but that is no longer viable 
 in the public sphere and is looked down upon by their Costa Rican hosts. By 
 the same token the narrator’s  consecration by television as an authority figure 
 relieves him of the need to retail his past position as a revolutionary leader; his 
 transnational celebrity as a writer reinscribes his masculine identity within the 
 cultural contours of the new millennium. (674)  
 
I would add to Henighan’s precise reading of this encounter, that it is intensified by 
the apriori status of the domestic worker in Gloria Tinoco’s home. Tinoco echoing 
                                                
33 Also see Juan Murrillo: Se echa de menos en esta novela, considerando la licencia 
artística que asume Ramírez, que no se escuche la propia voz de Yolanda Oreamuno, o 
más aún, su interioridad  como ella misma lo hiciera magistralmente con sus propios 
personajes de novela. Tampoco se explora su faceta de escritora que es, finalmente, el 
mérito en el que debería descansar su fama. (670, partially cited by Stephen Henighan)  
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Oreamuno writing sarcastically about Costa Rican hospitalidad (see Chapter 1) tells 
Ramírez: “Usted ya sabe, por todo el tiempo que vivió en Costa Rica, que casi nunca 
nos prestamos para invitaciones sociales; somos poco para eso, y por eso nos critican 
los demás centroamericanos, ¿no es cierto?” (22) Her insistence on the Costa Rican 
home as a space reserved for family buts up against the ubiquitous presence of the 
foreign woman.34 
 But, while it is true that, through the figure of the maid, Nicaragua becomes a 
subject of La fugitiva, it is not true that, as Henighan has claimed, La fugitiva has an 
“announced ideology” which is “(a) transnational identity, that of liberal feminism” 
(669). This is never a subject for Ramírez, whose novel actually evinces the sardonic 
sexual identity politics of Oreamuno. La fugitiva belies its own publicity: which 
suggests that it is an exploration of the writer’s life, which was more laden with 
tension than her writing.  
 
The three witnesses: 
 
                                                
34 Henighan also clarifies that Nicaraguan identity is reintroduced at the end of 
Ramírez’s narrative, with the introduction of a character named Salomón de la Selva, 
who is based on the Nicaraguan poet. One of Sergio Ramírez’s few blatant conceits as 
a novelist is to imagine that Oreamuno and Salomón de la Selva were lovers in 
Mexico City, and that de la Selva paid for her burial when she died. While the two did 
coincide in Mexico City, they never met. But Henighan claims that Salomón de la 
Selva’s introduction underscores the idea that “future Central American artists who 
hope to establish themselves will need to do so under the rubric of being “Mexicans.” 
This theme dominates the final pages, displacing the liberal-feminist claims of a 
woman’s right to independence that are La fugitiva’s announces ideology” (678).   
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In La Fugitiva, Sergio Ramírez dialogues with three women, characters who 
bear a supersensuous resemblance to extra-diegetic subjects who positioned 
themselves very differently in relationship to a feminine Tican diaspora.  
Gloria Tinoco is a pseudonym for Vera Tinoco Rodríguez, who was Yolanda’s 
classmate at El Colegio Superior de Señoritas, and later married into the family of 
two-time Costa Rican president Rafael Yglesias y Castro. Tinoco is, herself, doubly 
Tican. She was born in Costa Rica, left briefly in her late teens, and then returned, 
rejecting the trajectory of her classmates, who repatriated to Mexico or Guatemala or 
who completed advanced degrees in the United States and Europe. Her opinions about 
Oreamuno, and the path she chose for herself, stand in for those of Costa Rica. Costa 
Rican literary critics praised Ramírez’s portrayal of Tinoco, noting the linguistic 
authenticity of her speech; Ti(no)co actually sounds tica.   
 Marina Carmona is a pseudonym for Lilia Ramos, who should be remembered 
along with Gabriela Mistral and Rosario Castellanos, as a revolutionary figure in 20th 
century Latin American pedagogy. She founded Costa Rica’s first school for parents, 
brought braille to Central America and studied psychoanalysis under Jean Piaget at the 
Soborrne. She wrote revolutionary literature for children, and her memoirs served as a 
resource for Victoria Urbano, Rima de Valbonha and finally Serio Ramírez, writing 
about Oreamuno.35 In La fugitiva, Ramírez converses with Carmona in La Biblioteca 
Nacional, where he says she remains like a book on the shelves, “tras su jubilación le 
                                                
35 Chief among them: Ramos, Lilia. Fulgores En Mi Ocaso. San José, Costa Rica: 
Editorial Costa Rica, 1978. 
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permitieron quedarse en su cubículo de siempre, como el incunable de una biblioteca 
donde no los hay” (136). 
Finally,  Manuela Torres is a pseudonym for Chavela Vargas, who expatriated 
from Costa Rica to Mexico and achieved global fame as a singer of rancheras. 
Ramírez interviews his subject in her Mexico City flat, where she has grown old in the 
company of her xoloitzcuintlin, evincing the image of an artist who came to embody 
mexicanidad more than almost any Mexican woman.  
Ramírez introduces narrative tension to his three part testimony by introducing 
rivalry into the relationship between his witnesses. The possibility of imagining 
Tinoco, Carmona, and Torres as members of a community of twentieth century female 
Tican intellectuals is undermined by the way that their own imaginations have 
splintered around the figure of Amanda, and by the fact that each woman who speaks, 
holds the last woman who spoke, in contempt. This rivalry, however, is not 
unproductively stereotypically feminine. It allows Ramírez to critique the narrative 
styles that he is sampling, as insufficient defaults for talking about women.  
For example, Ramírez frames Tinoco’s testimony as an epistolary novel. This 
allows Tinoco to make confessions more indirectly. Then, in the next testimony, 
Carmona expresses disdain for what she calls Tinoco’s false modesty. Ramírez 
dialogues with Carmona as she gives her own testimony, and challenges her claims, 
which she makes with academic certainty about Amanda. Then, in the next testimony, 
Torres, disdains Carmona for being an academic. There is no one to disdain Torres’s 
discourse. But Ramírez subtly critiques Torres for overly-perfecting a performance of 
mexicanidad, that is caricaturesque.                                                             
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Contempt in testimony 
 
The first woman to speak is Gloria Tinoco. She was educated with Amanda at el 
Colegio Superior de Señoritas, where she encountered, Esther de Mezzerville, the 
French-Guatemalan educational reformer who adapted the theory of Johann Heinrich 
Pestalozzi within a feminist framework. Later she was a member of el Círculo de 
Amigos de Arte, where, like Amanda, she encountered Joaquín García Monge, the 
editor of Repertorio Americano. But in Ramírez’s novel, Tinoco has supplanted the 
radical education that both she and Amanda received with gossip about the men that 
they encountered in these institutions. This is comically illustrated by Tinoco’s 
summary of her and Amanda’s political education: “Además de los profesores que ya 
dije … estaba también un muchacho muy guapo, que no puedo acordarme del nombre, 
de una familia libanesa muy rica de Guayaquil, exiliado en San José por alborotos 
políticos, que nos daba no sé qué histórico. ¿Cómo se llamaba eso del desarrollo 
comunista y toda esa cosa…? Materialismo histórico.” (68)   
 It would be easy to conclude that Ramírez uses Tinoco’s testimony to parody 
the historical material consciousness of female scholars as recreational. But we can 
also choose to ignore Ramírez’s unknown intentions, and observe that, just as it is 
given, this testimony flattens out the influence of legitimate male authorities, i.e. 
Joaquín García Monge, with those of men who became accidental antagonists in the 
lives of Tinoco and Amanda. For instance, Tinoco punctuates her account of 
Amanda’s circulation within Amigos de Arte with an anecdote about how she was 
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kidnapped by her then boyfriend, who Ramírez names Roberto Goicoechea. (Rima 
Valbonha also references this event, calling the kidnapping a “rapto sin 
consequencia.” But Valbonha doesn’t name names. (7)) Tinoco says that the 
kidnapping was executed as revenge on Amanda, who offended Goicoechea by 
appearing in a bathing suit in the magazine La Hora. This episode  
 
       
 
Yolanda Oreamuno appears in La Hora in her bathing suit. The caption reads:  
Yolanda Oreamuno, arquetipo de belleza perfecta, mide exactas las medidas de Miss Universo”.36 
 
suggests an equivalence between the men who became intellectual influences in 
Amanda’s life, and the men who interrupted her life.   
When Marina Carmona’s testimony begins, she shifts the focus of the narrative 
from the accidents (men) that figured in Amanda’s life, to the way that Amanda 
                                                
36 Mora, Alexander Sánchez. Tras el mito de Yolanda Oreamuno. 
http://wvw.nacion.com/ancora/2008/abril/06/ancora1483490.html 
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processed these events in her fiction. Much of Carmona’s testimony is 
subvocalization: She reads aloud from Amanda’s letters, articles and also from her 
novel, La puerta cerrada, which is La ruta de su evasión. “He leído todo lo que se 
puede leer acerca de Amanda, buscando cómo explicármela más allá del conocimiento 
personal … he llegado a la conclusión … de que muchas claves autobiográficas, y de 
identidad, se encuentran en sus propias ficciones.” (179)37 As evidence, she analyzes a 
seen from La puerta cerrada, which has actually been adapted from La ruta de su 
evasión.  
The adaptation appears on page 180. What Ramírez has done is rewrite a 
passage from La ruta de su evasión in which the character Aurora remembers an 
episode from her childhood in which she interrupted her mother and father during sex. 
Her mother was mortified, but her father was calm and comforting. As a result, she 
came to disdain her mother, and to believe that her father, and men in general, were 
incarnations of a sublime and superior race. Ramírez does not transcribe this passage 
word for word, but preserves the central ideas in it: “Mientras tanto, el padre, entidad 
suprema feliz y segura … se asienta en la firme conciencia pagana, libre de secretos y 
temores” (181).  
Carmona tells Ramírez that this passage is not autobiographical in the most 
obvious sense of the word: Amanda didn’t know her father, because he died, and she 
                                                
37 Sergio Ramírez also has Maria Carmona ask a question that the Real Victoria 
Urbano asked, and that I quoted in Chapter I: “Cómo podían hablar de su primera 
novela, que nadie leyó, porque nunca se publicó?” (130)  
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didn’t deify her stepfather, because he tried to rape her. But Carmona tells us that 
Aurora’s aesthetic, and worship of masculinity was shared by Amanda. (178)  
However, Ramírez pushes Carmona to recognize the limits of the knowledge 
that the archive has supplied her with. When Carmona denies that Amanda’s first 
husband Jorge Calvo Wood infected Amanda with syphilis, and presents Ramírez with 
a letter in which Amanda claims to be living in marital bliss with Wood in Chile, 
Ramírez responds by sharing a letter that Amanda wrote to Tinoco in which she called 
her marriage to Wood a living hell, and alludes to the virus: “desespero de que el 
veneno haya penetrado mi sangre.” (177) Carmona’s response betrays her jealousy of 
Tinoco’s relationship with Amanda: Ramírez speaking: “(Carmona) me responde que 
no cometerá la indelicadeza de preguntarme quién es la corresponal, aunque puede 
sospecharlo.” (177)  
This interpretation of Amanda’s prose is undoubtedly more informed by 
Oreamuno’s writing than anything that Lilia Ramos, or even Victoria Urbano or Rima 
Valbonha, wrote about Oreamuno. Because Ramos, Urbano and Valbonha, who 
frequently quoted one another, and whose criticism consequently bleeds together, 
were reluctant to consider the significance of Oreamuno’s female characters’ 
deification of men: I have already established in Chapter 1, that they privileged 
Aurora’s role in La ruta de su evasión over Elena Viales’s. They also neglected this 
aspect of Aurora’s psychology. 
Finally, Manuela Torres’ vision of Amanda is radically anti-textual. She says 
that she never read anything that Amanda wrote: “Nunca leí nada escrito por Amanda” 
(289). Instead, she claims a purer love for Amanda than that which animates Tinoco 
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and Carmona’s memories: “La Amanda que yo conocí, a la que yo deseé sin fortuna, 
no era la escritora. Era una diosa, que es mucho más que escritora.” (289) Here, Torres 
suggests, carnal approximation to the subject is pure, while textual approximations are 
polluted by the messiness of hermeneutics.38  
Torres regards Carmona with utter disdain. Throughout her testimony she 
refers to her as the ugly woman: “¿Quién recuerda (a Yolanda) como escritora? Una 
lista de gente que encabeza la fea” (289). She sees Carmona’s commitment to an 
imagined literary history for women as decadent, a leisure activity that she participates 
in because she isn’t desirable enough to be included in the labor of actually loving 
other women. The only women that Torres, nurtured by the prose of Juan Rulfo, says 
that she feels an affinity with, are those who have died or will die on Mexican soil. 
Amanda Solano is one. Edith Mora, who witnessed Amanda’s death, is another.39  
Ramírez uses Torres’s disavowal of Amanda as a writer, and her professed 
ignorance of Amanda’s texts to assert that his narrative hinges, radically, upon the 
contingency of the philological record. He does this via quotation, putting Oreamuno’s 
words in Torres’s mouth. Torres says, “Cada vez que he regresado a Costa Rica ha 
                                                
38  As Stephen Henighan has detailed. With Torres, who is based on the infamous 
womanizer Chavela Vargas, Ramírez has an opportunity to parody the trajectory that 
Proust’s Marcel takes in La Fugitive, as he rediscovers his deceased lover, Albertine, 
through her affairs with women. But, Amanda not only resisted Torres’ advances; 
according to Torres herself, she was indifferent to them: “Fue parte de mi vida. Lo fue, 
aunque yo no haya sido parte de la suya, ni modo” (289).  
39  Torres contradicts rumors that either Amanda or Edith committed suicide. She 
maintains Edith died of hunger: “El hambre va quitando la voluntad de vivir, te afea el 
ánimo, te lo rebaja, te predispone a resbalarte y caer de cabeza en una bañera llena de 
agua herviente. Más si lo único que tienes para engañarla es tequila del más grosero” 
(227). Relating her theory in the second person, Torres romanticizes scarcity tinted by 
luxury, as part of a Mexican aesthetic of death. Ramírez’s portrayal of Torres here 
appears almost caricaturistic.  
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sido para arrepentirme una y otra vez. Qué país. La ley del serrucho. Si te alzas más 
alto que los demás pendejos, no te serruchan el piso, te serruchan las piernas para 
dejarte al mismo nivel” (232).  
Ostensibly, Torres is speaking of her native Costa Rica, where she remains 
unrecognized as a singer due to her status as a tortillera (dyke). However, this 
statement is immediately recognizable as an adaptation of the proverbial statement 
made by Yolanda Oreamuno about Costa Rican society in 1939 that I discussed in 
Chapter 1:“ Al que pretende levantar demasiado la cabeza sobre el nivel general, no se 
la corta. ... Le bajan suavemente el suelo que pisa, y despacio, sin violencia, se le 
coloca a la altura conveniente”. This is the moment to which the novel builds, a 
moment in which a character makes an original statement, that is in fact a quotation 
from a text that she has never read. It is a moment that allows the non human artifact 
of Oreamuno’s novel, to impress itself onto a new diegesis. This effect is redoubled in 
a final quotational instance:  
After Yolanda Oreamuno’s first husband, Jorge Wood, committed suicide she 
was forced to return to Costa Rica.40 There, while married to the economist Oscar 
Barahona Streber, and before becoming pregnant, she wrote her prize winning lost 
novel, Por Tierra Firme. Both Victoria Urbano and, now, Marina Carmona (in La 
fugitiva) have suggest that we have no information about what this novel included. 
However, Manuela Torres affirms that it, like a third novel that Amanda was drafting 
                                                
40	  Ramírez’s narrator, Marina Carmona, says that the culminating scene of La ruta de 
su evasión, in which Gabriel lays his head on Aurora’s lap and shoots himself, is 
semiautobiographical, although she doubts Amanda was an eyewitness to the actual 
event.	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at the time of her death, Casta sombría, included: “la historia de una niña violada por 
su padrastro, y que entra en conflicto con la madre cuando la madre se pone contra ella 
y toma el partido del violador. Su propia historia, por lo que ves” (83). So Manuela 
Torres, the character who has read nothing, is able to cite a novel that no one has read. 
This instant also allows the non human artifact to impress itself onto the diegesis. 
Only this time, it is an artifact that is arriving from somewhere beyond the archive.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE BAD NEWS: 
GOSSIP BEFORE THE CHILD CRUCIFICTION 
 
 Sedition and human sacrifice are the events that Rosario Castellanos’s Oficio 
de tinieblas immortalizes. The novel weaves together the stories of citizens of Ciudad 
Real and San Juan Chamula, centers of Ladino and Tzotzil political power, and 
culminates in a regional war representing the Caste Wars that took place in Chiapas 
during the last half of the 19th century.  
 In Ciudad Real, sedition takes the form of resistance against federally 
mandated agrarian and educational reforms. Specifically, the establishment of ejidos 
and of free, secular schools for Indigenous children. In this context, sedition employs 
as its chief apparatus, gossip: A rumor mill that is always already in place and that 
normally functions as a weapon of domestic terror, but that can be appropriated in an 
instant of political crisis as a weapon of political terror. In Oficio de tinieblas, it is 
gossip, turned against representatives of the federal government, that neutralizes the 
individuals who are potentially able to effect reform in the region. Notably, this gossip 
remains familiar even as its breadth of impact expands to include political figures. At 
its heart are salacious details regarding sex, family composition and religiosity.  
 Meanwhile, in San Juan Chamula, Tzotzil Indians crucify a nine-year-old boy, 
Domingo Díaz Puiljá. (The real crucified child was named Domingo Gómez Checheb, 
and he was killed on Good Friday in 1868.) This violence is verbally conjured by the 
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boy’s adoptive mother, Catalina Díaz Puiljá, who is the leader of a spontaneously 
emerging animist cult, The Cult of the Stones. During holy week, Catalina gives a 
speech in which she calls for the creation of an Indian Christ that will go to battle 
against the Christ of the Europeans and make the Tzotzil invincible.  
 There is both a gap and a curious confluence between these phenomena: 
sedition and human sacrifice. A rumor mill propels the narrative up to the moment of 
the novel’s violent climax, increasing narrative tension. However, this mill does not 
produce the event of the crucifixion. Nor does the event of the crucifixion ever 
become a referent for gossip.41  
 Instead, at the time of the crucifixion, the rumor mill ceases to turn. The 
Ladino community enjoys a moment in which gossip is suspended. This moment 
should be understood as a different sort of state of emergency. It takes place beyond 
the rule of law that gossip, described by the novel as a functional speech act, 
constitutes.  
 It is a moment of singular importance in the diegetic universe that Castellanos 
constructs over the course of half a dozen novels and short story collections, because it 
belies the ostensible project of her oeuvre to carry out a regional anthropology and 
construct a qualified apology for societal norms and practices in Chiapas.   
 
El ciclo de Chiapas, el ciclo de chismes 
 
                                                
41 This represents a significant transformation of this event, since, historiographically, 
the crucifixion of the historical person,  
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 Oficio de tinieblas, written over the course of 15 years and published in 1962, 
launches a diegetic space that compresses events spanning a century of national and 
regional history. The novel represents two sets of events as occurring simultaneously: 
The first includes political developments that we readily identify with the 1930s, 
which saw the introduction of Cardenista reforms to the region. Federally sanctioned 
civil servants arrive in Chiapas and attempt to establish land-reform as well as free, 
mandatory education as provided for by Article 27 of the Constitution of 1917. They 
form an unstable alliance with their indigenous counterparts, municipally sanctioned 
Tzotzil civil servants. At the same time, they are frustrated by an economically 
depressed land-owning class and its transitory allies: Church officials who struggle to 
redefine their mission in Chiapas in the wake of an institutional anticlericism also 
engendered by the Constitution of 1917. The second set of events includes action 
specific to the Caste Wars of the previous century – a fifty year war of resistance 
waged by the indigenous population against urban centers of Ladino power - and 
especially the Chamula revolution of 1887. These include the seemingly spontaneous 
emergence of the Cult of Stones near Chamula in 1886, and the apocryphal crucifixion 
of a child by Tzotzil Indians in the region, which occurred later that same year.  
 Most scholars describe this alternative, synthetic history in one of two ways: 
Either Castellanos represents nineteenth century events as taking place in the twentieth 
century, or she represents twentieth century events as taking place in the nineteenth. 
 These descriptions are binarily opposed and create inequality between historic 
strata, with the base strata, the time period into which events are being moved for 
narration, implicitly receiving privilege. For instance, the Cambridge Companion to 
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the Latin American Novel states: “Oficio de tinieblas centers on an indigenous 
rebellion in the mid-nineteenth century. Castellanos transfers this history to the 
1930s.” (Gollnick, 56) Gollnick then goes on to describe political phenomena from the 
1930s. In this articulation, the privileged position of the base strata is connoted by the 
amount of attention that it receives, in the form of intellectual labor, from scholars 
who identify it on the basis of myriad characteristic political phenomena, including 
Cardenismo, post revolutionary or late revolutionary constitutionalism and 
anticlericism.  
 On the other hand, the singular events of the Cult of the Stones and child 
crucifixion, despite being more concrete, are rendered transparent, as scholars treat 
these as mere artifacts, that can be moved in time and space. On the basis of the 
artifact status of these events, scholars naturalize, and thus underprivilege them, even 
as they frequently become the explicit, salacious subject of scholarship.42  
 One explicit goal of this chapter, then, is to denaturalize the singular events 
that the novel appropriates, the emergence of the cult of the stones and the crucifixion 
of the child, and to consider their phenomenological constitution as part of a dialectic, 
that includes the representation of early twentieth century history.   
  A second problem that scholars face when thinking about Oficio de tinieblas is 
introduced by the fact that the novel compresses not only events from history, but also 
from a larger, diegetic universe; what has been called Rosario Castellanos’s Chiapan 
                                                
42 This is why even more equitable articulations of the temporal situation of the novel 
– e.g.: “La autora recrea literariamente dos períodos históricos, que superimpone en el 
mismo eje cronológico” (Gil Iriarti 248) - are problematic. They do not compensate 
for this imbalance of phenomenological attention.   
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cycle. To my knowledge, this phrase is first applied in this way in the title of Joseph 
Sommers’s "El ciclo de Chiapas: nueva corriente literaria".43 (Although, previous to 
this, Sommers uses the phrase to refer to a larger movement of writing by Chiapan 
authors.44) René Prieto demonstrates the use of this phrase to describe a progressive 
tendency in Castellanos’ novels: “Castellanos’s Neoindigenista novels follow one 
another in an ever-improving progression that culminates with the widely acclaimed 
master-piece of the “Ciclo de Chiapas”: Oficio de tinieblas” (158).45 And finally, 
Brian Gollnick plays with the phrase in the title of his 1999 monograph “El ciclón de 
Chiapas.”  
 The use of this phrase has several shifting motivations. By the nineteen-
nineties it allows critics to create a verbal association between Rosario Castellanos and 
Oficio de tinieblas and novelists and novels of the Boom, such as Gabriel García 
Márquez and Cien años de soledad, which is stereotypically identified with the so-
called el ciclo de Macondo. This would be useful in rescuing Oficio de tinieblas from 
the repressive myth of pre-boom literary stagnation. And it also allows critics to 
smooth over ostensible, and often unfairly attributed, differences in the quality of the 
books that make up this cycle: These include Balún canán (1957) Ciudad real (1960) 
                                                
43 Revista ICACH. Tuxtla Gutiérrez, núm. 14, enero-junio, 1965, pp. 7-22. 
44 “Sin duda la zona indígena más favorecida por los novelistas es la de Chiapas. 
Forman este ciclo Juan Pérez Jolote, de Ricardo Pozas; El callado dolor de los 
tzotziles, de Ramón Rubín; Los hombres  
verdaderos, de Cario Antonio Castro; Benzulul, de Eraclio Zepeda; La culebra tapó el 
río, de María Lombardo de Caso; y Balún Cañan y Oficio de tinieblas, de Rosario 
Castellanos.” Sommers. “The Indian Oriented Novel in Latin America.”  
45 René Prieto, “The Literature of Indigenismo” Ed. Gozales de Echeverría, Roberto & 
Enrique Pupo-Walker, The Cambridge History of Latin American Literature, 1996. 
158. 
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46 and Los convidados de agosto (1963). Put bluntly, Balún canán, which has a child 
protagonist, has never completely thrown off the stigma that is attached to children’s 
literature. Ciudad real at times appears overly didactic, especially when it represents 
the follies of colonialist agents. And Los convidados de agosto subtly reframes many 
of the same existential crises introduced in Oficio de tinieblas inside a more domestic, 
claustrophobic setting that was not widely appealing to boom audiences.  
 The use of the term cycle is appropriate, despite vested critical interest, as all 
of these works do comprise a discrete world that is recognizable, not only on the basis 
of its identification with Chiapas but also on the basis of the repetition of certain 
subjectivities, even if the characters that appear in each of these works are different. 
One of these reincarnated subjectivities is that of a criolla child who forms her identity 
through a voyeuristic fascination with other young white women. In Oficio de 
tienieblas, this is Idolina, whose fascination attaches temporarily to her dead mother, 
and later to her father’s mistress, Julia Quevedo. In Los Convidados de agosto, this is 
the anonymous narrator of the novella Amistades efímeras whose fascination with her 
best friend, Gertrudis, borders on erotic.47 A second is a ruminative, isolated 
                                                
46 Ciudad Real is often called a short story anthology. However, the vignettes it 
represents constitute a single diegetic reality lending the work, as a whole, a novelistic 
quality. The main difference between Ciudad Real and Oficio de tinieblas, besides the 
level of intricacy with which each vignette is connected to the next, seems to be the 
culmination of each narrative. In Ciudad Real, Castellanos introduces the foreign aide 
worker and missionary, thus expanding the horizon on which the Chiapan native fails 
to see his reality corresponded or contested. There is always an absurd suspension of 
the moment of encounter or contestation. In Oficio de tinieblas, Mexico, meaning 
Mexico City, stands in as the ultimate horizon, the ultimate limit. But still, there is 
never an encounter or real conflict between the region and the capital.   
47 This relationship is introduced in the first line of Amistades Efimeras, one of the 
most compelling first lines of any of Castellanos’s stories or novels: “La mejor amiga 
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subjectivity problematically identified with the Mestiza or ladinized woman. In 
Ciudad Real, this subjectivity is typified by the character Modesta Gómez, who 
suffers anti-Mestiza violence in isolation and only cooperates with other Mestiza 
women to mob travelling Indian merchants. In Oficio de tinieblas it is typified by the 
young Indian woman Marcela Gómez, an inversion of Modesta Gómez: She bares a 
similar name, is similarly the victim of sexual violence, and is actually the victim of 
atajadoras. There is thus a great deal of slippage between characters in different 
works.  
 This chapter also has the goal, then, of recognizing the significance of this 
slippage: That its existence, the existence of a ciclo de Chiapas, makes it possible for 
Castellanos to use Oficio de tinieblas to define a limit for the kinds of experiences that 
can be had by her characters in all of her novels, and thus is crucial to defining the 
existential quality of her obra as a whole.  
 
Lessons about gossip from the past  
 
 What is the sense in turning to Oficio de tinieblas to talk about gossip, as one 
such experience? This is a preemptive gesture against the application to Latin 
American literature of currently en vogue critical models for applying gossip studies to 
                                                                                                                                       
de mi adolescencia era casi muda, lo que hizo posible nuestra intimidad. Porque yo 
estaba poseída por una especie de frenesí que me obligaba a hablar incesantemente, a 
hacer confidencias y proyectos, a definir mis estados de ánimo, a interpretar mis 
sueños y recuerdos. No tenía la menor idea de lo que era ni de lo que iba a ser y me 
urgía organizarme y formularme, antes que con actos, por medio de las palabras”  
(9).  
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literature. Because the tropes of gossip studies have become monolithic and 
hegemonic. They include the exploration of gossip as a feminization of speech, or a 
queering of speech, but most of all they hinge on the qualification of gossip as a mode 
of resistance.   
 They can be traced back to 1985, and Patricia Mayer Spacks’ book Gossip 
(1985):  
 (There is a form of) gossip I call “serious,” which exists only as a function of 
 intimacy. It takes place in private, at leisure, in a context of trust… Its 
 participants use talk about others to reflect about themselves, to express 
 wonder and uncertainty and locate certainties, to enlarge their knowledge of 
 one another. Such gossip … may use the stuff of scandal, but its purposes bear 
 little on the world beyond the talkers except inasmuch as that world impinges 
 on them. It proved a resource for the subordinated (anyone can talk; with a 
 trusted listener, anyone can say anything), a crucial means of self-expression, a 
 crucial form of solidarity. (5)   
  
Spacks follows this quotation with an example about women in a harem who 
“critically analyze … the world of men” (5). The quotation exemplifies a trend in 
communications studies that we identify immediately with the 1980s: That of looking 
for, and finding, instances of “resistance” in superficially passive activities; that of 
reconfiguring practices of reception as practices of production. But this by no means 
signifies that scholars of global literature have become exhausted with these tropes. In 
fact, a quick google search reveals that this passage from Gossip has been quoted 
within the last five years in criticism on the culture of servants in 19th century Brazil 
(Roncador, Sônia. Domestic Servants in Literature and Testimony in Brazil, 1889-
1999. , 201) and an anthology of Jane Austen’s letters (Austen, Jane, and Vivien 
Jones. Selected Letters. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). Not to mention 
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several articles. (I became aware of Spacks through the work of Nick Salvato48.) 
 Meanwhile, a culturally informed reading of Oficio de tinieblas, and possibly 
other canonical Latin American novels, does not admit these tropes. This culturally 
informed reading, however, is not meant as an affront to gossip studies as a field. 
Instead it suggests that we reconsider some of the original questions that are at the 
heart of the field.   
 Gossip studies was confirmed as an authentic discipline in 1963, when Max 
Gluckman published the paper, “Gossip and Scandal,” in Current Anthropology. This 
paper is most often cited today by scholars who wish to highlight a central controversy 
in the field; one that most will argue has not been resolved: Whether gossip is the 
enterprise of a collective (this is Gluckman’s premise) or individuals.49 However, 
today we should also return to “Gossip and Scandal” to witness an unexpected critical 
gesture that Gluckman carries out. This is the way that Gluckman speaks in the first 
person and inserts himself into his own anthropology.  
 After completing a thorough review of the primordial academic literature on 
gossip from 1927 to the early 1960s – a review that merits consideration in its own 
right50 - Gluckman states his theory of gossip and then relates it to his private life by 
introducing an ostensibly humorous, but still surprisingly personal anecdote. His 
theory is that gossip is a privileged form of narration, and that the privilege of 
                                                
48 Salvato, Nick. Editorial Comment: “The Age of Gossip Dom.” Modern Drama. 
53:289-296. 2010 
49 For a review of this controversy, as well as a general overview of the field, see Eric 
K. Foster’s “Research on Gossip: Taxonomy, Methods, and Future Directions.” 
Review of General Psychology, Educational Publishing Foundation 2004, Vol. 8, No. 
2, 78–9 
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gossiping is concentrated at the political center or centers of a special group, which 
works to exclude others from gaining the literacy required to decode its rumors. This 
is a theory of gossip, as a functional phenomenon. His anecdote, which also tells us all 
we need to know about Gluckman’s class, and race status, is as follows:  
 
 When it came to riding, I was never able to acquire the gossip among those 
 who rode even in the small circles of Johannesburg-and I always felt lost in the 
 group. I was glad when the time came for me to slink away … to carry out my 
 field research in Zululand, until there again I found myself excluded from 
 groups because I did not know enough gossip. 
 
This original articulation of why gossip works, of what it is for – to create opacity - 
continues to form the basis of contemporary scholarship, including post-colonial or 
anti-colonial scholarship that complicates, inverts and parodies this schematic. (This is 
scholarship that Gluckman actually anticipated with perspicacity.51)  
 Meanwhile, the unprecedented significance of Gluckman’s first person 
narration is that it allows him to define the phenomenological limit of Gossip studies, 
at the moment of the field’s creation: 
 
                                                                                                                                       
50 Here we can see that gossip studies grew out of anthropological primitivism: A 
tendency to find aesthetic and formal inspiration in indigenous societies located, 
stereotypically, in Australia, the Pacific North West, and Tropical Africa. For instance, 
Gluckman begins his article by citing Paul Radin’s Primitive Man as a Philosopher 
(1927).  
51 Gluckman also theorizes at this point that in a society that has been completely 
fractured by trauma, such as genocide or colonization, this schematic breaks down. 
The new centers of power that produce gossip are no longer recognizable in the same 
was. This is because literacy in the gossip that they produce is no longer universally 
aspirational, as different social groups do not aspire to acquire that literacy.  
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 Outsiders frequently complain that anthropologists are able to find that 
 anything social has a useful function and they may therefore conclude that 
 anthropologists approve of everything. Thus it has been argued that criminal 
 classes are as important as the police … If I suggest that gossip and scandal are 
 socially virtuous and valuable, this does not mean that I always approve of 
 them. Indeed, in practice I find that when I am gossiping about my friends as 
 well as my enemies I am deeply conscious of performing a social duty; but that 
 when I hear they gossip viciously about me, I am rightfully filled with 
 righteous indignation. 
 
 
Much of the literature that has followed Gluckman’s article has obscured its point. For 
instance, Robert Pain criticizes Gluckman for positing gossip as a “function” of 
community while ignoring the fact that gossip can be understood as an operation of 
individuals who are seeking “information”. (280 – 281)52 To make this claim, Pain 
identifies the construction of identity as a prerogative of the community, and the 
consolidation of information as an initiative of the individual. He thus reifies the 
community and the individual as a duality. But Gluckman’s own first person account 
of how he experiences gossip when he is gossiping in contrast with when he is being 
gossiped about suggests that Gluckman understood these unrequitable experiences as 
an aporia.  
 Sensitivity to this aporia has inspired the type of critical work in gossip studies 
that most acutely resounds with the representation of gossip in literary criollismo, 
indigenismo and caciquismo. It opens towards and increases our appreciation of Latin 
American landscapes as a verbal heterotopia, where the proliferation of gossip creates 
impossible spaces.   
                                                
52 Pain’s article is scathing and misrepresents several quotations from Gluckman’s. 
Paine, Robert. "What Is Gossip About? An Alternative Hypothesis." Man ns 2.2 
(1967): 278-85  
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 A good example is David Gilmore’s ethnography, Varieties of Gossip in a 
Spanish Rural Community, which was published in 1978 and renewed the field of 
Gossip Studies. Here, Gilmore attempts to intervene in the congenital war between 
“functionalists” and “informationalists” by proffering a toolkit with which to explore 
“gossip as a category (and) not one thing or the other” – meaning neither a collective 
nor an individual enterprise – “but a diverse range of behaviors.” (89) The subject of 
the ethnography is a town that Gilmore calls “Fuenmayor”, a pseudonym meant to 
protect the guilty. Gilmore explains his selection of this town for his study thusly:  
 
 In government bulletins, the main product of Fuenmayor is described as wheat 
 … it would be  more appropriate to describe the main product of Fuenmayor as 
 gossip, because 100 percent of the people are engaged in its cultivation. (92) 
  
Gilmore’s is, ingeniously, a meta-linguistic study of gossip. He analyzes the way 
people talk about gossip, identifying eleven distinct verbs that the Fuenmayoreños use 
to refer to the act of issuing critical language about a third party.53 This, in turn, allows 
him to suggest a typology that “may facilitate both data collection and comparative 
research” on gossip and that focuses on variables including “number of gossipers 
(subject); status of gossipee (object); instrumentality (purposefulness); and legitimacy 
(betrayal).” (100)   
 The salient aspect of Gilmore’s typology is that it depends upon his 
recognition of the way that Fuenmayoreños negotiate space. The way in which they 
                                                
53 Criticar; Rajar; Darle la lengua; Cuchichear; Murmurar; Chismorrear; Paliquear; 
Cortar el traje; Charlar; Hablar oculto; Contar  
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are present. This is most apparent in the narrative flourishes that enrich Gilmore’s 
writing. Take for instance his novelistic introduction of Fuenmayor:  
 
 The town is highly nucleated in the typical Andalusian pattern of narrow 
 concentric streets enclosed by parallel rows of two-story houses. Its geometric 
 symmetry is broken only by a few  irregular gardens and plazas. … The 
 impression of architectural compactness is intensified by  a cultural trait: the 
 extreme gregariousness of the Fuenmayoreños. These are highly extroverted 
 people who love nothing better than the crowding and bustle of town life. They 
 insist that anyone who must live in the isolated countryside is "sad" and 
 "lonely," and that his life is, as some people put it, "tragic." (90) 54 
 
 Gilmore thus represents the town as a poignant discursive heterotopia. For the 
Fuenmayoreños, the state of being present together – and not just present together but 
being practically on top of one another - in the same space and at the same time is 
inherently aspirational. Thus, these urban folk are naturally convinced that country 
dwellers are “tragic”.  
 But whenever Fuenmayoreños do come together they are also compelled by a 
secondary motivation: To displace a version of themselves that exists in the judgment 
and discourse of others, that is the subject of gossip and that is inevitably present 
where and whenever they are not. A Fuenmayoreño will quickly join any group he 
sees on the street to displace this specter of himself. And in an inverse gesture that 
nevertheless reproduces the heterotopia, women refuse to have guests over to their 
houses. They fear that the invited will be able to deduce an item of gossip simply by 
                                                
54 This passage is deceptively similar to passages in Castellanos’s obra. It perfectly 
represents the aesthetic of anthropological neutrality that is properly Castellanos’s.  
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entering this space. In order to maintain the home as a space that their neighbors want 
to visit, in order to be hospitable, the Fuenmayoreño keeps those spaces empty.  
 Given the deep cultural ties between Andalusia and Hispanic America, it 
comes as no surprise that different versions of this heterotopia are represented in many 
canonical Mexican and Latin American novels, though each of these emphasizes a 
different aspect of the heterotopia. For instance, Juan Rulfo’s Pedro Páramo (1955) 
highlights the gossipscape’s potential to produce literal specters.55  While, La mala 
hora (1962) by Gabriel Garcia Márquez, insists upon the visceral nature of experience 
in the gissipscape, which it represents as an embodied space.56  
 Oficio de tinieblas represents a heterotopia that almost perfectly resembles the 
one described by Gilmore. In Castellanos’s novel, the struggle to occupy or evacuate 
public space is always a fight to stay ahead of gossip. Even specific details are similar. 
One competes for territory, not just with other people but also with the self that is the 
                                                
55 In the novel, nearly all narration is related as rumor as a nameless subjectivity 
overhears the history of the residents of the town of Comala. At first this subjectivity 
is identified explicitly with the grandson of Pedro Páramo, Juan Preciado. But midway 
through the novel Juan Preciado dies and his privilege to hear, or to overhear, is 
reduced to equality with that of the other dead residents of the dead town. From this 
point onward the novel gives all of the residents of Comala access to the stories that 
are told about themselves; but this access is contingent upon each resident being 
deceased. The premise of the novel is that the only situation in which one can be 
present with that other version of oneself that is the subject of gossip is a spectral one. 
56 In this mystery novel, an unknown individual posts pasquinades at night in a 
nameless town. After one of these slanderous bulletins inspires a man to kill his wife’s 
lover, military forces are dispatched to keep the peace. The soldiers, however, become 
the violent doubles of the towns’ original population. The novel thus represents 
citizens’ desperate, and ultimately self defeating scramble to carve out personal 
narrative space for themselves. First, they try to avoid their neighbors. Later, they 
must also avoid military discipline. Slander and libel, biting language, are identified 
with physical discomfort and deformity, as Márquez focuses his physical descriptions 
of characters on the deteriorating conditions of their mouths and teeth.   
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subject of others’ discourse.  The chain of gossip unravels according to the layout of 
the city, through streets surrounding houses surrounding discrite/eet courtyards. And 
the Coletos are profoundly ambivalent about houseguests.  
 In the culminating chapters of the novel, the city is placed, first under the 
threat of siege, and then under an imaginary siege by Indian revolutionaries. 
(Imaginary, because the Indian’s march on Ciudad Real becomes a perpetual march, 
as they go in circles and procrastinate ever arriving at the city.) As this unfolds, the 
aporia of the gossipscape becomes less tolerable. The functional necessity of gossip is 
temporarily overshadowed by the existential threat that gossip poses. The narration 
imagines moments in the life of the city in which gossip is temporarily suspended.  
 These moments constitute a state of emergency in Ciudad Real and engender 
temporary political disruptions and involve the emergence of female solidarity, the 
dissolution of male privilege during heterosexual discursive relationships and the 
validation of articulations by political pariahs as legitimate political analysis. The 
novel inverts a pattern that we find in most progressive, contemporary literature, 
which emphasizes the state of emergency as one that poses special danger to 
minorities. 
 
Gossip as usual: Inside the heterotopia 
 
 The purpose of this section of the chapter is to describe how the novel’s main 
characters exist normally within the gossipscape, before gossip is suspended. This 
description is made possible by the fact that, Oficio de tinieblas, before being an 
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existentialist novel, is a meticulous, narrative anthropology of a community in which 
gossip exists as a functional phenomenon. I have schematized this description of the 
gossipscape by considering the relative functional success with which characters 
navigate it. At the same time, this section reveals that inequality is characteristic of 
situations in which gossip functions.  
 Catalina Díaz Puiljá, the Tzotzil matriarch who eventually enacts the 
crucifixion of Domingo and incites revolution in Chiapas, is by far the most successful 
denizen of the gossipscape. Her success in this context contrasts with her 
marginalization as an Indigenous woman in a postcolonial situation.  
 At the beginning of Oficio de tinieblas, Catalina Díaz Puiljá is concerned by 
two rumors that have gained traction in her community. The first is that she is barren, 
an item that could impact her credibility as a curandera. The second is that her 
younger brother is intellectually disabled, which wounds Catalina because it is through 
her bond with her brother that she maintains a sense of connection to her childhood 
and an idealized past in which the Tzotzil were more culturally integrated.  
 Catalina neutralizes these two stories by using the rape of a young Tzotzil girl, 
Marcela Gómez, to her advantage. After the rape of Marcela by the Caxlan Leonardo 
Cifuentes, Catalina convinces Marcela’s mother to marry her to Catalina’s brother. 
She later adopts the baby that resulted from the rape as her own. By engineering the 
spectacle of marriage, Catalina creates a pretext for herself and her newly expanded 
family to reassert their presence in the markets, camps and trade routes where 
members of the community live in close proximity. And she displaces the critical 
speech that had begun to circulate there.  
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 Another character who has unexpected success navigating the gossipscape is 
Isabel Cifuentes, Leonardo Cifuentes’s wife. Isabel, seen as an archetype, look like a 
victim. Her husband is an infamous womanizer. However, Isabel is the functional 
beneficiary of this infamy.  
 Her position of privilege is referred to first, in the scene of Marcela’s rape. 
After Leonardo attacks Marcela in the shop of one of his old mistresses, the young girl 
escapes and runs through the city. Isabel Cifuentes, attracted by the noise, watches the 
flight from a window in her house.  
   This is not the first time that she has watched this scene unfold and Isabel’s 
gaze further embellishes Ciudad Real as a heterotopia. Her Andalusian style house, 
with its shuttered windows and private courtyards, is not just a container for her 
humiliation, it is also a panopticon. Her gaze, directed at the Tzotzil women who are 
her husband’s victims, characterizes her as an accomplice in their victimization.57 And 
in fact, this situation is advantageous to Isabel. While Indian bodies absorb the 
excesses of her husband’s sexuality, the threat of adultery with another Ladina woman 
is avoided, as is the destabalizing impact that a rumor about that kind of disloyalty 
would bring.  
 Isabel does eventually become the victim of a rumor that her husband has 
committed adultery with another Ladina, Julia Quevedo. However, Isabel benefits 
                                                
57 The geography of Ciudad Real is an Apartheid geography. It is constituted by the 
constant exercise of motion by the Tzotzil. Exercises of penetration, escape, 
maintenance of distance, and even residence. These repetitive motions form a type of 
discipline. While these motions are all automated, there are non-tzotzil agents that 
reinforce them. In Oficio de tiniebelas, at the beginning of the novel, these are 
represented by a group of atajadoras, low class mestiza women who attack Marcela 
Gomez and her party as they pass through a last bit of wilderness before entering 
Ciudad Real. These women will, costumarily, surround the tzotzil on a path, 
physically assualt them, and steel their wares.  
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from this rumor as well, since she stands in positive relief against Julia, whose 
performance of her femininity is judged too urban by the ladies of Ciudad Real.  
 Julia Quevedo, nicknamed La Alazana, appears to be a completely inept 
denizen of the Coleto gossipscape. She enters into a relationship with Leonardo 
Cifuentes, the husband of a respectable Coleta lady. And she then breaks the rule of 
(in)hospitality in Ciudad Real: She begins to hold salons, inviting the ladies of the 
town over to Leonardo Cifuentes’ house. She also establishes an age-inappropriate 
friendship with Isabel’s young daughter, Idolina, over relying on her to explain Coleto 
society.  
 The gossip that attaches to Julia is so strong that phenomenologically it 
appears to precede the action that it describes. We see this in the following passage, 
which describes how Isabel and Leonardo are robbed of the opportunity to act 
originally, by the apriori inscription of their actions inside of gossip:  
 
 Las entrevistas de los amantes no eran fáciles. La Alazana las preparaba con 
 cuidado, creyendo que la discreción basta para tapar la boca de la 
 maledicencia. No había testigos pero sobraban testimonios. Y como el mal no 
 se inventa sino que se repite, a estos gratuitos informadores de la curiosidad 
 pública les bastaba repetir. Historias viejas, sobradas. La misma historia que 
 Leonardo y Julia vivían, considerándola original. (197)58  
                                                
58 This quote also hints at an import aspect gossip as a quotational practice. The 
content of gossip is not simply reported discourse. The content of gossip is always and 
originally reported discourse. There is no genealogy of the reported discourse that 
leads to an original speaker, a first person speaker. The “first person” that pronounces 
an item of gossip is always already reporting that item. How is this possible? My 
assumption is that this is possible because of a mimetic break. Were the first person to 
pronounce an item of gossip a true first person then their pronunciation would have 
some representational claim. “I saw Johnny kissing Mary” would claim to represent 
Johnny kissing Mary. This is never the case with gossip, which, as an irreducible 
category of language is always divorced from its representational function. This 
possibility may present a secondary, decidedly inconvenient possibility: There may be 
no linguistic cues to tell us whether an item is representational or gossip. “I saw 
Johnny kissing Mary” might be either. This is especially true if Johnny really did kiss 
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  Finally, Julia becomes the victim of pasquinades, anonymously published, 
calumnious letters, composed by Idolina. She discovers these letters, accidentally, in 
the Cifuentes house. At least some of them appear to be addressed to her husband, 
Fernando Ulloa. Most frightening to Julia, however, is the fact that these items, which 
detail her infidelity, apparently mean nothing to Fernando, who has received them but 
never accused her. 
 All this notwithstanding, Julia’s ineptitude makes her the most logical avatar 
for readers, who learn, along with Julia, how gossip functions in Ciudad Real. And 
ultimately, Julia survives her emersion in Coleto society.  
 It is Julia’s husband, Fernando Ulloa who represents an object lesson in the 
material damage that gossip can do. His experience confirms gossip as a form of 
verbal violence.  
 Fernando Ulloa has come to Ciudad Real as an interpreter of federal law. His 
chief purpose is to enact land reform. To this end, he symbolically appropriates the 
tools of colonial bureaucracy: An Indian translator and Jesuit maps. However, to 
support himself he becomes a mathematics professor at the military college in Ciudad 
Real. And it is as a pedagogue that he becomes vulnerable to gossip. According to 
rumor, he is a communist, possibly an atheist, bent on the corruption of Coleto youth. 
                                                                                                                                       
Mary. However, I am convinced that the “sinful” nature of gossip, if gossip figures as 
a categorical sin in Oficio de Tinieblas, arises from its betrayal of a representational 
duty reserved for language. This is, specifically, the duty of representing a Catholic 
reality. Gossip is an inversion of the sanctified language category that the Catholic 
tradition calls news.  
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He becomes the victim of an academic mobbing, is fired from his job and unable to 
hire people to assist him at his bureaucratic work.  
 Fernando Ulloa’s vulnerability, as a sanctioned enforcer of civil law, stands in 
relief against the invulnerability of Leonardo Cifuentes, a prototypical cacique, who is 
impervious to civil law. Rumor confirms that Leonardo has risen to entrepreneurial 
power by assassinating his business rivals. At one point, when Isabel accuses 
Cifuentes of having killed her late husband in order to marry her, he invokes civil 
law’s failure to punish him, responding: “Lo dicen los chismes del pueblo. Y también 
lo dices tú. Pero si fuera verdad no estaría yo aquí, sino bien potreado en una cárcel … 
Nadie puede probar lo contrario.” (70). Here, Leonardo calls our attention to the most 
important function of gossip: Guilt that cannot be processed civilly becomes 
exceptional, and is processed instead inside of gossip.  
  But Fernando Ulloa’s real foil in Ciudad Real is not Leonardo Cifuentes.  
It is a young cleric, Padre Manuel. Because Padre Manuel, like Fernando Ulloa, is an 
idealist.  
 Padre Manuel, like Ulloa, fails to recognize the functional necessity of gossip. 
Instead, as he explains to Bishop Alonso, he understands gossip to be a symptom of 
Coletos’ “urbanidad”. By urbanidad, he means the tendency of Coletos’ to participate 
in an over-scrupulous critical discourse, one that avoids directs confrontation and 
focuses on behavior that it judges to be offensive. Padre Manuel’s analysis of this 
form of discourse is, ironically, a sophisticated humanistic critique: He correctly 
observes that when critical discourse focuses only on those forms of injury that it 
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judges offensive, it becomes impossible to recognize injuries committed against those 
who are beyond offending: Indians: 
 
 Y la moral de los coletos es muy peculiar. Son escrupulosos hasta la 
 exageración, hasta la gazmoñería, en sus tratos mutuos. … Pero ese mismo 
 comerciante integro, ese profesionista cabal, no vacila un instante si se le 
 presenta la ocasión de robar a un indio … cuando raptan en la calle a una niña 
 para esclavizarla en el servicio doméstico, pueden hacer alarde de su hazaña 
 sin que nadie la encuentre reprobable. Lo sería si de un modo indirecto 
 perjudicara los intereses de otro ladino. Pero hecha esta salvedad, ¿quién 
 condenaría al que sacude a un árbol mostrenco para aprovecharse de sus 
 frutos? ¿Quién, sino el que cayera en la aberración de suponer que los árboles 
 son persona y que por lo mismo deben ser respetadas como tales?  (105) 
 
 
When the Bishop Alonso reminds Padre Manuel that he is compelled to forgive the 
sins of the Coletos, Padre Manuel responds with another sophisticated humanistic 
critique: Forgiveness cannot be enacted by a proxy: 
 
 Manuel: La urbanidad no es mi fuerte, monseñor, Mis maestros me enseñaron 
 a ser cortés con Dios, no con los hombres. 
 Alonso: Ibas predispuesto contra el dueño de la casa. De Leonardo Cifuentes 
 corren historias, se cuentan hazañas no muy edificantes. Pero, ¿qué vamos a 
 hacer nosotros? Nuestro oficio no es juzgar; es perdonar. 
 Manuel: Muy cómodo… mientras no somos los ofendidos. 
 
The Bishop Alonso interprets Padre Manuel’s formalism as an inability to adapt to 
Coleto culture. Citing rumors that Padre Manuel possesses Cristero sympathies (la 
autoridad civil no entiende de sutilezas y encuentra que tus actividades son 
sediciosas.” (103)) he sends Padre Manuel to San Juan Chamula, to serve the Indians 
there. Predictably, Manuel is no more adaptable to Tzotzil cultural mores than to 
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Coleto ones. He observes that the Tzotzil are able to participate in the rites of the 
church but unable to internalize the theology behind those rites. He comes to view 
them as uneducable and abandons his parish before it crucifies Domingo.  
 The only Ladino men present at the crucifixion are Fernando Ulloa and his 
assistant, Cesar Santiago. Cesar Santiago, who is not from Ciudad Real, is, like Julia 
Quevedo, an outsider. But he is not an avatar for the reader. Instead he is a mysterious 
stranger, a character possessing divine, or diabolical insight into the way the diegetic 
universe functions.  
 Cesar Santiago is from Comitán, a city just like Ciudad Real. He left Comitán 
after his family, and that more human version of himself that lived there, were 
destroyed by gossip.  
 First, a rumor circulated in Comitán that Cesar Santiago’s father had 
accidentally inherited money that was supposed to have been bequeathed to the 
church. His mother, humiliated by this rumor, and by the nickname given to her 
husband, “el toro dorado”, became a religious zealot. Finally, his brother, Límbano 
Santiago, influenced by their mother’s piety, committed suicide rather than live 
modestly wealthy. To Cesar’s horror, in the wake of his parents’ debilitating grief, the 
Comitecos redoubled their rumor mongering, treating Límbano’s death as a new 
scandal:    
 
 En cuanto el ruido del disparo se hubo extinguido, ya en plena posesión del 
 juicio, los espectadores comenzaron a reflexionar sobre el hecho. De la 
 reflexión se llegó al fallo: los Santiagos habían tenido el castigo que se 
 merecían. Y ya bajo el amparo de esta certidumbre atenuante se podía hablar 
 del suceso y sus consecuencias con despego, con frivolidad, con burla. ¡Y vaya 
 que la burla cae bien a los comitecos! Pueblo de gente ingeniosa y aguda, ágil 
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 para las respuestas, certera para los apodos. La “raspa” era su entrenamiento 
 favorito. (170) 
 
In Ciudad Real, Cesar Santiago leads an unremarked upon life. Until Fernando is 
driven out of the military college, and becomes unable to hire anyone to be his 
assistant. Cesar Santiago, who had been a student at the college, drops out and 
volunteers to work for Fernando.  
 Perhaps, having already seen his reputation killed in Comitán, Cesar Santiago 
is not afraid to see it killed again in Ciudad Real. However, it is also César Santiago’s 
intention to use his position as Fernando’s assistant to foment a caste war between 
Ladinos and Indians. The ensuing violence and terror will be his revenge on society. 
This manipulation is most dramatically represented when Cesar Santiago steals a scarf 
from Julia Quevedo, and drapes it around one of the stone idols that Catalina’s 
animistic cult worships, so that it may be found there when Ladino authorities destroy 
the Tzotzil’s temple.  
 Although, it must be affirmed, it is the unprecedented event of the crucifixion 
of the child, Domingo that ultimately brings the Tzotzil to declare war on the Coletos. 
This is an event that Cesar Santiago could neither have engendered, nor predicted. 
Instead, he is happy to receive it as a gift.   
 
The Crucifixion of the child 
 
 
 In Oficio de tinieblas, gossip does not lead to the crucifixion of the nine year 
old boy, Domingo. Nor does it ever refer to it. This break in  the unfolding of the plot 
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is underscored by the fact that Rosario Castellanos portrays the crucifixion as an event 
that is immediately purged from regional memory, and which has no predicate status 
in regional discourse.  
 This is an obvious conceit of the novelist. In fact, Reifler Bricker writes about 
status of the crucifixion of a child named Domingo in both regional historiography, 
and regional liturgy.  
 According to Reifler, the historian Cristóbal Molina reports that on December 
22, 1867, a Chamulan girl, Agustina Gomes Checheb, saw three stones drop from the 
sky while she was tending her sheep in the hamlet of Tzajalhemel. She took the stones 
home with her, and they remained with her until January 10, 1868, when Pedro Díaz 
Cuscat, the local fiscal, arrived to investigate the matter. Instead of turning them over 
to the parish priest, as he was supposed to do, Cuscat took the stones home with him 
and kept them in a box. According to Molina, Cuscat convinced his neighbors that the 
stones “were knocking at the door to get out…  and that they should be treated as 
sacred objects. As news of these miraculous objects was disseminated, Indians came 
to worship them… With the help of Cuscat and Agustina Gomes Checheb, the stones 
“talked” to the worshipers. Not long afterward several clay figurines were added to the 
cult paraphernalia; Cuscat declared Agustina to have given birth to them and therefore 
to be the “Mother of God” (Bricker, 89).  
 Religious revival at Chamula soon gave way to dissensus, and militarization: 
Bricker quotes Pineda, who remembers these events twenty years after they occurred, 
“The leaders of this rebellion exhorted the Indians to the Catholic saints and, on Good 
Friday in 1868, crucified a ten or eleven year old boy, Domingo Gómez Checheb, to 
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be worshipped as the Indian Christ” (76). And Bricker observes that today, “The 
Passion cult is the only cult in Chamula for which the object of devotion is not a saint 
figure in the church. The emphasis is on impersonation rather than idolatry … There is 
abundant evidence that the Christ whom the Passion impersonates is this Indian Christ 
rather than the Ladino Savior (Bricker, 89).  
 Castellanos has adapted this story: First, In Oficio de tinieblas Pedro Díaz 
Cuscat is replaced by Catalina Díaz Puiljá (Pedro Winikitón’s wife) as the leader of 
the cult of the stones. In the second half of the novel, Díaz, disillusioned with her work 
as a wife, mother and ilol, goes into seclusion in a cave that she and her brother once 
visited when they were children. It is there that she encounters the stones around 
which she forms the cult. After a period of silent communal with them, she leaves and 
brings the community back to the cave, where she now acts as a translator for the 
stones, asking them questions from the people and relaying their answers. Second, 
where the finder of the stones and Domingo are linked, historically, by name only – 
Gomes or Gómez – Castellanos imagines that the leader of the cult, and Domingo’s 
mother are the same person. She has Catalina adopt Domingo nine years before she 
kills him.   
 The Chapter in question is Chapter XXXIII: Chapter 33, spelled out with three 
crosses and three individual digits. It is narrated from the perspectives of both Catalina 
and Domingo. Told from this double perspective, that of mother and son, the attack is 
characterized not just as a ritual killing, but also as an infanticide.  
 Castellanos exposes the psychology of motherhood as both banal, and extreme. 
There is nothing particular about Díaz’s mental state. Nothing that would not resonate 
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with Criolla readers. She sees in her son all of her communities’ reproach: “¿Quién es 
este extraño que ella ha entregado como complemento natural a la cruz? El bastardo 
de un caxlán de Jobel; la deshonra de una muchacha de su raza; la vergüenza oculta de 
Lorenzo; el reproche de su marido; su propia llaga” (319). And she remembers the 
abnegation that has pierced her life since she adopted him: “Si, la llaga que no cesa de 
sangrar, que no cicatriza nunca porque Domingo está presente siempre. A 
medianoche, cuando todos descansan, ella, Catalina, escucha la respiración del niño. 
Si es sosegada se apacigua. Pero si se entrecorta en un jadeo, correo a conjurar la 
amenaza de la fiebre” (319). For nine years, in other words, Catalina has been a 
mother - “No duerme. Vela en la oscuridad” (319) – a  slave to the fact that her own 
happiness in contingent upon the survival of her child.  
 But by crucifying Domingo, Catalina does not avenge herself of the sacrifices 
that, as his mother, she has made up to this point. Instead, she compounds them. As 
she watches her community prepare Domingo for the cross, she feels “defraudada” 
(319) because she knows now that he will never reach adulthood and repay her 
investment in him. 
 Castellanos also returns, in this chapter, to her vocation as a writer of 
children’s literature, or literature about children. Here, for the first and last time, the 
novel is told from Domingo’s perspective.  
 Domingo is not confused when the adults kneel at his feet, because he is used 
to the idea that adults kneel to talk to children. When they give him liquor, he is 
surprised by the taste, but then falls blissfully into his first inebriation, thinking that he 
would like to frolic in a field like a puppy. After he is bound to the cross, he is awoken 
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suddenly by Catalina, who throws cold water on him, in order to bring him back to 
himself. (Catalina is worried that God will not count an unconscious victim.) But even 
though he is uncomfortable, he is still not afraid, because he recognizes in Catalina’s 
expression her intent to protect him. The first time that he is stabbed, he is still not 
afraid, because he feels that he can escape from his body and his agony along with his 
blood, which is gushing from the wound. Domingo only comes to experience terror at 
the end, when he recognizes that he has become subjected to strength; a strength 
defined in apposition of his weakness, and as he feels that it is not his own life that is 
ending but the world.  
 Castellanos’s omniscient narrator, still inside Domingo’s mind, explains the 
ways that Domingo’s education has and has not prepared him to experience his own 
crucifixion: 
 
 Es un niño pero su infancia no ha sido preservada de la contemplación de la 
 lucha desigual entre los seres. Desde su nacimiento lo marcaron con la cifra 
 indeleble de la única ley que rige el mundo: la de la fuerza. Presenció, 
 temblando, los asaltos nocturnos de los coyotes a los gallineros, vio descender, 
 rápido y certero como una flecha, el gavilán sobre su presa; se defendió de las 
 atajadoras en las entradas a Jobel; durante la celebración de las festividades 
 asistió a las riñas de los rivales. Y vio, sin espanto, como sobre la cara del 
 caído, golpeaba, una y otra vez, el caite de suela triple y cuádruple del 
 vencedor, hasta desfigurarlo. Pero nada era semejante a la desgracia que se 
 había abatido sobre él. Nada. Ni siquiera ese instante en que la tribu entera 
 enarbolaba el palo, el machete, el luk, para acabar con el perro rabioso. O con 
 el brujo.  
 
  
 To understand Domingo as the double object, as a sacrifice and an infanticide, 
it is necessary to understand this attack in its mass(ive) dimension. It is massive 
violence not because it is carried out by a mass of people – indeed, when we consider 
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the way it is narrated, from the mother and then the son’s perspective, we see right 
away that it is an intimate scene – but because of its destructive intentionality towards 
an object that it simultaneously constructs as an individual. This construction is a 
parody of the construction of the modern individual intended by a federally sanctioned 
pedagogical program that Castellanos, as an administrator and teacher, adheres to.59 In 
this scene, Domingo is brought back to a state of speechlessness, and then taught to 
speak again. Once he is able to speak, the discourse that Castellanos attributes to him 
is the one quoted above, recognizably, that of the archetypical child subject that we 
find at the heart of indigenist literature:  
 In this literature, the child is subjected to a regimen of violence that is taboo. 
Not in the sense that, in America or Europe, it is taboo at this time to subject children 
in literature to any amount of violence.60 Rather, this regimen is taboo in the sense that 
                                                
59	  The child first emerges as an individualized subject in the political context of 
institutional indigenismo. In Chiapas the SEP (Secretaría de Educación Pública), for 
which Castellanos worked, becomes the apparatus responsible for the subjection of 
children to pedagogic indigenismo: identified, chiefly, with bilingual or translational 
education. The child’s experience is necessarily the experience that institutional 
indigenismo first seeks to act on. This action takes the form of an attempted 
intervention the child’s experience, to transform it into individual knowledge during 
childhood. (See Lewis, Stephen E. The Ambivalent Revolution: Forging State and 
Nation in Chiapas, 1910-1945) 	  
60 Certainly, when the child emerges as a subject in socialist literature in Europe, for 
instance, the work of Michael Ende, he is subjected to really excessive amounts of 
violence. This is true even in the domain of literary criticism. It was the children’s 
literary theorist, Bruno Bettelheim that insisted that the function of the child in 
literature/as well as literature for the child was to represent or instill a terror that would 
bring the child once again into contact with the imminence of his death. (Bettelheim, 
Bruno: The Uses of Enchantment). And this is not a minor point, or a digression. I 
bring this up because it is an ongoing problem is Latin American literary criticism that 
the representation of violence against children that we find in the indigenist classics 
spanning the period of 1945 to 1974 is almost never related to the violence against 
children that we find in contemporary, European literature.  
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it conforms to a particular aesthetic that encompasses the taboo: Bodily processes, 
consumption, elimination and copulation exchange functions. This aesthetic is 
perfected by José Maria Arguedas. (See the rape of Marcelina in Los Rios Profundos.) 
Not only in his novels, but also in his short stories, many of which were originally 
performed orally for a working class Peruvian audience, Arguedas folds the abuse that 
he was subjected to as a child into a diegesis that combines the particularly Hispanic 
aesthetic of el picaresco with the existential; the insatiable desires that one cannot 
escape in life are pulled apart in space and in time. Arguedas’s narratives about 
children are not activist. Instead, they locate and celebrate the joy at the heart of 
common childhood humiliations. When Arguedas read his short stories out loud in 
Peru, his audiences laughed.61   
 
The siege of gossip lifted  
 
After Domingo is killed, the Indians begin their march on Ciudad Real. It is a march 
that will never end because they go round in circles, attacking provincial haciendas, 
but never arriving at the city. César Santiago explains that the Indians are not 
disorganized; rather their route is predetermined. It is merely an iteration of routes 
taken in the past. Nevertheless, rumors of the impending invasion reach Ciudad Real 
and cause panic. Two men on the night watch kill one another, terrified of the prospect 
                                                
61 We hear this laughter when José Maria Arguedas reads aloud from his Confesiones 
an episode called La Mula. MrRppc. Confesiones de José María Arguedas – La Mula. 
Actualizado el 19 ene. 2011. Accedido en Marzo 2016. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G2qy0EukRDc.	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of becoming victims of an Indian massacre. The official story is that they were 
assassinated. Leonardo Cifuentes confides in Julia Quevedo the truth: “Pero no los 
mataron los indios. Eso lo invitamos nosotros. / ¿Entonces qué? / Se mataron entre 
ellos. De miedo.” (335) 
 By confiding in Julia at this moment Leonardo Cifuentes breaks a silence by 
which he had previously excluded her from political intercourse: “Julia conocía muy 
bien estas separaciones que impone, aun a la proximidad más íntima, la preocupación, 
el cuidado de asuntos ajenos al amor. Y las detestaba.” (334) Whereas the novel has, 
up to this point, constituted Leonardo Cifuentes as the prototypical cacique: A 
philanderer, rapist and murderer intent on achieving commercial and political 
soberanía, now he becomes the first man in Oficio de tinieblas to cross the divide 
between the male and female spheres and establish camaraderie with a woman. This 
radical gesture is precipitated by a reversal in roles: 
 Leonardo Cifuentes was, under normal conditions, impervious to scandal. He 
was not bothered by the fact that gossip about his villainy circulated throughout 
Ciudad Real, because he understood that it did so only as a supplement to his 
immunity before the law. Now, however, Leonardo, who remains otherwise calm in 
the state of emergency, is scandalized by the conduct of those around him: “Se 
escandalizaba de la conducta de los otros. Les había señalado, como su jefe que era en 
la presente situación de emergencia, obligaciones muy precisas. Todas los 
beneficiaban directamente a ellos y sin embargo las evadían con los pretextos más 
inverosímiles” (335).  
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 Castellanos gives the cacique narrative an anticlimactic twist; It is Leonardo 
Cifuentes, and his loyalty to his city’s functional depravity, that the city herself 
betrays, leading Leonardo to reflect: “(de una manera difícil, dolorosa y, para él, 
imposible de formular) era que no valía la pena haberse esforzado tanto por ser una 
parte integrante, viva de Ciudad Real” (334). It suspends this depravity, including 
gossip. Leonardo Cifuentes is almost horrified that he no longer has to feign discretion 
when visiting Julia Quevedo in her husband’s home: “Visitaba a la Alazana sin para 
consumar sus abominaciones” (335).  
 Julia Quevedo’s home is the apex of this phenomenon of candor.   
 The last half of the novel deconstructs the institution of the tertulia, which is 
the most important space of gossip in the novel.  
 A tertulia is a recurring meeting, in which people from the same class come 
together in an intimate setting to share their downtime. In the early 20th century, in 
Central America and Southern Mexico, seating areas in cafés where people spent long 
periods of time were sometimes called tertulias. Additionally, the word tertulia can 
refer to a manual. There are tertulias for Spanish grammar and Spanish usage. The 
tertulia is not necessarily a gendered space, but in Oficio de tinieblas it is upper class 
women who attend weekly tertulias.62 
 The right to host the tertulia is a dubious privilege, as Julia Quevedo learns 
when she wrests this right from Isabel Cifuentes. With the help of Leonardo and 
Idolina, Isabel’s daughter, she succeeds in relocating the tertulia to her own home. 
                                                
62 Vega Jiménez, Patricia. Con Sabor a Tertulia : Historia Del Consumo Del Café En 
Costa Rica, 1840-1940. 1. ed. San José, Costa Rica: Icafe, Instituto del Café de Costa 
Rica , 2004 
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Leonardo subsidizes the food and drink, and Isabel instructs Julia in the minutiae of 
the organization of the event. However, her attendees abuse her hospitality, dirtying 
her house and eating all of her food. 
 Worst of all, Julia’s guests finally include her in their gossip, revealing an 
unpleasant truth: That there is no variety in experience in Ciudad Real. What would 
seem to qualify an event as fodder for gossip, its singularity, is an illusion. Every item 
of gossip is an iteration, because every experience that it refers to is, universally, 
Coleto. 
 A shift in narrative voice and style underscores this revelation. The omniscient 
narrator gives way to a second person narrator, which tells “you” (la coleta) 
everything that you will experience in Ciudad Real. It does this, while repeating a 
litany of objects around which “your” experience will hinge: El padre, los hombres, el 
dinero: 
 
 El padre, ante cuya presencia enmudecen el terror los niños y de respeto los 
 mayores… 
 El padre que bendice la mesa y el sueno, el que alarga su mano para que la 
 besen sus deudos en el saludo y en la despedida. 
 El padre que, una vez, te sentó en sus rodillas y acarició tu larga trenza de 
 adolescente. (286) 
 
Another object that constitutes the litany is fama; reputation.  
  
 Fama. Hay que hacerse una cruz sobre la boca para que ángel guardián nos 
 libre de cometer el crimen – porque sí, es un crimen – de herir la reputación de 
 nuestros semejantes, de inventar calumnias, de propagar rumores.  
 ¡Pero la conversación sería tan desabrida sin el granito de sal de las 
 murmuraciones!  
 Con suavidad, con lentitud, con delicadeza se remueven los sepulcros 
 blanqueados y escapa el olor fétido de los secretos que no pueden callarse 
 porque claman al cielo. De injusticia, de dolor, de miseria.  
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 No se puede callar. Porque si se callara lo que está oculto bajo los techos, bajo 
 las sábanas, se pudriría, hasta contaminar el mundo entero.  
 
 
Because of the inclusion of fama in this litany, gossip, originally about people’s lives, 
is revealed to be the thing that people’s lives are about in Ciudad Real. At least, it is 
normally.  
 But when the city is subjected to military siege, the siege that it was placed 
under by gossip is lifted:  
 Leonardo volvió la cabeza para ver a Julia ya vestida, lista para su tertulia de la 
 tarde. ¿Pero quién asistiría? Las que no estaban encerradas a piedra y lodo, 
 refugiadas en alacenas y en el interior de aljibes vacíos vagaban por las calles 
 como locas, confesando a gritos sus pecados, arrodillándose ante cualquier 
 transeúnte para pedirle perdón. (335)  
 
 
Reflections: 
 
 Let us never entertain the idea that gossip in Oficio de Tinieblas is a means for 
wondering self-expression, or for solidarity. (To borrow words used by Spacks.) There 
can be no genuine wonder about experience expressed by gossip when that gossip is 
about an experience that is already known, and that is universally particular to ones 
town. Likewise, there can be no solidarity.   
 Recently, in 2013, Edgardo Cozarinky expanded his essay, El museo del 
chisme, originally published in 1973. The essay posits narrative fiction as a genre of 
gossip. It arrives at this position as it compares the situation of the writer of narrative 
fiction to that of the writer of history in America. The latter earns a space of social 
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privilege. With his discourse, he performs an obligation to the establishing members 
of his society and to its descendants. The former, eschews this space. His discourse 
treats only the particular, and works only to provoke pleasure. – Cozarinsky, evoking 
what I have called the aporia of gossip, posited by Gluckman, focuses on the pleasure 
that story telling brings the story teller as, potentially, the other side of the pain that it 
brings to its subject. - Most frequently, Cozarinky reports, the fiction writer does not 
realize what he has eschewed until after the fact. That is, until he has discovered that 
the kind of writing he does is a form of leisure (ocio), which the pillars of his society 
revile because it is neutral towards them.  
 Cozarinky implies that the intense aversion that national, civic and ethnic 
authorities feel towards both gossip and narrative fiction is proportionate to the threat 
that a neutral position represents.  
 Castellanos appears aware of the potential of gossip to constitute such a threat. 
The siege of gossip will be instituted again in Ciudad Real. It is a siege under which 
women and men, Ladinos and Indians, will find that their lives refer back to gossip, 
and that the content of that gossip is universally particular. A siege that renders 
Chiapas neutral, and thus dissident before the consideration of the nation state.    
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CHAPTER 3 
THE REPRODUCTION OF WOMEN RADICALS’ BOOKS IN THE 
CONTEMPORARY LATIN AMERICAN NOVEL: 
A CASE STUDY OF MARIO VARGAS LLOSA’S  
EL PARAISO EN LA OTRA ESQUINA 
 
 
 
… escribiste, a poco de llegar a Francia, tu primer libro. Mejor dicho, librito, 
folleto de pocas páginas: Sobre la necesidad de dar una buena acogida a las 
extranjeras. Ahora, ese texto romántico, sentimental, lleno de buenas intenciones 
acerca de la nula o mala acogida que recibían las forasteras en Francia, te 
avergonzaba por su ingenuidad. (351)  
 
 
This chapter explains and contextualizes a practice of quotation in Mario Vargas 
Llosa’s El paraíso en la otra esquina that attributes to the radical 18th century feminist, 
Flora Tristán, feelings of shame about her books. For example, the above excerpt 
summarizes Tristán’s pamphlet, Sobre la necesidad de dar una buena acogida a las 
extranjeras, a treatise about the mistreatment of female travelers by the French, 
criticizing it as romantic, sentimental and naive: “romántico, sentimental … te 
avergonzaba por su ingenuidad.” The excerpt is typical not only in the way that it 
negatively qualifies Tristán’s writing, but also in the way that it softens the blow of its 
critique. Using a second person narrative voice, it imbeds judgment inside of Flora’s own 
interior monologue. We, the readers, thus understand that in El paraíso it is Flora who 
brutalizes her own work, and not the novel’s third person narrator.  
This brutalization constitutes a ruminative thought pattern that defines the way 
that the character Flora Tristán relates to the books she wrote before 1843 from the 
vantage point of a diegetic present, 1844, and contrasts with the way that she relates to 
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the books she is currently disseminating or drafting. The latter category includes, La 
unión obrera, Tristán’s manifesto for the creation of an international workers’ union, and 
also Le Tour de France, a journal which the narrator tells us will be published after her 
death in 1844 by her biographer Jules Puech. Her orientation towards these works is 
characterized by activity and intentionality. Flora is physically exhausted but spiritually 
invigorated by the labor of disseminating La unión obrera; And this is communicated by 
the undaunted tone that the narrator bestows on Tristán in the diegetic present, which, 
supposedly, corresponds to the undaunted tone of her journal.  
The difference between these two ways of relating to her books, past and present, 
produces an effect: what I call the artifact status of the historical Flora Tristán’s books in 
Vargas Llosa’s novel. This becomes, in turn, a model for the potential artifact status of 
Vargas Llosa’s own, El Paraíso en la otra esquina. Understanding this represents a first 
step towards understanding El Paraíso’s singular potential to transcend a small but 
significant corpus of novels in Latin America that do not simply quote from, but actually 
reproduce the books of women radicals.  
MarioVargas Llosa in not the only Peruvian writer of the early 21st century to 
have published a work on the basis of Flora Tristán’s books. In 2011, the playwright Juan 
Rivera Saavedra also published two plays, Ciudadana de segunda categoría and Tras 
aquella puerta. The first play imagines an encounter between Tristán and an imaginary 
female proletarian. Saavedra actually wrote most of Ciudadana in the mid 1980s. Today, 
however, he does not consider it a success: “Era básicamente una pieza para mujeres … 
no me convencía de todo” (Saavedra, Voces, 88) He prefers Tras aquella puerta, in 
which all of his characters are men, and celebrities at that: “Chateaubriand, Lord Byron, 
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Goethe, Eugenio Sué” (88). In Tras aquella puerta, Saavedra stages a conversation 
between these men, about Tristán, at the gates of hell.  
Saavedra records, in his own journal, that his students informed him that Vargas 
Llosa was writing about Tristán at the same time. (Saavedra, Obras Seleccionadas, 117) 
Later, in an interview for Voces, he reports coinciding with Vargas Llosa in terms of his 
interpretation of Tristán’s writing and what it signified about her sexuality: He agrees 
with Vargas Llosa that there is no evidence that Tristán’s lesbianism ever materialized 
outside of her letters to her female friends.  
All of these works embrace the same deviances and eccentricities that make the 
books they quote radical.63 Still, El Paraíso en la otra esquina is unique in the way that 
its use of its original source material produces the figure of the artifact.    
 
The figure of the artifact  
 
 The figure of the artifact is distinguished by three phenomena: authorship, 
transfiguration and excision.  
 To speak about a book as an artifact is to return to the figure of the author. “An 
artifact has necessarily a maker or an author; thus artifact and author can be regarded as 
correlative concepts” (Hilpinen, 2011). The distance between authorial intention and an 
                                                
63 I would not, for comparison, include in this list Elena Poniatowska’s novel Querido 
Diego te abraza Quiela, an epistolary novel composed of letters written by the Russian 
painter Angelina Beloff to her husband Diego Rivera. This novel is thematically 
comparable to the books I have already mentioned, since it reads as an apology for its 
main character’s self-destructive commitment to her male partner.  
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artifact is a defining question in the field of artifact studies. On the one hand, sources 
have asserted that an artifact is only ever a thing its author has intended. On the other it 
has been claimed that the artifact has at times been both this intended thing and also the 
byproduct of its fabrication.  
 As Hilpinen allegorizes: Both the clothes a tailor makes and the scraps a tailor 
produces have been called artifacts by different people for different reasons. And in this 
way artifact has become its own homonym and antonym. I would argue that this 
instability, or turn in the discourse of artifact studies, does itself most resemble the latter 
kind of artifact. But the more salient point is that this question reveals intentionality as the 
limit for our recognition of the artifact. There can be no such recognition, except on one 
or the other side of intention.  
 Closely related to the question of authorial intention, is a secondary question of 
prosthesis. Some, but certainly not most, scholars of the artifact have proposed that we 
qualify authorial intention by recognizing it specifically as the intention to make a thing 
for use. According to this line of thought, all artifacts are also prostheses through which 
one acts on the world, and it is this praxis, made possible by the object, and not the mere 
employment of the object – not the mere keeping busy and in motion of the object - that 
makes it an artifact.  
 In the fields of both disability studies and art studies this operation works 
backwards as well as forwards. The act of using a literal prosthesis to create an artwork 
might not have the intention of creating an artwork, but it can constitute the prosthesis as 
an artifact by putting it in use.  
 El Paraíso en la otra esquina dramatizes these features of authorship by 
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representing Flora Tristán’s books as objects that the author creates through the force of 
her will, that cannot be reduced to an effect of the writer’s meager education, and that 
come to make up a part of her praxis in a way that gloriously over-determines the course 
of her life.  
 The second characteristic of the artifact is its definitive place in the semiotic 
environment. Contemporary philosophy of technology differentiates the artifact from 
other modified natural objects by insisting upon the impossibility of the return of the 
artifact to the material world. To illustrate this point, artifact studies commonly employs 
the following just-so-story:  
 Many species besides human beings modify natural objects and use these as tools. 
But this is not a semiotic act. These objects, once modified, may be discarded and return 
again to the physical environment. Consequently, when an anthropologist describes an 
object that an animal used as a tool (a lure, a spear, etc.) he does not refer to it as a lure or 
a spear but calls it a stick used for “reaching” or a “spear” in quotation marks. (This 
pattern of usage is exemplified in the writing if Shumaker, 2011). On the other hand, an 
artifact is precisely that which can never be discarded or return again to the physical 
environment. A stick once used as a lure by human hands will always be a lure. (Leino, 
2012). The common language of anthropology affirms that, while any one can create 
tools, only permanent residents of the semiotic environment can create artifacts.  
 This premise constitutes an essential predicate for a Marxian philosophy of 
alienation (Ihde, 1990). It should be specified, though, that it is not clear whether the 
moment of alienation that this premise imagines, in which an object becomes 
nonreturnable to its physical environment, belongs to history or to mythology. That is, 
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whether the production of a lure takes place sequentially, occurring over and over again 
every time a new lure is made; or whether, these mundane events are merely reiterations 
of an original alienation that constitutes a mythological event: the expulsion of Adam and 
Eve from a pre-semiotic garden.  
 El Paraíso en la otra esquina represents its main characters as traumatized by this 
expulsion. In one scene that I examine closely in this chapter - which is the scene in 
which Tristán/Vargas Llosa treat the London finishes -  Tristán uses her writing to 
represent a chain of diabolical semiotification/implementation of objects. The novel thus 
posits that Tristán’s own writing becomes a tool with which to do battle with other tools 
that are in use.   
Finally, a third, recently theorized characteristic of the artifact is its static 
presence with relation to the assemblage and dis-assemblage of technologies, including 
machines, social systems and discourses. This is a premise that arises as the common 
language of positivist discourse meets that of contemporary hermeneutics. Hilpinen 
explains that, “in experimental science, the expression ‘artifact’ is sometimes used to 
refer to experimental results which are not manifestations of the natural phenomena under 
investigation, but are due to the particular experimental arrangement, and hence 
indirectly to human agency” (2011). In contemporary hermeneutics and especially 
hermeneutics after the book, “experimental results,” can be replaced with “experiential 
results”: Thus, for example, the semiotician O.T. Leino may refer to computer games and 
“the ways in which the materiality of the computer game artefact shapes the phenomenon 
of gameplay” (2012).  
 In both these formulations, the term artifact or artefact refers to something not 
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necessarily accidental, but extra to the assemblage through which the experimenter or 
experiencer acts and understands. Implicit is the idea that, by virtue of already being in 
excess, the artifact cannot be simply deconstructed with the assemblage. This idea 
corresponds with the generally accepted notion that one final characteristic of the artifact 
is its potential intact movability. 
 El Paraíso en la otra esquina dramatizes the intact movability of the texts of 
Flora Tristán through long-quotation, and hyper-quotation. Large passages of text are 
reproduced with almost word for word accuracy, and stand out from the greater text of 
the novel.   
 To sum-up: Authorship, transfiguration and excision define the phenomenology 
of the book in El paraíso en la otra esquina. The novel revalidates the concept of the 
author by insisting upon Flora Tristán as the material fact that precedes her books and by 
not admitting or dramatically exploiting any difference between Flora Tristán – her 
biological self, her experience and her way of thinking - and her books. It stages the 
transfiguration of the book - text to book - as the major significant event that takes place 
in the novel. Positing, in turn, this new text as book as a tool of confrontation in a 
semiotic environment filled up with diabolical tools. And finally, it reproduces the book 
as a limit, something that cannot be deconstructed with its assemblage, something that is 
destined to survive even this analysis of Vargas Llosa’s novel.  
In the next part of this chapter I will explore Vargas Llosa’s reproduction of three 
of Tristán’s books, Peregrinaciones de una paria, Paseos en Londres and La Unión 
obrera, and how, in each case, this reproduction produces some or all of these 
phenomena. 
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Peregrinaciones de una paria 1838/2003  
 
Flora Tristán was born in 1803 to Therese Anne Pierre Laisnay and Mariano de 
Tristán y Moscoso. Her mother was a French war refugee and her father a Peruvian 
colonel in the Spanish army. The two met in Bilbao and were married in a religious 
ceremony. Four years later, Mariano de Tristán died and Flora and Therese were plunged 
into misery. As a teenager in Paris, Flora began working as a colorist for a lithographer, 
Andrés Chazal. She married Chazal soon after meeting him and, in short order, had three 
children by him. However, after the birth of her last child, she abandoned the marriage, 
fleeing Paris to work as a maid in England. Her husband immediately brought criminal 
charges of abandonment against her in France.  
In 1833, Tristán, almost thirty years old, attempted to repair both her financial and 
legal situation by traveling to Arequipa, and meeting her Peruvian family. There, she 
sought her paternal inheritance, which was in the hands of her father’s brother, Pío de 
Tristán. She was ultimately denied on the grounds that there was no contract of civil 
marriage between her parents, but her journey formed the basis of her first book, 
Peregrinaciones de una paria, which she published upon returning to Europe. The book, 
part memoir, part travelogue, and part political manifesto, turned Tristán into an 
overnight celebrity in Europe and a pariah in Peru.  
A rich tradition of scholarship and literature now exists around Peregrinaciones 
in Peru. The contemporary incarnation of this tradition begins with the complete 
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translation of Peregrinaciones in 1946 by the writer Emilia Romero de Valle.64 The 
Peruvian historian Jorge Basadre wrote a preface to this translation, in which he affirms 
that he possesses an ongoing relationship with Peregrinaciones de una paria, having 
begun his career with an article based on a lost, 1925, translation by Jorge Guillermo 
Leguía. Basadre’s introduction contains many bio-bibliographic details about Tristán that 
Mario Vargas Llosa distills in his own preface to a 2005 republication of Romero’s 
translation. More importantly, Basadre’s introduction contains negative judgments about 
Flora Tristán’s writing that Mario Vargas Llosa has Flora Tristán confront in his novel. 
The most stunning (of multiple examples65) is a judgment about letters that Flora 
Tristán wrote to her husband, Andrés Chazal before they were married. According to 
Basadre, Tristán’s letters refute the idea that she puts forth in Peregrinaciones de una 
paria that she married under duress: “Parece inverosímil la afirmación de Flora de que 
este matrimonio fue impuesto por la madre (de ella) … más bien hay, de esa época, 
apasionados documentos suyos dirigidos a Chazal, sólo seis años mayor que ella, 
escritos sin freno y sin ortografía” (I). Here, Basadre focuses on the idea that the letters 
were romantic in sentiment, and adds a barb about Tristán’s off the cuff style of prose 
and poor spelling.  
                                                
64 Romero’s career has been largely eclipsed by that of her husband, Rafael Heliodoro 
Valle. One wishes that the 1946 edition of Peregrinaciones included a note by the 
translator.  http://www.jstor.org/stable/20138880?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents. 
65 For instance, Basadre calls Flora Tristán’s novel, Méphis (the only work of fiction that 
Tristán ever produced) “una novela filosófica y social, llena de truculencia romántica, 
con un argumento largo e inverosímil …” (X) To which Mario Vargas Llosa’s second 
person narrator appears to reply, “And you wrote Méphis … a novel which few people 
read and the critics judged dreadful. (Maybe it was. You didn’t care. What mattered was 
not an aesthetic that lulled people into pleasant slumber but rather the reform of society)” 
(17). 
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Basadre’s critique is exaggerated but recognizable in Vargas Llosa’s novel. Here 
it appears imbedded in the novel’s second person narration:  
 
Y sin embargo, Florita idiota … después de aquella repugnante violación  
escribiste a Andrés Chazal esa carta que el miserable haría pública diecisiete años 
más tarde, ante un tribunal de París. Una esquela mentirosa, estúpida, con todos 
los lugares comunes que una muchacha enamorada debía decir a su amante 
después de ofrecerle su virginidad. ¡Y con tantas faltas de ortografía y de 
sintaxis!” (49)  
 
 
But the novel’s second person narrator constructs a sophisticated apology for these letters 
within the quotation. He* insists that these were not manifestations of genuine affection, 
but of a traumatic response to an initial sexual encounter with Chazal that was equivalent 
to being raped. If the writing in the letters was cliché, it was cliché precisely because it 
was compulsory, or even compulsive. It was compelled within a major, hegemonic mode 
of storytelling: “Por qué se la escribiste si te habías levantado muerta de asco de aquel 
chaise-longue? Porque eso hacían en las novelitas las heroínas desfloradas.”  
 In this context, what was originally Basadre’s critique appears, narrated in the 
second person, to be Flora Tristán’s self-critique. But it is also made to appear ridiculous 
as it focuses on the stylistic faults of the writing - its poor spelling and syntax, and even 
its substitution of romantic clichés for truth – to the exclusion of the interpersonal context 
in which the writing was completed. This exaggerated critique is thus performatively 
self-abusing, making the point that Flora Tristán’s claim to have been forced into 
marriage and her representation of reality in general in Peregrinaciones de una paria is 
accurate.  
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 El paraíso en la otra esquina suggests the possibility of receiving 
Peregrinaciones de una paria as a radically accurate book. That is, as a book that does 
not admit any difference between itself and the author or her intent. In this section of this 
chapter, I continue to explore this suggestion by focusing specifically on examples that 
intersect with Tristán’s sexuality.  
This is, obviously, not a comprehensive discussion: The highlights of 
Peregrinaciones are manifold: Tristán’s voyage across the Atlantic, during which the 
captain of the ship on which she was traveling fell in love with her; Her impressions of 
her family in Peru, as the embodiment of early nineteenth century Criollo society; Her 
testimony of the armed conflict in Peru between followers of Presidents Orbegoso and 
Gamarra, which includes a formal theorization of the institutionalization of war in Peru; 
And finally, encounters with individual female celebrities (or pariahs), whom she 
considered universal models for feminine subjection and resistance.  
 Based on the breadth and diversity of experiences had by Tristán during her brief 
journey (she was away from Europe for only two years), scholars have been able to 
produce a large amount of writing on the contradictions within Peregrinaciones. This 
academic writing often seems to benefit, stylistically, from the novelistic momentum that 
such tensions organically supply.  
 For instance, Francesca Denegri, in her study included at the bevining of the 2005 
edition of Peregrinaciones de una paria, identifies three things that Tristán actually 
chooses to keep secret, besides her letters to her husband. These include “la relación con 
su madre, la relación con su hija y finalmente, su propia sexualidad.” (Page) In short, 
Tristán’s entire orientation towards other women. Now, Denegri recognizes the political 
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impossibility of Tristán speaking to her own homosexuality in Peregrinaciones66, but she 
emphasizes that today these omissions lend Peregrinaciones the sort of psychological 
depth that is inherently engaging to readers: “Hay preguntas que zumban … en el oído 
del lector acerca de aquellas inconfesables ambiciones.” In short, Denegri appreciates and 
calls upon us to appreciate a narrative feature of Tristán’s writing that will attract 
potential 20th century readers to her memoir: mystery.  
 However, in his adaptation of each of these parts of Peregrinaciones for his 
novel, Vargas Llosa carefully disarms such aporia, reinscribing Peregrinaciones as the 
purest distillation of a mind unburdened by skepticism about its own intentions or 
destiny.  
 When Vargas Llosa’s Flora Tristán expresses shame about the content of 
Peregrinaciones, she qualifies and thus neutralizes her shame as a sacrifice necessary for 
the production of a praxis and of a corresponding text.  
 I explore these in the following examples, understanding that second person 
narration doubles as interior monologue.  
 In a first example, Flora expresses chagrin about content in Peregrinaciones that 
might have upset Zacharie Chabrié, the ship’s captain who fell in love with her, and who 
she profiled in her memoir: 
 
¿Qué habría sido del buen Chabrié todos estos años? Nunca habías vuelto a saber 
de él. Tal vez había leído las Peregrinaciones de una paria y de esta manera 
conocido la verdadera razón por la que te serviste de esa fea treta para rechazar su 
                                                
66 As for the other omissions that Denegri mentions it is worth recognizing that a 
gendered split exists in Tristán’s Peregrinaciones. Tristán exposes the lives of her male 
family members and friends with a brutal, insensible candor: See for instance her profile 
of her uncle Pío Tristán and friend Zacharias Chabrié. It is as though Tristán does not 
understand there to exist any discursive contract of good faith between men and women.  
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amor. ¿Te habría perdonado? ¿Te odiaría todavía? (238)  
 
Here, the second person narrator poses these questions in the context of a larger 
interrogation of Flora Tristán that explores the idea that there is a truth about her 
relationship with Chabrié that Peregrinaciones does not communicate directly. The 
narrator asks, for instance, if it is true that Flora Tristán never loved Chabrié: “Aunque 
nunca sentiste amor por él, lo cierto era, ¿no, Florita?” And the narrator also asks if it is 
true that that Flora Tristán never regretted toying with Chabrié’s emotions: “¿Te habías 
arrepentido, Florita … de haber jugado … con los sentimientos del buen Zacarías 
Chabrié?” (236 check) 
Alone, these questions introduce a certain narrative tension, driven by an implied 
contradiction between what Flora thought and what she wrote. However, the second 
person narrator of El paraíso answers both these questions at once: “No te arrepentías? 
No.” And, “Nunca sentiste amor por él.” These answers defuse narrative tension.  
This absence of narrative tension in Paraíso is not, however, a lack. It is 
necessary to the novel’s concept of praxis.67  
                                                
67 None of this is to say that Vargas Llosa’s diegetic Peregrinaciones de una paria is 
actually a faithful reproduction of the real Peregrinaciones de una paria. It is not. For 
instance, consider the way that the novel represents a culminating episode from Tristán’s 
relationship with Chabrié. In the original text, Tristán pledges eternal friendship to 
Chabrié, who responds by breaking down in unhappy tears:  
 
Esperaba lograr que M. Chabrié comprendiera que mi amistad le sería tan dulce 
como el amor … – He decidido, le dije, que usted será mi amigo toda la vida … 
¿Y nada más? … me preguntó con una voz emocionada. ¡Ah! ¡qué desgraciado 
soy! Continuó, dejando caer la cabeza entre las manos … Al verle así, presa del 
dolor, pensaba en lo que me había dicho la víspera M. David: los hombres no 
aman a las mujeres sino por amor … Desdeñan la amistad de las mujeres. (78) 
 
In Vargas Llosa’s novel, Trsitán also pledges eternal friendship to Chabrié. But, in the 
corresponding passage, Chabrié is crying not with disappointment but with illusion:  
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Ultimately, Tristán determines that it is not love that has led her to feel poignant 
emotions about her publication of Peregrinaciones de una paria, and her symbolic break 
with Chabrié, who may still have held an ideal version of her in his head. Rather it is the 
appreciation of the practical implications of publishing.  
 
¿Cómo habría sido tu vida, Florita, si te casabas con Chabrié y te ibas a enterrar 
con él a California, sin volver a poner los pies en Francia? Una vida tranquila y 
segura, sin duda. Pero, entonces, nunca habrías abierto los ojos, ni escrito libros… 
(238) 
 
After Peregrinaciones de una paria, there could never again be any contingencies in life. 
Rather, life, like her book, would emerge as an artifact of praxis.  
 This is not what happens to all authors, in the world depicted in Paraíso. For 
instance, the second person narrator compares the significance of Tristán’s 
Peregrinaciones to the writing of George Sand.68  
 
Si no fueras como eras, Florita, hubieras podido convertirte en una gran dama, 
gracias a la popularidad de que gozaste algún tiempo gracias a Peregrinaciones de 
una paria y a la tentativa de asesinato. Serías ahora una George Sand, señora del 
gran mundo, halagada y respectada, con una intensa vida social… (364) 
 
 Here, the narrator acknowledges that Peregrinaciones was, briefly, quite a 
popular book. They also mention an episode in which Chazal, following the publication 
of Peregrinaciones, discovered Tristán and shot her on the street. They confirm that the 
public read, and even enjoyed, this shooting as a continuation of the personal drama that 
                                                                                                                                            
 
The seaman was trembling … so mortified by his forwardness … You told him 
that you would always love him as the best of friends. In an impulse that would 
bring you trouble later, you took his face in your hands and kissed him on the 
forehead. Crossing himself, the captain of the Mexicain thanked God for making 
him the happiest man on earth. (English trans/replace later.) 
68 Paraíso downplays the extent to which Tristán felt disappointment about George Sand, 
and the lifestyle that the latter chose. 
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Tristán had begun to narrate in Peregrinaciones.   
 And yet, contrary to this public reading, which constituted Peregrinaciones as a 
confession, a transformation of Tristán’s tragic past into a story for consumption, the 
second person narrator reads Peregrinaciones as a manifesto, one which predicts a life 
distinguished by unpaid praxis.  
 The structure of this reading exactly reproduces the structure of Tristán’s 
reflections about Chabrié’s hypothetical reading of her text. It is an if/then structure, 
hinging on the use of the conditional. If Flora had been different, then the significance of 
Peregrinaciones would be different. But once again, the narrator introduces this 
hypothetical only to dismiss it, and to affirm a singular narrated and lived reality.  
Efraín Kristal, in his chapter on El paraíso en la otra esquina for the Cambridge 
Companion to Vargas Llosa, provides a description of the narrator’s proximity to 
characters’ consciousness.  
 
Vargas Llosa’s narrator oscillates Between a third-person descriptive mode and 
second-person singular voice, engaged in an intimate, ambiguous dialogue with 
his protagonists’ consciousness: at times the narrator appears to raise his own 
unresolved questions regarding his character’s aspirations. There are even 
moments in which the narrator encourages his characters to revisit some of their 
own experiences, with hindsight and a historical perspective that belong to him 
rather than to them. (132) 
 
Kristal describes the labor of the second person narrator in El paraíso en la otra 
esquina as wholesome. He proposes that this narrator is a mediator. They work with both 
a theoretical third person – maybe Vargas Llosa, maybe Flora Tristán’s superego - and a 
theoretical first person – the authentic Flora. And for Kristal, this is not just a formal 
mediation, what Franz Karl Stanzel has referred to as “mediacy”, the felt imminence of 
one or more harmonious or contradictory narrative voices, but also more importantly, a 
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moral mediation.69 Because it is “empathy” imbuing. In conversation with the second 
person narrator, Flora Tristán reencounters the reflected self of her early books.  
This is a misleading description of what occurs in the novel. To say that the 
narrator “encourages” Flora Tristán to “revisit” her experiences almost seems to suggest 
that the narration carries out some sort of psychoanalytic project. This doesn’t happen. 
Flora Tristán does not acquire any empathy for her reflected self, that version of herself 
reflected in her early works. Instead, she appreciates the practical necessity of her early 
works. And this appreciation is not a factor of any process. Instead, it is itself a practice. 
Each if/then statement that the second person proffers about Tristán’s early work is an 
iteration of a previous if/then statement.  
Miguel Oviedo, writing for the Guatemalan literary review, Luvina, provides a 
more accurate description:  
 
(En El  paraíso en la otra esquina hay un) recurso narrativo también reconocible 
en el repertorio técnico del autor: la constante interiorización de la experiencia 
que los personajes viven al desdoblarse y dialogar consigo mismos en 
segunda persona. Pero hay una notoria diferencia con los moldes narrativos 
habituales en el Vargas Llosa de (su) primera época, cuando el estilo instintivo y 
de altísima carga dramática otorgaba a sus novelas un clima de arrolladora 
tensión. Aquí la acción, en sí misma vasta y compleja en grados y niveles muy 
distintos, está narrada a través de reflexiones o recuerdos de los personajes; es 
decir, desde los remansos de su conciencia, lo que agudiza su cualidad reflexiva, 
propia del ensayo. 
(http://luvina.com.mx/foros/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=806
&Itemid=50) 
 
                                                
69	  Franz Karl Stanzel, who affirms the expansion of the definition of the parallel concept, 
“free indirect style”: “In recent decades the literary explanation of free indirect style has 
concentrated … on its extrasyntactical aspects. More of the literary explanations of free 
indirect style today agree in assuming that the essence of free indirect style lies in the 
dual view of the events from the perspective of the narrator and from that of a fictional 
character” (Stanzel 191).	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Oviedo identifies the second person narrative mode explicitly as one in which 
Flora Tristán dialogues with herself. However, although he says that this mode 
constitutes a form of interiorization (“interiorización”), he clarifies that the effect is one 
of untwining (“desdoblarse”) rather than intimacy. Moreover, Oviedo compares this 
narrative mode with ones preferred by Vargas Llosa in his earlier, historical fiction, by 
specifying that it does not work to create dramatic tension, but rather, to qualify Paraíso 
as a “novela-ensayo-crónica de la utopia”. Here, Oviedo is less negative than critics 
writing in English.70 While the novela-ensayo-crónica does not contain a lot of dramatic 
tension, it does testify to the praxis of its author, and the author’s sources. Oviedo hints 
that this quality actually furthers, perhaps even completes Vargas Llosa’s literary project.  
Oviedo’s description of the second person narrative mode in Paraíso does not 
explicitly recognize dialogue as a form of intertextuality. But it is still the most 
comprehensive description available. It especially exceeds Kristal’s description by 
considering utopia as a referent of this dialogue, without recurring to explanations that 
hinge on empathy, something that isn’t really created by the second person in the text.71   
                                                
70 See, for example Michael Dirda’s Book Review in the Washington Post: “Vargas Llosa 
certainly knows everything about the nature of fiction, but that doesn't preclude making 
misjudgments. To evoke the obsessive quality of Flora and Paul's views of the world, he 
never quits their consciousnesses. As a result, The Way to Paradise gains textual intensity 
but must also settle for a kind of narrowness and claustrophobia … As narrative The Way 
to Paradise is virtually inert. The book loops backward and forward in time to describe 
the lives of its protagonists, but almost as though this were experimental biography, not 
fiction.” And also Alfred Hickling’s Book Review in The Guardian: “Ultimately, 
however, it is these tensions and contradictions within Gauguin that make him the more 
fully realized fictional creation. This is also a matter of circumstance - the local colour of 
the South Sea islands is invariably richer than Flora's endless itinerary of dour workers' 
meetings, which invariably begin to merge into one another after a while.”  
71 Kristal on empathy: Vargas Llosa used to treat his fanatics and eccentrics at a remove, 
with distance and reserve, sometimes with a measure of irony or even contempt. In The 
Way to Paradise, he presents his fanatical protagonists with more indulgence, greater 
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A Shameful Excerpt/Exception  
 
There is an exception to the pattern by which Flora Tristán expresses shame about 
her writing in Peregrinaciones de una paria. It is an exception that, I think, proves the 
rule. Because it doesn’t use the self-deflating if/then structure that the examples I explore 
above use.72 Instead, it seems to function as a straightforward statement of regret. Here, 
Tristán regrets using dehumanizing language to describe the African slaves whom she 
sold during her journey across the Atlantic.  
 
En el libro que publicaste en 1838, Peregrinaciones de una paria, contando aquel 
viaje al Perú, en el relato de tu paso por La Praia incluías aquellas frases sobre 
<<el olor a negro, que no puede compararse con nada, que da náuseas y que 
persigue por todas partes>> de las que nunca te arrepentirías bastante. ¡Olor a 
negro! Cuánto habías lamentado después esa imbecilidad frívola... No era el 
<<olor a negro>> lo repugnante en aquella isla, sino el olor a la miseria y la 
crueldad... Pese a todo lo que habías aprendido en materia de injusticia, todavía 
eras una ignorante cuando escribiste las Peregrinaciones de una paria.  (180)  
 
In this one case, if in no other, it does appear that, as Kristal says, “the narrator 
encourages his characters to revisit some of their own experiences, with hindsight and a 
historical perspective that belong to him rather than to them.” Here the implicit third 
                                                                                                                                            
empathy and less distance ... Indeed, there is a clear parallel Between Vargas Llosa’s 
fictional account of Flora Tristán’s courageous, but failed attempt to launch a political 
movement in the novel and his autobiographical account, A Fish in the Water... of his 
own unsuccessful effort to establish … apolitical party during the Peruvian presidential 
campaign of 1990.  ß Save for part about praxis in the moment. This is incorrect because 
VLL’s Tristán’s late texts are not failed texts in the diegesis. / Or empathy  
72 This pattern is repeated in the if/then statement that suggests shame about the way that 
Tristán deceived her uncle: ¿Qué cara habría puesto don Mariano de Goyenche, leyendo, 
en Peregrinaciones de una paria, la verdad sobre los embustes que le hiciste tragar? ¡La 
sobrinita pura y cándida, a la que le pagó un pasaje al Perú, resultó ser una madre 
indigna, perseguida por la policía! (140) 
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person narrator, who Kristal always refers to as male, seems to overpower the implicit 
first person narrator. “He” does not give her the opportunity to rationalize her outrageous 
failure to produce a morally acceptable abolitionist discourse. Nor does “he” allow 
himself the luxury of simply leaving that discourse out of the narration. 
And yet, the inclusion of this critique of racist discourse in Peregrinaciones is 
only possible because it is plausible that Flora Tristán, in the diegetic present, could 
recognize her mistake.   
Contrastively, Paraíso does not incorporate the problematic racial discourse that 
Tristán used to talk about Andean peoples in Peregrinaciones.   
 The real Flora Tristán wrote that the essential difference between Andeans and 
Europeans was more meaningful than the difference between all other castes. Andeans 
were an exceptional species, defined first and foremost by their indisposition towards 
slavery. In Peregrinacions de una paria, Tristán compares the Incan to his beast of 
burden, the Llama. The llama, she says, is unique because if it realizes that it is being 
worked – for instance, because it sees that a load has been placed on its back - it will 
actually collapse and die. (210) Incans, similarly, cannot become conscious of their labor 
and live. And for this reason, a proletariat Incan class will never exist.  
 Tristán’s beliefs about the constitution of Incans, and indigenous Americans in 
general, were representative of those held by natural philosophers in the 18th and early 
19th centuries. They can be traced back to propositions made during the debates at 
Valladolid in the 16th century. However, Tristán was almost certainly one of the first, if 
not the first person to re-inscribe these beliefs inside of a socialist discourse, or to attempt 
to project the future of Peru under capitalism on the basis of the ethnic characteristics of 
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its indigenous population. Here, it seems likely that Tristán viewed the existence of such 
a caste as a challenge to the very existence of capitalism as an eternal, global 
phenomenon.  
 Vargas Llosa does not call the reader’s attention to these quaint attitudes even 
when he quotes passages from Peregrinaciones in which they are explicit. 
 Take, for instance, the following passage from Peregrinaciones. It develops 
Trsitán’s profile of the Incans, positing extreme levels of sexual dimorphism between 
men and women. Tristán believes that Incan women, represented here by the rabonas – 
soldaderas accompanying the army – possessed all of the capacity for conscious labor 
that Incan men lacked. Thus, the existence of the Incans, as a race that could not be 
incorporated into a capitalist system was actually made possible by the Indian woman.  
 
Cuando el ejército está en marcha, es casi siempre del valor y de la intrepidez de 
estas mujeres que lo proceden de cuatro o cinco horas, de lo que depende su 
subsistencia. Cuando se piensa en que, además de llevar esta vida de penurias y 
peligros cumplen los deberes de la maternidad, se admira que puedan resistir. Es 
digno de notar que, mientras el indio prefiere matarse antes de ser soldado, las 
mujeres indígenas abrazan esta vida voluntariamente … No creo que se puede 
citar una prueba más admirable de la superioridad de la mujer en la infancia de los 
pueblos. (280)  
 
 In Vargas Llosa’s novel, the second person narrator explores this passage in 
dialogue with Tristán in the context of her sexual discourse, not her racial discourse. 
“His” interest is, specifically, Tristán’s position on prostitution. And the question, which 
he asks indirectly, is whether this position was stable throughout Tristán’s life or whether 
Peregrinaciones evidences, if not an evolution of her philosophy, then at least an incident 
of subvocalization: A moment when she wrote unconsciously and the message of her text 
threatened to exceed her own thoughts.     
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Tu odio a la prostitución era de larga data y tenía que ver con el disgusto y la 
repugnancia que, desde tu matrimonio con Chazal y hasta conocer a Olympia 
Maleszewska, te inspiraba el sexo…. Y sin embargo, en Arequipa, por primera y 
única vez en su vida, durante la guerra civil entre orbegosistas y gamarristas que 
le tocó presenciar en los primeros meses de 1834, Flora llegó a sentir por las 
rabonas, que, a fin de cuentas eran una variante de las rameras, respeto y 
admiración. Y así lo escribiste en Peregrinaciones de una paria, en el encendido 
elogio que hiciste de ellas. (272)  
 
This excerpt is representative of passages in Paraíso in which intertextuality allows the 
reader to take great leaps in space and time. It traces Tristán’s aversion to heterosexual 
penetrative sex back to her marriage to Chazal, forward to her affair with her friend, 
Olympia Maleszewska, and then checks it against what she wrote in Peregrinaciones 
about the rabonas, who it says were “a fin de cuentas … una variante de las rameras.” It 
contains marked, vertiginous shifts between second and third person.  
 The ultimate effect of this passage is not to use intertextuality to suggest 
psychological tension, or development, but to document, with performative objectivity, 
the details of Tristán’s discourse.  
 
Paseos en Londres 1840/2003 
 
Tristán would come to explore the labor of prostitution most thoroughly in Paseos en 
Londres, a book she wrote after returning to France, on the heels of Peregrinaciones’ 
success. In 1939, Tristán travelled to London, where she had briefly worked as a maid in 
her twenties, to conduct a sociological investigation of the state of the British proletariat. 
However, many of her contemporaries suspected that Tristán wanted to reclaim London, 
for her reinvented self. Moreover, many of her contemporaries suspected that Tristán 
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was, at heart, a French nationalist, and that her book would serve as anti-British 
propaganda. The actual text that she wrote does little to dispel these suspicions. Charles 
Dickens, referring to Tristán’s descriptions of prostitution in Paseos, complained at the 
time: “What have I and my compatriots ever done to Madame Flora Tristán, that she 
should be so fierce and wrathful? And where, for goodness’ sake, has Madame Flora 
been, to have ever stumbled upon the sights which she so graphically describes?” (143)73  
Vargas Llosa chooses to focus on Peregrinaciones as the book that might have 
made Flora a celebrity, and in Paraíso, his narrator gives the impression that Paseos was 
ignored upon its publication in France. But in reality, Paseos’ harsh treatment of British 
society helped it to become a very successful publication, going through four editions 
total.74 However, Paseos en Londres deserves to be read, today, not as an artifact of 
French xenophobia, or of the xenophobia inherent in early continental socialism, but as 
one of the first comprehensive, phenomenological critiques of penetrative heterosexual 
sex under capitalism. And it is exactly what Dickens called the “graphic” aspect of the 
book, its description of specific violations of prostitutes’ bodies, which captures the 
attention of the second person narrator in Paraíso. Through second person narration, 
descriptions of the text of Paseos become the safe space in which Tristán can transform 
her own sexual shame. Eventually, sexuality in the quoted Paseos en Londres becomes 
formally grotesque; while imminent threats are located outside the quoted text, in the 
diegetic world. This is how Paraíso articulates the difference between text and world, the 
artifact status of Paseos.  
                                                
73 See Charles Dickens in All the Year Round. London: Charles Dickens, Nov. 17, 1860. 
143.  
74 See Beik in Flora Tristan, Utopian Feminist: Her Travel Diaries and Personal 
Crusade. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993 
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In Paraíso, the narrator’s dialogues with Flora Tristán reveal that her personal 
sexual shame leads her to become heterosexually celibate and practice political 
lesbianism. Paseos, however, is depicted in Paraíso, as the book through which this 
partial celibacy, which up to this point only constitutes a form of self-defense, becomes 
total celibacy and a form of praxis.  
The quotation of Paseos is unique in Paraíso because it is the largest quotation of 
any of Tristán’s works in the novel. It spans nearly an entire chapter, titled Ciudad 
Monstruo, which is an adaptation of a chapter from Paseos called Prostitutes. Prostitutes 
is about what Tristán witnessed while touring neighborbhoods in London where 
prostitution was endemic. The phrase “ciudad monstruo” is taken from a line in the 
original chapter, and was actually the title under which Paseos was republished in its 4th 
edition: 
 
In the monster city there is no compassion for the victims of vice: the fate of the 
prostitute inspires no more pity than that of the Irishman, the Jew, the worker or 
the beggar. The Romans were no more indifferent to the fate of the gladiators who 
perished in the arena. (89)  
 
 Vargas Llosa begins Ciudad Monstruo in the diegetic present: Flora Tristán is in 
the south of France, which she experiences as a hellscape akin to Dante’s inferno. (The 
playwright Juan Rivera Saavedra, remarked that Tristán’s London Diary had caused him 
to think about Dante’s inferno as well.) She takes refuge in memories of her affair with 
her friend, Olympia Maleszewska.  
 The second person narrator introduces this affair, framing it as a referent of letters 
that Tristán wrote to Olympia from London. Her affect towards these old letters inverts 
her affect towards the letters she wrote to her husband at the beginning of their 
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heterosexual relationship: She feels satisfaction instead of shame as she reflects on their 
composition and content.  
 Here, Vargas Llosa’s second person narrator embellishes letters that the historical 
Tristán wrote to her friend, Olympe Chodzko. For instance, a letter in which Tristán 
wrote, “In my thoughts, I devour you with kisses” (Grogan, Life Stories, 145) is echoed 
in Vargas Llosa’s novel, “I devour you with kisses and caresses in all my dreams.”  
Overall, in the letters that are quoted in Paraíso, it is clearer that Tristán is in a lesbian 
relationship with Olympia than it is in her real letters. Also, these diegetic letters portray 
Tristán as being pursued by Olympia, when, in reality, it seems that it might have been 
Tristán who pursued Olympia, or who at least pushed Olympia to articulate the 
possibility of women experiencing romantic love for other women. Moreover, the real 
Tristán’s letters are more egotistical than the ones quoted in Paraíso. In one of these real 
letters, Tristán reflects that she may be too insatiable to be satisfied by the love of either 
sex. Whereas in Paraíso, the narrator posits that Tristán could barely process the 
overwhelming joy that homosexual sex provided her with.  
 In Paraíso, this possible inversion and definite elision make it easier, at the 
beginning of the chapter Ciudad Monstruo, for the narrator to foreshadow the 
significance of Paseos for Tristán’s praxis. Ultimately, Paraíso uses quotes from Paseos 
to make credible the idea that Tristán became, through her own phenomenology-through-
writing, a socialist on a different level, so that after the event of this book, she would 
never again enjoy the society that Peregrinaciones had secured for her. Susan G. Krogan 
says that after Peregrinaciones Tristán traded the life of a “socialite” for the life of a 
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“socialist” (145). But here, in Vargas Llosa’s novel, with Paseos, we see her going 
further, eschewing private as well as public friendship. 
 Paraíso’s narrator also foreshadows, at the beginning of Ciudad Monstruo, 
Tristán’s phenomenology of prostitution by referencing her editor’s censorship of 
Paseos. I am not aware of any sources attesting to such censorship, in real life. But this 
detail foreshadows the graphic nature of the passages that Vargas Llosa quotes.  
 This detail does not, however, appear to function – as one might expect - to justify 
any embellishment of these passages on the part of the narrator. Because, while the 
version of these passages that appears in Vargas Llosa’s novel is unbelievably graphic, so 
is the original. Saavedra, after reading the original, remarked in his own diary, “Ahora no 
sé quién o quiénes fueron más corrompidos: ¿Calígula, Nerón, o los ingleses…?” (113)   
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In Vargas Llosa’s long quotation of this passage I perceive a carnivalesque 
element that has been frequently attributed to depictions of rape in the novelist’s greater 
body of works.75 The description of the way that the politicians poison the prostitutes and 
then defile them while they are being sick shares elements with descriptions of rape 
found in Vargas Llosa’s earlier novels. One clear example is the rape of Bonificacia in La 
casa verde (1966). Another controvertible example is the rape of Sebastiana in La guerra 
del fin del mundo (1981). Both of these describe the presence and participation of a 
community - a gang, tribe or family unit - in the violation of a woman’s body, as well as 
the exploitation of physiological processes that are not universally considered to be 
sexual in nature, such as elimination and regurgitation. And although these earlier 
descriptions were not quotations, they still possessed a mimetic quality. They were a 
tribute to an aesthetic that had been developed by José María Arguedas, whose own 
                                                
75 The only thing missing is a cuttlefish of nightmares.  
The very honorable members of Parliament remove 
their coats, untie their cravats, take off their waistcoats 
and braces … The orgy rises to a crescendo; between 
four and five o’clock in the morning it reaches its 
height … What a worthy use these English lords make 
of their immense fortunes … (they) offer fifty, even a 
hundred guineas to a prostitute if she will lend herself 
to all the obscenities that drunkenness engenders. For 
in a finish there is no lack of entertainment. One of the 
favorite sports is to ply a woman with drink until she 
falls dead drunk upon the floor, then to make her 
swallow a draught compounded of vinegar, mustard, 
and pepper; this invariably throws the poor creature 
into horrible convulsions, and her spasms and 
contortions provoke the honorable company to gales of 
laughter … Another diversion much appreciated at 
these fashionable gatherings is to empty the contents of 
the nearest glass upon the women as they lie insensible 
on the ground. I have seen satin dresses of no 
recognizable color, only a confused mass of stains: 
wine, brandy, beer, tea, coffee, cream etc., daubed all 
over them in a thousand fantastic shapes – the 
handiwork of debauchery! (Tristán, 86) 
 
En los finishes, las verdadera diversión no era la cama 
ni el látigo, sino el exhibicionismo y la crueldad. 
Comenzaba a las dos o tres de la madrugada, cuando 
lores y rentistas se habían quitado chaquetas, corbatas, 
chalecos y tirantes y empezaban las ofertas. Ofrecían 
guineas lucientes y contantes a las mujeres – 
muchachas, adolescentes, niñas – para que bebieran las 
bebidas que ellos les preparaban. Se las embutían en el 
estómago, regocijados, festejándose unos a otros en 
corros estremecidos por las carcajadas. Al principio les 
daban a beber ginebra, sidra, cerveza, whisky, cognac, 
champagne, pero, pronto, mezclaban el alcohol con 
vinagre, mostaza, pimienta y peores porquerías, para 
ver a las mujeres que, con tal de embolsillarse aquellas 
guineas se bebían los vasos de un tirón, caer al suelo 
haciendo muecas de asco, retorciéndose y vomitando. 
Entonces, los más ebrios o perversos, entre aplausos, 
azuzados por los corros, se abrían las braguetas y las 
meaban encima o, los más audaces, se masturbaban 
sobre ellas para enmelarlas con su esperma. (Vargas 
Llosa, 404)  
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descriptions appropriated a picaresque aesthetic of rape, and developed it within a 
humanistic discourse, revalidating the figure of the Indian, the woman and the child.   
This description of rape, however, is unique in two ways. It does not, as Kristal 
says, encourage Tristán to revisit her own experiences, with hindsight and a historical 
perspective that belong to Vargas Llosa. Instead, it encouraged Tristán to revisit her 
experience with a historical taste that belongs to Vargas Llosa rather than to her. And yet, 
because this description does not really add anything to what was already in Tristán’s 
own description, what emerges is not a victory of the third person over the first, but a 
perfect synthesis of two voices. Also, in this passage, Vargas Llosa is no longer paying 
homage to José María Arguedas, but rather, to himself. Having found a point in Tristán’s 
text where a nexus can be created between them, where he can impose his own aesthetic 
without displacing hers, Vargas Llosa can self-consciously parody himself.  
This is the only place, by the way, in the portion of the novel dedicated to Tristán, that we 
see this carnivalism. While the portion dedicated to Gauguín is rife with it, Vargas Llosa 
does not introduce it to Tristán’s portion other than here, where it seems to be conjured 
by Tristán’s own prose.  
Vargas Llosa’s recapitulates and annotates his own quotation of this passage from 
Paseos en Londres just a little later on in the same chapter. Here he describes Tristán’s 
persistent affect towards what she wrote in Paseos en Londres. The quotation begins with 
a reference to Tristán’s ex-husband’s rape of their daughter, Aline.  
 
Nunca habías llorado tanto, Flora Tristán. Ni siquiera al saber que André Chazal 
había violado a Aline, lloraste como después de aquellas dos amanecidas en los 
finishes londinenses. Entonces decidiste romper con Olympia para consagrar todo 
tu tiempo a la revolución. Nunca habías sentido tanta compasión, tanta amargura, 
tanta rabia. Revivías esos sentimientos en esta noche desvelada de Carcassonne, 
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pensando en aquellas cortesanas de trece, catorce o quince años —una de las 
cuales hubieras podido ser tú si te raptaban cuando trabajabas para los Spence— 
atragantándose esas pócimas por una guinea, dejando que el veneno líquido les 
destrozara las entrañas por una guinea, permitiendo que las escupieran, mearan y 
regaran con semen por una guinea... ¡Dios mío, Dios mío, si existías, no podías 
ser tan injusto para quitarle la vida a Flora Tristán antes de que pusiera en marcha 
la Unión Obrera universal (408)    
 
 
Here Flora, the French mother crying for the daughters of English women more 
than for her own biological daughter cuts, potentially, a transgressive political figure. The 
narration, however, does not take the expected route of highlighting this emotional and 
ethical tension. Instead, this instance of Tristán privileging the political over the personal 
is given as one in a series of instances in which she does the same. It is not different from 
them; it only offers to be different - because Vargas Llosa highlights it so spectacularly - 
and then rescinds that offer. In the very next sentence, the narrator tells us that Flora’s 
pain led her to leave her lover, Olympia, whose comfort she realized was a bourgeoisie 
luxury. I sense that the narrator, that latent force that collates these quotations, is poking 
fun at (his) novel-subject and forcing the issue of the imminence of her discourse to her 
habit, and I recognize that this imminence is the sign of a praxis. A purer form of that 
discourse. The narrative betrays all of the apparatuses that I, as a reader, already have in 
place for understanding Tristán’s discourse. I cannot attribute to Flora Tristán any ethics 
of care, or ethics of intimacy, based on her sex, because such an attribution would be a 
reference to an apriori, while the novel itself does not admit any apriori for Tristán’s 
discourse. Tristán’s discourse has the same absolute presence as her affect, which 
becomes more unchanging the closer the narrative brings me, with each new quotation, 
towards the diegetic present from which Tristán considers her books: “Revivías esos 
sentimientos en esta noche desvelada de Carcassonne, pensando en aquellas cortesanas de 
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trece, catorce o quince años.” 
There remains a marginal question: Does the implied third person of the novel 
critique Tristán’s phenomenology of penetrative heterosexual as defunct, much like (he) 
does her belief in, for example, phrenology? - Tristán is ahead of her time in critiquing 
British jails but, ironically, is fascinated by phrenology - Or does (he) introduce it as an 
artifact, something that can move into a new space, and that can neither be refurbished 
nor deconstructed?  
Both Flora Tristán’s abstinence and lesbianism constitute a form of 
costumbrismo, as opposed to praxis. They are recognizably the same abstinence or 
lesbianism as that of a series of defunct feminisms, including “messianic feminism” (e.g. 
Shaker feminism), “second-wave feminism” (e.g. the feminism of Andrea Dworkin) and 
“radical feminism” (e.g. the feminism of Mary Daly). They respond to the premises that 
1) intercourse is harmful to women and 2) social and scientific technologies that aim to 
reduce or mitigate the harms caused by intercourse - through, for example, the 
establishment of consent, the cultivation of pleasure during sex, or the mitigation of 
specific medical risks implied by intercourse - reify that harm.  
For my part, I recognize these premises as constitutive of extra-diegetic 
discourses whose promise has been neutralized. In fact, outside the novel, one witnesses 
that these premises now make up part of a vulgar discourse. This is due, on the one hand, 
to the fact that they only seriously appeal to the academically disenfranchised; women 
whose feminist formation takes place outside of academia and who fetishize the least 
salient aspects – i.e. voluntary abstinence and political lesbianism – of the primordial 
feminisms that the movement’s foundational texts describe. But it is also due, on the 
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other hand, to the attempts of academically entrenched women to apologize for these 
aspects by teaching us to appreciate them as part of a movement’s “rhetorical strategy.” 
As rhetorical strategy they no longer effectively threaten to cut one off from the logos of 
love, connectivity and reproducibility.  
As an artifact, Tristán’s voluntary abstinence and political lesbianism escape this 
slide into vulgarity.  
 
Afterwards : La Unión Obrera inside El Tour de Francia 
 
After leaving Olympia, Flora Tristán begins a tour of France with her manifesto, 
La unión obrera. This book receives a unique treatment in Paraíso en la otra esquina. 
The novel does not quote from it directly, at all. 
The elision makes sense if quotation, in Paraíso, is primarily a function of 
Tristán’s internal monologue. In the diegetic present, Tristán is living with La unión 
obrera, not as a text, but as a book, as an artifact. It’s weight, and the pressing necessity 
to physically disseminate it, displace discourse.   
Actually, in the diegetic present, Tristán is living with La unión obrera exactly as 
she reports living with it in her diary, which is later published as Le tour de France/El 
tour de Francia.76 The novel’s treatment of La unión obrera, therefore doubles as an true 
quotation of El tour de Francia.  
                                                
76 El tour de Francia is published in Spanish for the first time in 2006. Ironically, the 
edition contains marginal notes that quote Vargas Llosa. For example, Vargas Llosa 
rationalizes Tristán’s displacement of her daughter for her female prodigies. (209) 
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 Paraíso does reveal some descriptions of socialist society, which are contained in 
La unión obrera and not in El tour de Francia. But it does so indirectly, by representing 
them in relief against a vulgar vision of socialist society possessed by France’s workers. 
As she tours with her book, visiting workers meetings across France, Tristán is not 
depicted as lecturing or reading from her text out loud, but as arguing with these workers. 
Tristán precedes Marx, but the novel represents the workers of France, 
anachronistically, as members of an already fatigued pre-socialist community. Or, 
alternatively, perhaps the novel posits the existence of a primordial fatigue in the 
movement; Because Tristán’s back and forth with the workers very much resembles an 
exchange between one formally empowered and many vulgar interlocutors for socialism.  
In any case, through these arguments (and also in a few conversations that are 
represented in the novel in which she complains about these arguments) the novel does 
give us some salient information about what Tristán had proposed in La unión obrera: 
This included: 1. The professionalization of union activism through the creation 
of paid positions in the union for activists, and 2: The creation of several specific 
nontraditional leadership positions. These positions would be nontraditional in the sense 
that the type of “leadership” that Tristán envisioned was analogous to the ideal leadership 
of church officials. The union would have apostles and a chief defender, who would be 
chosen for their ability to proselytize.  
But above all, these arguments serve to clarify that Tristán was convinced that 
revolution would hurt, rather than help the union’s mission, and that the remuneration of 
women’s labor was an essential predicate to its success. 
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There is one passage in El paraíso en la otra esquina that comes very close to 
quoting La unión obrera directly. This passage tells us that La unión does not describe 
what sexual relationships will look like in Tristán’s socialist society: “En su proyecto de 
Unión Obrera no había recetas sexuales; salvo la igualdad absoluta entre hombre y 
mujeres y el derecho al divorcio, el tema del sexo se evitaba.” (101) 
 However, this nearly direct quotation appears accidental: In this passage Tristán 
reflects, not on her own text, but on those of her contemporary, Charles Fourier. Here, the 
second person details the baroque sexual life of the phalansteries that Fourier envisioned. 
This is interesting, primarily, because Fourier appears to have been one of the first 
socialist thinkers to have proposed a sexual social service for the disabled, a controversial 
program that has reasserted itself in debates about sex-work and welfare in the 21st 
century.77  
                                                
77 The real Charles Fourier (1772 – 1837) wrote that society should be organized into 
phalansteries that would provide individuals with a framework for the realization of their 
human potential. Fourier’s utopianism is distinguished by the following ideas: That 
civilization represents the repression of common creative and ecstatic energies; That it 
frustrates the work that is the natural product of those energies; That all human beings 
should have access to all forms of occupation and be compensated for their work; And 
that the activity of childhood, including playful mimesis, constitutes work. Sexual 
energy, meanwhile, is conceived of as the play of adulthood: A creative and ecstatic 
energy meriting respect but also needing to be channeled, especially in the case of 
individuals who belong to one of several extreme sexual types. This leads Fourier to 
foresee the necessity of establishing a sexual social service. Generally speaking, Fourier’s 
sexual socialism reflects early nineteenth century positivistic thinking about natural 
systems: It does not anticipate that the natural system constituted by society should have 
exponents or constituents that are doomed to be destroyed. (See Jonathan Beecher.) 
Vargas Llosa outlines almost all of these points, and more, on pages 99-101: En los 
falansterios … habría jóvenes vírgenes que prescindirían por completo del sexo, y 
vestales, que los practicarían de manera moderada con los vesteles o trovadores, y 
mujeres todavía más libros, las damiselas, que harían el amor con los menestrales, y así 
sucesivamente, en un orden de libertad y exceso crecientes … hasta las bayaderas, que 
practicarían el amor caritativo, acostándose con … seres a los que … la injusta sociedad 
actual condenaba a la masturbación o a la abstinencia.” And he also imagines Tristán’s 
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And yet, despite this negative or indirect trend of quotation, La unión obrera is, as 
the physical object that displaces discourse, represented more than almost any other book 
in El paraíso. While Tristán moves from one worker’s meeting to another, La unión 
obrera is depicted, like the too tall tables it rests on, or the hard chairs that Tristán sits on, 
as an obstacle.  
There are many descriptions of the practical hassles implied by the materiality of 
the book: Tristán, who has less than a year to live, is physically weakening and 
experiences great physical hardship as she carries dozens of copies of the book from one 
meeting to another, from one hotel room to another. If this hardship is lessened each time 
she gives her work away, then it is also renewed as she periodically visits her publisher to 
collect more copies. 
In one scene in which Tristán is watching her book being printed (“vigilabas la 
impression de aquellas páginas” (153), she encounters Karl Marx. This scene stages an 
imaginary encounter between Tristán, the socialist philosopher who anticipated Marx, 
and Marx himself, who quoted, but also maligned Tristán.  
Both Saavedra and Vargas Llosa state that they are interested in how Marx and 
Tristán might have been linked by an inequitable quotational practice. Marx via 
Saavedra: “Flora muere en 1944. Años después Marx se apropia de la frase acuñada por 
Flora ‘Trabajadores del mundo uníos’, y nunca le reconoce su autoría. En su manifiesto le 
dedica un par de renglones, donde la califica despectivamente de socialista utópica” (90). 
Marx via Vargas Llosa: “Marx no sitúa nunca a Flora Tristán, y Engels – que aprovechó 
de una manera muy evidente el libro de Flora Tristán sobre Londres … sin citarla nunca 
                                                                                                                                            
response: “a Flora este sistema le parecía indebido, la hacía temer que, a su amparo, 
brotaran nuevas injusticias.” (101)  
  150 
jamás - también conoció la obra de Flora Tristán. ¿A qué se debe?, me he preguntado 
muchas veces: yo creo que pura y simplemente al machismo.” (Enrique Krauze, 59)  
In El Paraíso, the narrator dramatizes the resentments implied by this inequity. 
When Marx appears on the scene, and becomes irritated that the press has delayed 
printing his review, Anales Franco-Alemanes, he asks, “¿Por qué la imprenta … 
privilegiar <<los alardes literarios de esta dama recién venida>>.”  In short, Marx 
criticizes Tristán’s writing as a vanity project.  
The narrator, however, imagines Tristán rebuffing her critic, Marx, on the basis of 
his linguistic homelessness:  
 
- ¿Con qué derecho viene usted a dar esos frito de gallo capón? –  
 El vociferante personaje masculló algo en alemán y, luego, reconoció que no 
 entendí la expresión aquella. ¿Qué significaba <<un gallo capón>>? 
 -     Vaya y consulte un diccionario y perfeccione tu francés – le aconsejó 
 Madame-la-Colere, riéndose – Y aproveche para cortarse esa barba de 
 puercoespín que le da aspecto de sucio.  
 -       Rojo de impotencia lingüística, el hombre dijo que tampoco entendía lo de 
 <<puercoespín>> (453)  
 
 Here, we see Tristán embrace and perform her linguistic nationalism. We learn 
that Marx is inept. He has been depending on his German friends, who are more fluent 
and better connected in France, to make and maintain connections. One of whom might, 
if not for a missed connection, have been Flora. Here, the second person narrator seems 
again to elide with that implicitly male, third person narrator, the one that Kristal 
describes as an avatar for Vargas Llosa. But at the same time, grounded as the second 
person narration is in Tristán’s interior monologue, it is also true that Vargas Llosa is 
using quotation to empower a confrontation between a spectral Tristán and a spectral 
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Marx. Key to this practice of quotation, is the appearance of La unión obrera as a 
physical object on the scene.  
El paraíso treats the weight of the physical object of La unión, in El paraíso, as a 
corollary for the weight of the cross on Christ. In so doing so, the novel quotes, and also 
interprets, Tristán’s El tour de Francia: The diary she kept during her tour.  
In El tour, Tristán posits that she is the female Christ come to redeem the world in 
the way that the male Christ could not. If I may be forgiven for interjecting, now, a 
reference to my own experience as a private reader of Vargas Llosa’s novel, I will say 
that in reading Paraíso this was the one completely loyal quotation of the historical 
Tristán by the narrator that I did not find transparent as such. That is, this claim appears 
so outrageous in Paraíso, and also so reminiscent of claims made by other characters in 
the works of Vargas Llosa, that I assumed that whatever figure of speech, metaphor or 
analogy Tristán may have used in El tour to inspire it, was wildly embellished by Vargas 
Llosa. 
This is not the case. The historic Tristán is grandiosely deluded in El tour de 
francia and literally views herself as a female redeemer. This is content that Vargas Llosa 
has condensed in the first paragraph of his novel. Here, Vargas Llosa clearly marks his 
own quotation of Tristán with two time stamps: Four in the morning is when Tristán 
wakes up and experiences the serenity that comes with her awareness of herself as a 
chosen one, or messiah. Ten years ago is when Tristán awakened to this awareness for 
the first time.   
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Tristán, in her real diary, couches her messianism within a nascent, implicitly 
Sapphic discourse. She feels affirmed as the female deliverer of the workers of France 
because her younger student, Eleanor Blanc has recognized her as such. But she also 
feels open to the potssibility that Eleanor Blanc, whose love for Tristán and for the 
union is unpolluted by any encounter with men, could herself be a female messiah. 
Was Tristán conscious of her declining health? Did she grapple with the possibility 
that she might not live to complete her mission and that another woman would have to 
step forth? She writes:
 Esta noche busqué comprender lo que (Eleanore) había sentido con respecto a 
 mí y lo que yo misma había experimentado, y tuve la revelación de que un 
 nuevo amor más grande y sublime que todos los amores conocidos iba a 
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 eclosionar en la humanidad, ¡Oh! ¡Qué amor sublime! … Hace más de diez 
 años que tuve el presentimiento de un amor semejante, y hoy Dioses en toda su 
 bondad ¡me ha hecho conocer la realidad de tal amor! ¡Eh! Cosa notable, es 
 una mujer del pueblo, una niña, todavía – porque ella no ha amado – quien es 
 elegida. (191)
In El Paraíso these possibilities are put aside so that the book, La unión 
obrera, can take the place of the women that Tristán claimed to have dwelled inside 
of: 
    Pasa entre Eléonore y yo lo que sucedía entre Jesus y San Juan. Vivía en su maestro                 
    porque su maestro tenía el poder de vivir en él. De la misma manera Eléonore vive  
    en mí porque yo tengo el poder de encarnarme en ella. ¡Que hecho! Mi alma 
    tomando posesión de otra alma sin tener en cuenta la envoltura. (193)78  
This book inverts our understanding of prologue or preface, such as has been 
supplied to us by post-colonialist deconstruction. When Gayatri Spivak asks “But 
what sovereign subject is the origin of the book?”, when she quotes Proust, “I was not 
one man only … but the steady advance hour after hour of an army in close 
formation”, she affirms that the Derridian concept of the preface, as that which is pre-
dicto, but not just before but also all around us all of the time, undermines 
                                                
78 This quotation continues in a way that calls to mind and inverts Tristán’s reflections, 
in Peregrinaciones, about the inadequacy of a woman’s love in friendship to men: Si 
este hecho ocurriera con respecto a un hombre se podría decir: esta posesión espiritual 
se operó en virtud del príncipe de atracción que atrae los sexos el uno hace el otro sin 
saberlo. ¡Pero aquí se trata de una mujer! He aquí un hecho que prueba más la 
existencia del alma que todas la teorías. Me acuerdo ahora de la cara que ponía su 
marido viéndola llorar. ¡La miraba con una sorpresa inaudita! No comprendía y sin 
embargo estaba celoso, sentía y comprendía que su mujer en sus demostraciones más 
afectuosas no lo había amado jamás de la manera en la que me amaba, ¡e 
instintivamente comprendía también que no la amaría nunca con un amor tal! Y este 
pensamiento lo torturaba porque se sentía humillado. Tengo bellas cosas que decir 
sobre la eclosión de este nuevo amor en la humanidad, pero no tengo tiempo ahora. 
(193) 
 
 154 
“humankind’s common desire for a stable center, and for the assurance of mastery – 
through knowing or possessing (that) a book … stands to satisfy” (Of Grammatology).  
The diegetic present, the action, that is coded in the material artifact of Unión 
obrera is certainly a preface in the Derridian sense to the discourse that is implanted in 
all of the flashbacks to text that make up the bulk of the novel. However, it betrays 
Spivak’s vision of what this kind of preface ought to do. No army of persons marches 
through this text. Or if one does, this is an army made up of persons so alike to one 
another (first, second and third person) that reading the novel is like attending a 
military parade and coming away with a case of line-hypnosis. On the other hand, if 
La unión obrera is not a prologue or preface, which is to say that if it is not true that 
action and represented discourse could hold a double referent, then there is still 
something to be learned from the disappearance of the content of La unión obrera at 
the “end” of this novel: Which is that, occurring simultaneously with the end of the 
novel’s fabula, with Flora Tristán’s death, we still find represented a simultaneous 
encounter between action and discourse in El paraíso en la otra esquina. It is merely 
the representation of the end of the scriptural and the end of the habitual as happening 
at the same moment.  
Ultimately, it is impossible to reduce judgment in El paraíso en la otra esquina 
to an activity of the character Flora Tristán. Certainly, it is narratologically correct to 
attribute judgments like the one with which this chapter opens (“Escribiste a Andrés 
Chazal …”) to Flora Tristán, to her inner monologue. But these judgments also have a 
historical life of their own that is not belied by the narratological operations that place 
them inside of inner monologue. And this is the chief methodological claim of this 
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chapter: The labor of considering how these judgments constitute the diegetic fiction 
is intensive and worthwhile. But this labor is not necessary, as a justification of the 
inclusion of such negative judgments, about a marginal woman writer’s work, in a 
novel by a preeminent male writer. Firstly because there is no duty to excuse this 
gesture. And secondly, because the virtue of the novel is that it affirms the priority of 
these judgments, at the cost of its own vibrant potential.  
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CHAPTER 4 
PEDRO SALVINO ZULEN AYMAR 
IN THE BURNING CHAPEL OF LANGUAGE 
 
 
Para prender fuego a los ídolos encerrados en la capilla ardiente del lenguaje, bastóle la 
llama de la vida. Su herejía le ha atraído sobre sí la condenación de los escribas del 
intelectualismo, de ese intelectualismo… que... no ejecutó más tarea que de elevar los 
castillos triviales y efímeros de sistemas que se derrumbaban al menor soplo de la 
realidad. Pero frente a los escribas y al lado del pensador austero, cabalga un sinnúmero 
de papagayos, diletantes, amateurs, embrolladores en fin, que se ha apoderado de la 
doctrina del maestro, y hay el peligro de que se confirme la incisiva e irónica frase de 
David Hume: <<La victoria no es ganada por los hombres en arma que manejan la lanza 
y el sable, sino por los trompeteros, tambores y músico del ejército.>> 
 
            - Pedro Zulen, La filosofía de lo inefable   
 
 
 The early 20th century Tusán philosopher and poet Pedro Zulen is almost in 
vogue. Pablo Quintanilla recently profiled Zulen as a mediator for the introduction of 
North American pragmatism to Latin America. Joel Rojas, for the first time, has collected 
all of Zulen’s prose in one volume, providing us with access to his scientific and science 
fiction writing. And Ignacio López-Calvo has brilliantly analyzed Zulen’s career in the 
context of the trajectory of the Chinese Community in Peru, calling our special attention 
to the writer’s poetry and suggesting that we reconsider it on its own terms, beyond its 
failure to conform either to stereotypes about Latin American modernist aesthetics or to 
the type of early 20th century romanticism practiced by la generación de 1900.  
 However, this chapter has a different trajectory: Pedro Zulen’s double situation as 
a character in Dora Mayer’s memoir, Zulen y yo (1925) and also in José B. Adolph’s 
novelization of Mayer’s memoir, Dora (1985). My investigation therefore has the 
dubious distinction of reintroducing into a renascent conversation about Zulen, two 
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lesser-known figures that attempted to intervene in the past to determine his legacy. I say 
dubious, because, while there is no doubt that Dora Mayer was unjustly assigned to 
intellectual oblivion by a patriarchal intellectual community, it is not at all clear that this 
fact balances out Mayer’s ethically complicated treatment of Zulen in her memoir.  
 The full title of Mayer’s memoir is Zulen y yo, Testimonio de nuestro desposorio 
ofrecido a la humanidad. It is, as its title declares, a first person testimony of the author 
and her subject’s marriage, offered up to humanity. Mayer testifies that Zulen was her 
husband, although he never admitted to being married to her. In fact, legally, the two 
were not married. Mayer’s claim hinges on the fact, as she tells it, that in 1920 Pedro 
visited her at her house, proposed “nupcias naturales” to her, and they consummated their 
marriage. Zulen maintained that this never happened.  
 Adolph, in order to write Dora, did two things: First, he recycled Mayer’s 
testimony, directly transcribing some passages from her book into his novel and adapting 
others. Second, he invented a corresponding testimony, which belongs to Zulen. 
Adolph’s imagined testimony evokes two texts by Zulen: La filosofia de lo ineffable and 
Del Neohegelianismo al neorealismo. These are Zulen’s bachelor’s thesis and 
postdoctoral manuscript, which focus on Henri Bergson and Bertrand Russell 
respectively, in which he developed his philosophy of practical idealism.  
It is my position that the portion of Adolph’s novel that is written from the point 
of view of Zulen should be read as a theorization of Zulen’s pragmatism as an antidote 
for the disavowal of cultural pluralism in Peru at the end of the 20th century; Though an 
emergent goal of this chapter is also to show in relief Zulen’s pragmatism, as it appears in 
itself. My chapter has three parts. The first concerns what Mayer said about Zulen. The 
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second what Zulen said in his philosophy, and the third, how Adolph imagines Zulen to 
have responded to Mayer. 
 
Dora Mayer  
 
 Dora Mayer was born in 1868 in Hamburg Germany. Her father brought her to 
Peru when she was five. She was Lutheran, not Catholic, and she was educated at home 
by her stepmother, who it appears that Dora may not have known was her stepmother. 
She detailed her education in her Memorias, which were archived at the library at San 
Marcos in 1958, a year before her death. In 1992 Memorias was transcribed by Rosa 
Boccolini, Yolanda Candia, Rosario Jimenez and Miguel Pinto and printed in three 
volumes. 
 In Memorias, Mayer compared her career as a scholar to that of Zulen by saying 
that he read everything, while she only read journals. By everything, Mayer meant 
philosophy and literature. She also reflected, in a passage which now appears poignant 
given the topic of this investigation, that because of his reading habits Zulen was able to 
detect and unable tolerate even the slightest plagiarism. It is unfortunate for us that here 
Mayer chose to remain neutral and not divulge the specifics of any of Zulen’s accusations 
towards other writers, although she does mention a conflict with Rivas Agüero.79 
                                                
79 “Creo que fue después que Zulen disgustó a Rivas Agüero con una crítica de un 
detenido estudio de esto, asunto en que no me mezclo por falta de conocimientos de la 
materia. Además de diferencias de juzgamiento, Zulen era temido por los plagistas, pues 
leía tanto que nada de plagio se le escapaba.” (Memorias, Tomo III, 179) In this passage 
Mayer partially quotes herself in Zulen y yo. 
  161 
 In fact, Mayer’s knowledge of Latin American journalism was a serious 
intellectual achievement in its own right. The sixth part of her Memorias, which is part of 
Memorias de mi vida interior is titled Recuerdos periodísticos and contains detailed 
information on over eighty distinct publications. This includes publications that Mayer 
herself worked on: “El Deber-Pro Indígena” (1912 – 1916), “La Crítica” (1917 0 1920), 
“Concordia” (1928-1929) and “El Trabajo” (1931 – 1934).80 It also includes one 
publication that Pedro Zulen worked on after the dissolution of “El Deber-Pro Indígena” 
and his relationship with Mayer, aptly titled “Autonomía.” However, what is probably 
most impressive about Recuerdos is its unparalleled account of the periodical activity of 
the Chinese, Japanese and Jewish communities in Peru at this time.  
 Still, the crowning achievement of Mayer’s career was that, along with Pedro 
Zulen and Joaquín Capelo, she co-founded the Asociación Pro-Indígena, Peru’s last and 
most important paternalistic indigenista institution. Within this triad, Mayer and Joaquín 
Capelo were most closely aligned ideologically because of their unwavering belief that 
legislative reform would restore indigenous Peruvians to their rightful place as full 
participants in civil society. Although both Mayer and Capelo were routinely disdainful 
of what they saw as legislative excesses, namely the suppression of the press, they never 
became openly antiestablishment and they both rejected romantic formulations of 
nationhood, including invocations of Tawantinsuyu, a once and future Incan nation state. 
  In this sense, the seeds of the dissolution of Mayer and Zulen’s working 
relationship were planted originally in the Asociación Pro-Indígena. Because Zulen was 
sympathetic to the aesthetic, if not the practical message, of a discourse about a new 
                                                
80 Mayer’s notes on Concordia are quite sad. She blames its failure on the a recession of 
the moral sentiments of her audience during the Oncenio of Leguía. (Tomo III, 101)  
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Tawantinsuyu, and because Zulen also believed that the urgency of dismantling the 
institution of the latifundio superseded the requirement that the progressive development 
of Peru’s democracy had for time. 
 The memory of the Asociación Pro-Indígena, and its significance for the history 
of indigenismo was co-created, following the Asociación’s dissolution in 1917, by both 
Dora Mayer and José Mariátegui. In September of 1926, a year after the death of Zulen, 
Mariátegui invited Mayer to contribute an article to the journal Amauta, in which she 
interpreted the meaning of the API: Lo que ha significado la Pro-Indígena.  
 Two months later, in December of 1926, Mariátegui followed up Mayer’s article 
with an article of his own, Aspectos del Problema Indígena. Here, Mariátegui indirectly 
confronts Mayer’s description of the efficacy of publicity (“publicidad”). Mayer had 
called “publicidad” …  “el eje de la acción de la Pro-Indígena” (21). She believed that 
publicity was a multipronged tool that could be used to disassemble the “ego” of a Peru 
that was deluded about the true nature of its treatment of its indigenous self. 81 
However, Mariátegui describes the efficacy of this kind of publicity as fatally contingent 
upon the corrupted sensibilities of criollo Peruvians. It thus amounted, in his 
consideration, to an experiment whose failure should have headed off the creation of the 
Patronato de la Raza. (A toothless state run institution for the management of Indian 
affairs.)  
  
                                                
81 “La publicidad constituía en buena cuenta el eje de la acción de la Pro-Indígena. Era el 
temor a la sanción pública provocada por la publicidad el motivo que servía de freno a los 
abusivos y que inducía a los funcionarios gubernamentales y judiciales a ocuparse de la 
reclamaciones presentadas por la Asociación en nombre de sus defendidos; era la 
publicidad que daba a los lectores de periódicos una noción de los problemas relativos…” 
(21) 
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 Ese experimento ha cancelado definitivamente la esperanza o, mejor, la utopía de 
 que la solución del problema indígena sea posible mediante una reacción de la 
 clase necesariamente mancomunada con el gamonalismo. El Patronato de la Raza, 
 instituido por el Estado, está ahí para testimoniarlo con su estéril presencia. 
 
 
Still, Mariátegui is more than gentle when he quotes Mayer in Aspectos del Problema 
Indígena. He praises her for having displayed both integrity and level-headedness by 
openly describing the API’s last period of decadence. And he also characterizes Lo que 
ha significado la Pro-Indígena in a way that both recognizes the centrality of the figure 
of Mayer and Zulen’s relationship to the text, while ignoring the bizarreness of Mayer’s 
treatment of this relationship:   
 
 Recientemente, Dora Mayer de Zulen, cuya inteligencia y carácter no son aún 
 bastante apreciados y admirados, ha hecho con la honradez y mesura que la 
 distinguen el balance del interesante y meritorio experimento que constituyó la 
 Asociación Pro-Indígena. La utilidad de este experimento resulta plenamente 
 demostrada por quien fue, en mancomunidad y solidaridad habilísimas con el 
 eneroso espíritu precursor de Pedro. S. Zulen, su heroica y porfiada animadora.82 
 
 
Mariátegui’s practice of quotation of Mayer is protective, but misrepresents the content 
of Lo que ha significado la Pro-Indígena. 
  In Lo que ha significado la Pro-Indígena, Mayer reintroduces the central thesis of 
Zulen y yo (1925): That the efficacy of the association had owed to her and Zulen having 
assumed the role of a primordial dyad, the engenderers of a renascent Peruvian 
civilization. To illustrate this idea she relates the following anecdote: On Sunday the 8th 
of November, 1926 she was attending a play, where she was approached by four Indians: 
                                                
82 Gerardo Leibner claims that Mariátegui over-relies on Mayer as a source for 
information about Zulen’s activities within the API.  
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“Me saludaron titulándome su Mama Ocllo. Sentí, halagada en ese momento, que una 
idea en el exterior respondía a un pensamiento que abrigo en el interior.” (20) 
 Mayer tells us that most nations conserve the legend of a political founder who is 
either male or doubly male (as in the case of Romulus and Remus.) Peru, however, 
conserves the legend of Manco Capac and Mama Ocllo. This brother-sister, husband-wife 
dyad were, according to legend, the founders of the Inca state, and possibly the offspring 
of God. Mayer considers the heterosocial pair singular and superior in their potential to 
inspire a civilization: “el símbolo de la perfección social más completo dentro de los 
moldes de la vida humana … no el hombre solo, no la mujer sola, sino una doble 
individualidad fundida en la maravillosa unidad del complemento.” (20)  
 Is it possible that these four Indians recognized Mayer as their Mama Ocllo? It 
seems as unlikely as Mayer’s assertion that at the same play an artist by the name of 
Teodomiro Figueroa referred to Zulen as Mayer’s “husband”. (Implied in “Tuve la 
inmensa satisfacción de escuchar referencia por el artesano … a la obra redentora 
emprendida por mi esposo y continuada por mi.” (20)) On the other hand, it is clear that 
some members of the community, Mariátegui among them, made certain concessions to 
Mayer. While Mariátegui doesn’t mention Mayer’s mythology in his Aspectos del 
problema indígena, he does call Dora by her married name, Dora Mayer de Zulen. 
Mayer, against Zulen’s protests, had taken his name after their “marriage” in 1920. In 
fact, she published both Zulen y yo and Memorias under this stolen name.  
 
 
 
  165 
Zulen y yo 
 
 In Zulen y Yo, Dora writes that in 1920, four years after the dissolution of the 
Associación Pro-Indígena, Zulen visited her at her house, gifted her with a copy of La 
filosofía de lo inefable, proposed “nupcias naturales” and claimed a previously promised 
loan of 400 libras peruanas. She states, “Nuestro matrimonio privado ante Dios se 
verifica el 25 de junio.” (19) This was several days before Zulen was to travel to Harvard 
to study librarianship.   
 Mayer also records how, upon returning from Harvard to Peru in 1922, Zulen 
went to his mother’s house and not hers. Mayer, outraged, followed him there, and 
announced their marriage. This provoked a scandal. Zulen was, at the time, engaged to a 
woman his own age by the name of Céspedes and her family was forced to break off the 
engagement. For the rest of his short life, Zulen maintained that he had never proposed 
marriage to or had sex with Mayer. He died just a few years later, in 1925, at the age of 
just 36. 
 Although Zulen only had a few years to wrest back his name from Mayer, his 
peers had reasons to believe him. Previous to 1920, Zulen had been estranged from 
Mayer, and this was public knowledge. In fact, in Zulen y yo, Mayer herself describes 
how, after she first declared her love for him in 1915, Zulen rebuffed her. She says that 
from 1915 to 1920, he either did not respond to her advances, or rebuked them in the 
harshest of terms. His appearance in her house in June of 1920 was therefore, by her own 
admission, unprecedented.  
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 Despite Mayer’s invocations of mythological archetypes in Zulen y yo, her actual 
analytical project is positivistic. She intends to use gestaltpsychology to reveal “la verdad 
de Zulen”: Which is that he was among the most virtuous men to have ever lived, but that 
he was also profoundly traumatized by this role. And that it was not him, but his 
subconscious that betrayed her and led him to deny their marriage. By accusing Zulen, 
Mayer endeavors to save him from a process of psychic fragmentation that began with his 
rejection of her.  
 The following quotes, from Adolph’s Dora, and Mayer’s Zulen y yo, conform her 
mission statement: 
  
 Nadie acusaba a Zulen, y yo lo acusé. 
 Nadie acusaba a mí, y yo me acusé a mi misma … 
 
 Pero, ¿soy yo víctima y Zulen el verdugo ... ? No; Zulen sufre como yo, porque es 
 solo un actor que representa al común villano humano, sin serlo. Zulen se ha 
 prestado á encarnar voluntariamente, en un arranque de ironía sublime, la  maldad 
 humana … (Zulen y yo, 4) 
 
  
 Yo acuso al hombre que amo. Y tengo que entablarle juicio, no en persecución de 
 su condena, sino de su absolución ante la faz de la humanidad. (Dora, 19) 
 
  
 Mayer analyzes Zulen as a version of two archetypes: The sphinx and Oedipus. In 
the story of Oedipus, Mayer sees the sphinx as an alienation of Oedipus’s own abilities to 
talk about the future of his civilization. Mayer says that Zulen, like Oedipus, became 
mute, unable to admit his “crime” – in this case, his marriage to her - when he became 
existentially conscious of his political effectiveness. He was paralyzed by the terrible 
possibility that he might succeed in his earthly labor to destroy the institution of the 
latifundio and to save Indigenous Peru. And so he sabotaged his relationship with her, 
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and the Asociación Pro-Indígena, where his labor was most likely to succeed. Mayer calls 
their Asociación, imitable, but initerable. “Volverán a formarse todavía Asociaciónes 
Pro-Indígenas, pero la primera, con la enorme consagración de dos almas apoyadas la una 
en la otra por el amor, no volverá.” (39)  
 Interestingly, Mayer does not identify herself with the archetype of Oedipus’s 
mother, even though it was their physical relationship that supposedly destroyed Zulen, 
and even though Mayer was old enough to actually be Zulen’s mother. Instead, it appears 
that Mayer may have identified with Oedipus’s daughter: the virtuous Antigone. Because 
it is Antigone who interprets Oedipus’s otherwise inscrutable tragedy.   
 Mayer writes Zulen y yo shortly after its subject’s death. But she believes that her 
gestaltpyschology has the power to reverse the silence that exists in death. Because this is 
a limit to communication that Mayer does not accept.   
 This reversal is dramatized in Zulen y yo in several ways. First, Zulen y yo 
actually begins with a spectacular modernist vignette: A description of how Carlos V 
called for his own funeral to be celebrated before his death so that he could attend it. 
Mayer claims that she, in writing Zulen y yo, has both called for and attended the funeral 
of her own reputation. She stresses that if not for her announcements of her marriage, 
society would still understand her to be a maid, of impeccable virtue.   
 Further challenging the divide between life and death, Mayer records that after 
Zulen died she wrote to the Archbishop of Lima and demanded that he compel Zulen’s 
confessor to divulge the content of Zulen’s later confessions. She is sure that Zulen 
confessed to the marriage. She also demands that the Archbishop affirm the couple as 
married, post-mortem. She includes the text of this letter in the epilogue of Zulen y yo as 
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well as the archbishop’s reply. (To us this reply now reads as pithy. But objectively, it is 
hard to see how the archbishop could have been kinder.)  
 
Nada puede hacerse porque Zulen ha muerto. El secreto de la confesión es 
inquebrantable. (43)  
  
Mayer laments that she does not belong to the Japanese culture, in which a man can 
marry his daughter to her fiance’s ghost. She also expresses interest in joining la iglesia 
positivista, which she thinks would be more sympathetic to her plight. (44) 
 However, at the end of her memoir, Mayer performs her own victory over death.  
She claims profound happiness in her positive knowledge of her relationship with Zulen. 
She says that she feels that she possesses, within herself, “un tesoro.” (40) That she has 
bridged the gap between death and purgatory. That she is no longer vulnerable to the 
agony of death.   
 Zulen y yo is a testament to the pervasive impact that positivism, and modernist 
aesthetics had on the behavior of its author. To me, it is clear that Mayer, despite her 
geographic and gendered marginalization, felt that the tools of epistemology that were 
available to her in her time, were not only adequate to her task before her, that of 
reanimating Zulen’s prose, and giving him a chance to repair the damage between them, 
but were more adequate than any that man, in previous centuries, had access to.  
We can now appreciate that Mayer’s true intellectual accomplishment was as a 
writer of a specific kind creative memoir, the creator of a genre that has not been 
duplicated. Although she wrote Zulen y yo in the 20s, it is in this work that we perceive 
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the aesthetic of modernism to have been realized in its fullest form. She combined 
positivist philosophy, orientalist materialism and romantic psychology.  
 
Pedro Zulen 
 
 Pedro Zulen was the son of Pedro Fancisco Zulen (Yua Zung Theng), a Chinese 
immigrant from Guangdong Province who came to Peru as a plantation worker and later 
opened a tea-packaging business in Callao. His mother, Petronila Irene Aymar y Salazar, 
was a Mestiza woman from Ica. In 1889, at the time of Zulen’s birth, the Chinese 
community was ascendant. This was in large part because of the community’s success 
navigating the political tensions between Peru and Chile during La Guerra de la Pacífica.  
 The theme of rapid ascension would mark Zulen’s life. Although he died at just 
36 years of age, he was incredibly productive. Between founding la Asociasión Indígena 
and writing a Bachelor’s thesis on Bergson and a post-doctoral thesis on Neohegelianism 
and Neorealism, he also completed research at Harvard, where he studied library science. 
Upon returning to Peru he put in place a plan for the development of the collection at the 
library at La Universidad Mayor de San Marcos. It was this work, specifically, that led 
the preeminent scholar of Peruvian history and materialism Jorge Basadre to recognize 
Zulen as a foundational figure in the 20th century Peruvian intellectual community.83  
                                                
83 Alberto Loza Nehmad, currently of La Universidad de San Marcos, quotes Basadre and 
analyzes their relationship: “«El valor primordial de esta obra de Zulen llegó a ser sólo el 
de habersabido suscitar. Trajo a su oficina, que vegetaba casi desapercibida, ese ritmo 
febril de los privilegiados centros de cultura, e hizo de ella no un centro burocrático sino 
un dinámico instrumento. Incrementó considerablemente los libros convirtiendo a la 
Biblioteca de la Universidad en la mejor del país en cuanto se refiere a la producción 
moderna...»” (129) 
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 It is very difficult to know how Zulen identified ethnically.84 When he was born, 
he had two names: Pedro Zulen and Zun Leng. This was typical not only of Chinese 
individuals, but also of indigenous and mestizo individuals born in Peru at the end of the 
19th century, and it no doubt owed as much to bureaucratic conventions surrounding birth 
and death certificates inherited from the viceroyalties as to personal preference. However, 
when he began to write, Zulen used a different name altogether, Neluz. An anagram of 
Zulen, Neluz has a vaguely, and generically indigenous ring to it, but no obvious 
associations. The choice to go by “Neluz” may represent an attempt at self-
autochthonization, or simply an effort to cast off the past and start again.    
 There is some evidence that Zulen may have embraced a pan-Asian identity and 
rejected inter-Asian identity politics in Callao. We know that in the 1920s in Callao and 
Lima there existed tension between the local Chinese and Japanese, owing, partly, to the 
fact that some Chinese immigrants were critical of Japanese imperialism. Dora Mayer, in 
her Memorias, speaks to this tension when she states that she almost collaborated with a 
Japanese newspaper, but was ultimately not allowed to because of her association with 
the Chinese community.85 Zulen, however, preferred Japanese poetry, and is credited 
                                                                                                                                            
	  
84 José B. Adolph imagines that Zulen felt his ethnic otherness cutely, that it predisposed 
him to be less empathetic towards the other others that surrounded him, but that he 
overcame this through his pragmatism: “Mi niñez de chinito de la calle Boza me dictó un 
orgullo intelectual que omitió la compasión: fue la razón y la madurez lo que, mucho más 
tarde, me obligó a la solidaridad con los que sufren. He querido más que nada, triunfar, y 
comprendo ahora que esa voluntad no era sino una sublimada sed de venganza. Venganza 
de pobre, de oriental.” (1983) 
85 “Mi amigo pensaba incluirme en los colaboradores de “Perú Jiho,” pero supongo que 
se oponía a eso una desconfianza de la Legación Japonesa – considerando mis 
vinculaciones con el lado chino. Aunque con preferencia para los chinos he sido – pro-
asiática en general, censurando el prejuicio de razas que por todos lados se pronuncia.” 
(1983) 
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with introducing haiku to Latin America: “Al golpe del oro solar / Estrella en astillas / El 
vidrio del mar.” (Zulen)   
 Certainly, orientalism was a feature of both modernist Latin American prose and 
poetry and the literature of la generación de 1900, which inherited these tropes from the 
modernists. So the orientalist tendencies of an author of East Asian parentage should not 
necessarily be taken as self-referential. Generally, however, orientalism in modernist 
Latin American literature is ekphrastic, not mimetic: It hinges on descriptions of oriental 
art rather than the imitation of South East Asian art forms.  
 It is my position that these ekphrases are not truly referential to the Orient. Rather, 
they serve to render domestic material culture, during a protracted process of 
industrialization, transparent. This is because oriental crafts, including mass produced 
silk, ceramic and wicker, are markers of bourgeois consumption in Peru, Ecuador and 
Costa Rica. This had been true in Mexico in the late 18th century. But the enjoyment of 
these objects in the Andes and Central America did not peak till the late 19th century.86  
 When we find these kinds of objects haphazardly listed in the work of writers 
such as Ruben Dario’s (see El rey burgués) what we are actually encountering is a list of 
wares that can be placed in proximity with one another, without producing any semiotic 
meaning. This is because these objects were not made to be related to one another, but 
rather, for export. And their consumption was motivated not by any coherent aesthetic 
ideology, but by the prerogative of consumption itself. Far from representing the aesthetic 
                                                                                                                                            
 
86 Evelyn Hu-DeHart. "Mexican Manila: A Trans-Pacific Maritime Enterprise and 
America's First Chinatown." Keynote Speech at JHUPLAS Annual Meeting 2014.  
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harmony that modernism was, erroneously, supposed to represent, these scenes are 
disorienting and discomforting. Their intricacy only underscores this.   
 Zulen’s own poetry however is not ekphrastic. It is authentically animist in the 
way that it treats natural and material objects. Ignacio López-Calvo, writing on Zulen’s 
prose-poem “El olmo incierto de la nevada” says “In the Japanese haiku tradition that 
Zulen admired, the narrator tries to decipher his destiny and find answers to metaphysical 
questions by observing nature’s season changes.” (49) Historically, Zulen’s poetry has 
been judged quite harshly. And, while López-Calvo appreciates Zulen’s poetry as the 
ground on which Zulen claimed his Chinese identity, he adds to this negative judgment: 
“The frequent exclamations, pathetic fallacies, and references to cemeteries give the 
collection Romantic overtones.” (48)  
 However, Zulen’s poetry deserves to be reevaluated. It distinguishes itself 
because of the frank, literal treatment that it gives to his most esoteric philosophical 
ideas. Many of the lyrics that he wrote which have been taken for romantic metaphors are 
either sophisticated language games, or frank truth-claims. This is certainly true in the 
case of  “El olmo incierto de la nevada”, which ends with the following line: “De no tener 
algo de olmo, no habría congeniado con él, no le habría comprendido.” López-Calvo 
summarizes the significance of this line: “In the end, the narrator concludes that if he has 
been able to understand the tree, it is because he is also part elm.” (50)  
 This is not a neoclassical appropriation of the story of Daphne, which it would 
have doubtlessly been if Mayer had written this verse. Zulen believes that the self cannot 
understand anything outside itself, and whatever the self understands that is not the self, 
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is also therefore the self. Zulen also believes that this understanding is partial and 
incomplete. Since the self is not, ultimately, all of the thing that it understands.  
 Zulen’s poetic practice was still nascent at the time of his death. But the few 
poems of quality that he did leave behind anticipate the fiction of an international 
vanguard: His treatment of nonhuman life and of landscape calls to mind Cortázar and 
Neruda. The assumption that whatever one can say must in some sense be true anticipates 
the application of Wittgenstein to poetry.   
 Zulen’s philosophical writing is marked by this same literal treatment of reality, 
the same frankness. And it is therefore ironic that much of this writing is about Henri 
Bergson, a philosopher who relied heavily on metaphorical language.  
 Zulen’s conciseness reveals his competence in each of the philosophical fields 
that he treats. It also is a form of praxis for Zulen. Zulen increasingly understood his own 
mission as a social servant to the be that of creating an infrastructure for the transmission 
of information. His prose takes on the architectural, and bureaucratic qualities of his ideal 
library.  
 
La filosofía de lo inexpresable  
 
Zulen’s Filosofía de lo inexpresable provides an exceptionally clear description of the 
situation of Henri Bergson and idealism at the beginning of the twentieth century. In 
representing the controversy between idealism and positivism for a Latin American 
audience, Zulen purged it of jargon and nonessential references. This allowed him to 
make his own interventions.  
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 Zulen begins by recognizing one of the qualities of Bergson’s writing that led to 
his being forgotten later in the twentieth century, at least until Deleuze resurrected him in 
Bergsonism (1966): His tendency to speak in metaphors: “con … un atavío de metáforas 
que … sugestionan” (18) In a speech no doubt inspired by Bergson’s metaphorism, the 
same one that graces the opening of this chapter, Zulen states that “para prender fuego a 
los ídolos encerrados en la capilla ardiente del lenguaje, bastóle la llama de la vida”, 
Here, Zulen explains precisely what it is that he finds valuable in Bergson’s thought: 
 Bergson has affirmed that science relies on the creation of systems to understand 
reality. Namely, mathematics and language. But while these systems are part of reality, 
and therefore worthy of exploration, they can only be used to explore themselves. The 
belief that they can be used to explore reality as a whole is an illusion, one that is 
ironically reinforced by the rhetoric of intellectualism: “frente a los escribas (del 
intelectualismo) … cabalga un sinnúmero de papagayos … y hay peligro de que se 
confirme la incisiva e irónica frase de David Hume: << La victoria no es ganada por los 
hombres en arma que manejan la lanza y el sable, sino por los trompeteros, tambores y 
músico del ejército. >> 
 And yet, as Zulen observes, literature has the power to testify to the existence of 
parts of reality that have not been, or that cannot be described by language. This is 
because of literature’s diegetic, or world-holding quality, and its related ability to make 
grand deictic pronouncements: “cuando (el más subjetivo poeta) quiera expresarse sin 
recurrir a imagines sacadas de la Naturaleza, y cuando aquél quiera expresar lo más 
inexpresable, apelará a cosas también inexpresables.” It is important to note, though, that 
Zulen does not privilege literary experience as a special type of experience where this 
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kind of intuition can be practiced. The main realm in which intuition is exerted is, in fact, 
daily life, where it motivates us to make similar deictic gestures.  
 Despite the apocalyptic poesy of this introduction, Zulen is conservative when 
describing the importance of Bergson to the history of consciousness. To begin with, 
Zulen acknowledges that Bergson has inherited his antiintelectualismo by way of 
William James. In fact, it was William James who offered, “la única aprobación de valor 
para los doctrinas (de Bergson)” (20). Another problem with Bergson is that he has 
become a staple of salon philosophy; discussions of Bergson pair well with tea. In a 
sentence that reveals Zulen’s ignorance of the participation of women in philosophy he 
laments, “le ha traído la denominación poco grata de filósofo de moda al punto que ya no 
son solo las mujeres las que se disputan al escucharlo” (11).  
 Zulen wonders if the relegation of Bergson to the salon owes simply to the mass 
appeal of his language or if it is also produced by the fact that Europe, following the First 
World War, psychologically depends upon its intellectualism. But Zulen is still 
sympathetic towards those who are suspicious of Bergson because of the philosopher’s 
popularity. He acknowledges that there are serious problems with the way that Bergson 
transmits his ideas: “Hay muchas cosas en su filosofía todavía no claramente emitidas” 
(21).  
 Zulen’s own criticism of Bergson, and the real point of Filosofía de lo 
inexpresable, is that the philosopher fell into the same rationalist traps that he warned 
others about. Before the inexpresable, “Bergson no querrá declararse vencido y levantará 
entonces la arquitectura de su sistema” (28): Zulen broadly sketches this system. He 
clarifies Bergson’s position that logical systems intervene in a world that is perpetually 
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moving, to give birth to stillness. He also clarifies Bergson’s position that intuition is a 
sense by which a person inducted into these systems can still become aware of the 
existence of perpetual movement outside of them:   
 
 Bergson establecerá entonces dos clases de conocimiento: el …. mediante la 
 inteligencia y el … mediante la intuición. Por el primero retendríamos de la 
 realidad moviente solo inmovilidades eventuales con las que crearíamos símbolos 
 que nos permitirían en cierta medida prever el porvenir y gobernar sobre la 
 naturaleza. (28)  
 
 
Zulen’s observation is that Bergson is apparently unable to describe this binary system 
without idealizing a locus of contiguity within it. Even if Bergson himself knows better.  
 Bergson compares memory to perception, claiming that they both involve the 
reception of “imágenes que se desplazan en el espacio” (37). There is no difference 
between memory and perception, until its content gets coded: “No alcanzamos a 
comprender por qué habría diferencia de naturaleza entre percepción y recuerdo puros; 
solo encontraremos diferencia de calidad, de contenido.” (37) Memory, in other words, is 
merely the reception of images that we call past.87 Neither perception nor memory are 
more real experiences in and of themselves. Neither perception nor memory are more 
reliable tools for accessing an external reality. And both perception and memory can 
transform into one another.  
 The difference between memory and perception is produced by the possibility for 
perception to become memory and for memory to become perception, a transformation 
                                                
87 The extent to which we can trust these images to represent any reality outside of 
ourselves is not something that Zulen’s text clearly addresses. My own impression is that 
Zulen was not entirely opposed to the idea of the past as a self-annihilating thing; Or to 
the idea that one could create the past in the present. (For more on this idea see...)   
 
 177 
that takes place in time. In either case, both of these processes respond to the possibility 
that the person receiving these images might use them as a pretext for taking action in the 
world. When Bergson compares perception to memory by saying that it is “el grado más 
bajo del espíritu” he is only referring to a species of perception that is being transformed 
into memory, and that thus contains images that are in reserve, and not readily being used 
by a person as inspiration to act. Vice versa: memory has a mediatic power, because 
when we access our memories (memoria) we can respond to our memories (recuerdos), 
which are images. (Zulen 36-37) 
 Here we can see where and why Bergson appealed to Zulen as a pragmatist. But 
Zulen becomes frustrated with Bergson’s inability to recognize, or at least offer explicit 
disclaimers for his own rationalism. Zulen criticizes Bergson’s exploration of the locus of 
the transformation of memory into perception and perception into memory as an 
idealization of an experience that Bergson doesn’t really have access to:     
 
 el dualismo, que sería sólo formal, aparece cuando tomo los extremos y hago 
 abstracción del intermedio, el cual escapa a toda explicación psicológica como en 
 el fenómeno químico escapan a toda explicación los cambios atómicos interiores. 
 (38)  
 
 Still, Zulen’s respect for Bergson remains intact, as he is able to move past these 
pitfalls of Bergson’s writing to appreciate his comments on Perception. The activity of 
perception, in Zulen’s consideration, is the chief prerogative of human beings and 
naturally leads to description. As to the pressing question of what we should do with the 
descriptions of others, Zulen grappled in Filosofia with Bergson’s hermeneutics. He 
summarizes Bergson: “El hecho de que la obra a menudo da lugar a interpretaciones 
varias” suggests that “el pensamiento desborda lo escrito” (34). Here, Zulen recognizes 
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that Bergson believed in the existence of the signified as an ideal object, one that could 
survive human life. But he, Zulen, is not comfortable with this. While he recognizes the 
power of the signified to transcend text, he looks to the existence of human life as a 
pretext for that transcendence. 
 In doing so, Zulen developed the imminence of praxis as a corollary concept for 
Bergson’s elan vital. One could only remember, perceive or write so long as practical 
action in the world were possible. Here it is important to clarify that Zulen totally rejected 
Bergson’s spiritualism. In fact, he calls Bergson’s premonition that the spirit survives the 
flesh a “ficción” and an escapist “acomodación lógica.” But it is also important to clarify 
that Zulen’s belief in the existence of a material support for memory and perception was 
not a form of neurocognitivism either. Because Zulen identifies the possibility of praxis 
with the individual’s situation, not as an organism with a brain, but as someone living 
with other beings and with other things. In this way, it is really Zulen, and not Bergson, 
who anticipates Deleuze’s figurations of affect.   
  Zulen’s reflections on Bergson’s concept of the elan vital insist on our 
psychological isolation. As Zulen would come to reassert in his second philosophical 
treatise, Del neohegelianismo al neorealismo (1924) (he spelled neorrealismo with one 
r), in his discussions of Bradley and Bosanquet (15-20), while intuition tells us about a 
moving reality that exists outside both our own moving reality, and the stationary objects 
of consideration of our rational systems, there is absolutely no possibility that through 
intuition we might really come to know anything specific about that other reality. This is 
true on both a cosmic level, and on a personal level. Gestaltpyschology is useless for 
telling me about any part of myself that I cannot pragmatically act on. And yet, because I 
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speak a deictic language, some of my annunciations, or gestures might be predicated on 
that part’s existence.   
 I don’t think Zulen was existentially tormented by these limits, which he imposed 
on himself. If anything, it appears that he rejoiced in the delicate contingency of memory, 
perception and communication. Where Mayer reads in Zulen’s poetry, most of which was 
composed while he was at Harvard, a sadness and confusion relating to his undetermined 
status as a lover, a spouse and a member of the Latin American community, I see a joy 
and satisfaction in Zulen’s realization of a series of minute, fleeting, previously 
unimagined opportunities to relate to different parts of himself and a supposedly 
“foreign” landscape. 
 More to the point, Zulen’s poetic practice was not, as Mayer believed, the 
workshop of his soul. That is, it was not a place to which Zulen retreated in order to 
produce himself as the sort of sensible person who could have the sort of sensible 
relationships that would be the foundation of his political charisma. Zulen, by the early 
twenties, seems to have had no interest in developing his charismatic potential. Instead, 
Zulen’s model, by 1924, of the perfect political actor is Bertrand Russell, a late,  
unexpected subject of Del neohegelianismo al neorealismo.  
 This is quite surprising, because all of Del neohegelianismo al neorealismo builds 
towards a refutation of what Zulen calls neorealism, a movement within which Zulen 
situates Russell. Zulen refuted essentially every major philosophical premise that he 
attributed to this movement, and especially its devolution into behaviorism.  
 In Del neohegelianismo, Zulen expresses horror at the violently irrational 
substrate of the North American body politic – he mentions, specifically, as a 
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manifestation of this, the activities of the Ku Klux Klan. Neorealism, in North America, 
persists as a state of denial about these activities. Zulen is especially concerned with the 
fallacies central to John B. Watson’s system of behaviorism. “Basta una pregunta para 
hacer titubear al behaviorista. Es esta: ¿existe el pensamiento? … Mas, el behaviorista 
reacciona y proclama … que la psicología no tiene necesidad de saber que el hombre 
piensa. Y en los tratatados del behaviorismo un capítulo sobre <<El hábito del 
lenguaje>> reemplaza al capítulo sobre <<Los procesos del pensamiento>>” (60)  
 In Zulen’s consideration, almost nothing meaningful that people or animals do 
can be considered a behavior in the sense that the behaviorists imagined. Speaking is not 
a behavior. Dying is not a behavior. Being born is not a behavior.   
 Zulen identifies Bertrand Russell as “la figura única del neorealismo, que hace 
notar esto.” And in his appendix to Neohegelianismo he observes that Russell developed 
his own understanding of psychology while in China (“En 1921 Russell estuvo en China 
y enseñó Filosofia en la Universidad oficial de Pekin. Producto de su enseñanza es su 
libro El Análisis Del Espíritu” donde discute los datos presentes de la Psicología.” (79)) 
It is quite tempting to imagine that Zulen was, at least in part, attracted to Russell as a 
transpacific philosopher.  
 However, Zulen is, above all, interested in the life of Russell, the philosopher’s 
praxis, and the question of praxis during times of horror:  
 
 Cuando el incendio y la muerte se desencadena sobre las masas humanas, los 
 pensadores asoman. Unos sienten renacer el patriotism. Bergson, ante el 
 panorama de Francia devastada reniega de su raza judía y se proclama francés. 
 Wundt entona himnos triunfales cascos prusianos. Royce sonda en vano la patria 
 democrática en busca de fuerzas que repelan y arrasen para siempre con todos los 
 181 
 imperialismos guerreros. Bradley … Hume … Bertrand Russell, más radical, más 
 rebelde, condena la guerra por santa o justa que se la predique. (75) 
 
In fact, the entire appendix of Nehegalianismo is a biography of Russell. In Russell, 
Zulen found a model fir himself, not as a philosopher, but as a technician of arts and 
letters; A reason to dedicate himself to the daily labor of the study of modern 
librarianship, and the development of the collection at San Marcos. 
 
Zulen himself against Mayer  
 
 At times, Zulen appears in his writing to be an unwitting ally to Mayer and her  
hermeneutics. When describing the deictic function of literature, he cites Oscar Wilde: 
“Salomé … dirá: Bien sé que tú me habrías amado y el misterio del amor es más grande 
que el misterio de la muerte.” Isn’t this the very idea that inspired Mayer to write Zulen y 
yo: That if our grief tells us, over and over again, that someone is dead; then love tells us 
that there are still other intuitive avenues of investigation open to us, that connect us with 
the dead.  
 But these synchronicities are accidental. Given his philosophy, it is entirely 
untenable that Zulen would ever have admitted as useful or defensible Mayer’s 
hermeneutics for the simple reason that he viewed life as a predicate for all hermeneutics. 
Zulen was never more dismissive than when he referred to what he considered Bergson’s 
abuse of the sort of language games that Wilde’s characters participate in as proof of the 
soul’s immortality. If a text’s meaning exceeded its content, then this was precisely 
because there was a living body to receive that content.  
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 However, on a more optimistic note, Zulen’s philosophical orientation might also 
have limited the extent to which he was existentially threatened by Mayer’s project. 
Perhaps, at the time of his death, Zulen was in the process of constructing a kind of 
linguistic privacy that was less nihilistic than other linguistic privacies.   
  This private Zulen is the Zulen that Adolph portrays in Dora.   
 
José B. Adolph 
 
José B. Adolph was born to a German Jewish family in 1933 and brought to Peru when 
he was five, shortly before World War II. He began his career as a novelist with a dictator 
novel, La ronda de los generales (1973). From 1974 onwards he primarily wrote 
speculative fiction. His novel, Mañana, las ratas (1984), imagines the development of 
technologies of the future in the Northern Hemisphere and a new regime of techno-
imperialism in Latin America. His trilogy, De mujeres y heridas (2000), contains three 
novels, “Ningún Dios”, “Especulaciones sobre otro Barco” and “La Profunda Maldad 
del Universo”. It is about intergenerational trauma stemming from the Holocaust and La 
Guerra Popular in Peru. It centers on a community of Ashkanazi Jews in Peru, and on 
women whose mental illness and sexual promiscuity imbue them with a dimension of 
holiness that stands in relief against the profanity of contemporary reality. De mujeres y 
heridas is a messy but substantial literary achievement that evokes Bolaño’s 2666.    
Dora is readily intelligible in the larger corpus of works by Adolph as a novel that 
explores the phenomenology of disaster. Because, while Dora, more than any other 
quoting novel that I have explored in this dissertation, directly quotes from or adapts its 
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source material – a substantial portion of the novel is pure transcription - it manages to 
portray, without explicitly saying as much, that its two main characters are aware of the 
impending failure of their  project to create a Peru in which civil society is authentically 
multicultural, and of the violent extremism that Peru would witness late in the 20th 
century. 
 
Dora 
 
 Dora is comprised of 70 short chapters, which are told from the perspectives of 
Dora, Pedro and El historiador, a younger, mutual acquaintance of the couple probably 
inspired, partially, by Jorge Basadre. There are also two preliminary chapters, which 
correspond to el autor and el narrador. The first chapter is autobiographical; in it José B. 
Adolph reflects on his geographic proximity to Mayer: “Veinte años de mi propia vida 
transcurrieron a pocos kilómetros de una mujer que persistía en firmar Dora Mayer de 
Zulen; en todo ese tiempo jamás escuché hablar de ella” (9). The second chapter is 
metaliterary; it begins: “Todos mis personajes han muerto. En junio desapareció el 
historiador” (13) If it were not for this chapter we could assume that el historiador was 
the novel’s narrator. But this chapter tells us this isn’t the case, and that el historiador is 
dead. Adolph thus constructs a diegetic world composed of intertext, while studiously 
avoiding any hint of mysticism.   
The chapters are organized thematically, not chronologically. In 1985 the 
historian dies (Basadre died in 1980, which undermines my last point about him). In 1925 
Pedro Zulen dies. The historian is at his funeral. In 1889, Dora, who has not yet met 
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Pedro, vows to remain celibate and independent for life. In 1909 Pedro meets Dora: “esta 
mujer de rostro rosado, cuadrado, mal trajeada, cuarentona, debe ser la famosa Mayer. 
Es, en este momento, la más profunda de nuestras escritoras.” (25) In 1904 Pedro is 
suffocating under anti-Oriental xenophobia. He takes refuge in school, “Chino-e-mierda. 
Ese soy yo. El chino-e-mierda ronda el Palais Concert, a las seis de la tarde: los veo, 
entro, me siento. Aquí no soy sino el chino, sin mierda. Puedo escuchar.” (29) The 
climactic moment, the moment that remains mysterious almost until the end of the novel, 
is 1920, when Pedro visits Dora at her house and they either do or do not have sex.   
There is no reason to recreate that suspense here. Adolph reveals that both Dora 
and Pedro are telling the truth.   
In the novel’s 61st chapter, Pedro affirms that he has never divulged the truth 
about his encounter with Dora to anyone: 
 
 Amigos de confianza me han preguntado, en varias oportunidades, si es cierta 
 la aseveración de Dora Mayer de haber realizado nupcias naturales. 
 Particularmente ansioso por conocer la respuesta se mostró el joven 
 historiador… Siempre lo negué. (138) 
 
But at this moment Pedro is recovering from a recent episode of acute illness. Energized 
by the catharsis of recovery, he decides that he will tell his friend, padre Arruti, about his 
sins: “Habré de utilizar los recursos retóricos más complejos para explicar al padre … 
que ambos estábamos en lo cierto” (139).  
 Pedro then reveals that on the night in question he proposed “nupcias naturales” 
to Dora, without intending to suggest that they have physical intercourse. He reveals that 
he has never been able to maintain an erection in order to have sex with a woman and that 
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on the night in question he was not able to either. Dora, who was even more 
inexperienced than Pedro, mistook an extremely intimate embrace for intercourse.  
 Because of the way that this scene is narrated, it constitutes a part of the rebuttal 
with which Adolph has supplied Zulen in Dora. And it does not matter that Zulen is 
confessing to a sex act, or that he states that, in the end, Mayer told more truth than he 
did. Zulen’s description of the embrace conforms to an aesthetic that we already identify 
with his writing. It completely reveals, but simultaneously defamiliarizes the sex act. The 
description of the sex is explicit enough that we could call it carnivalesque, if it weren’t 
for the fact that it lacks the affective charge implied by that term. This is not a frenetic 
encounter between two people participating in a rite in which past and present, high and 
low culture, collide. Instead, Pedro observes the encounter as an artifact of human 
biology, that has suddenly been thrust before his consideration. He is more intellectually 
engaged than disgusted by it. 
 We can contrast this scene with the many sex scenes in Adolph’s De mujeres y 
heridas that conform to the author’s sexual aesthetic; these scenes are surreal, and laden 
with affect. We can also contrast this scene with the way it would have been written if 
Adolph had stayed within the modernist aesthetic preferred by Mayer, and which Adolph 
sometimes imitates when describing sentimental exchanges between Dora and Pedro.  
 The construction of this scene therefore constitutes the first half of Zulen’s 
rebuttal. The second half is constituted by Zulen’s visions of the future.  
In Zulen y yo Mayer attributed Zulen’s abandonment of the Asociación Pro-
Indígena to his subconscious self-sabotage and did not address the historical events that 
changed the meaning of the API for Zulen: Margaritya Zegarra Flórez outlines these 
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succinctly: “La Asociación Pro-Indígena se disolvió en 1916, en parte porque la 
sublevación de Rumi Maqui dejó poco espacio para la vía legal, dando paso a posturas 
divergentes entre los miembros: básicamente legalista la de Mayer y Capelo, y radical, la 
de Zulen y Chuquihuanca” (36) 
Adolph preserves Mayer’s construction of Zulen as a tragic archetype. He is able 
to do this because he understands Mayer’s gestaltpsycholagie perfectly.88 But he expands 
and makes explicit the stakes of Zulen’s political project, for Zulen. He can do this 
because he situates Zulen in a world in which he has foresight into Peru’s political future.  
 The 14th Chapter of the novel is one of two stand alone chapters told from Zulen’s 
point of view that do not advance the narrative of his and Mayer’s relationship. In it, 
                                                
88 Observe Adolph’s appropriation of this passage, here quoted in full, from Zulen y yo, in 
which Mayer discussed Zulen’s efficacy. Adolph’s transcription of this passage subtly 
suppresses the possibility of the success of Mayer’s gestaltpyschology by emphasizing 
the past, rather than the future.  
 
 
 
	  
 187 
Zulen is standing on the corner of Washington and el Paseo Colón, watching the 
spectacle of Carnival in 1924. But this is not just any Carnival; The revelry has been 
coopted as a pep rally for split-term president-dictator Augusto B. Leguía: “De los carros 
aplauden a Leguía… es su gente, su clase, su hechura. Los ha hecho sentirse importantes 
… y este público, aunque no sea exactamente leguiísta, está recibiendo las migajas de su 
prosperidad.” (36).  
 Zulen understands, preternaturally, that as the public embraces Leguía for a 
second time, they also turn their backs irrevocably on a multicultural Peru. He describes 
the way the crowd mistreats him, a Chinese man in their midst - something, it is implied, 
that does not normally happen:  “Son una colonia extranjeras que da la espalda al Perú 
que yo conozco. A mí me dicen “chino” estos extranjeras, aspirantes a gringos” (36) He 
also describes an overwhelming feeling of objectivity before, and distance from the 
crowd: “El único con cara de piedra soy yo” (35).  
 This last quote, in which Pedro says he is the only one with a face of stone, is a 
nice touch on Adolph’s part. It is a reference to one of the only poems that Zulen wrote in 
which he explicitly references his Chineseness: “En Oriental decir me dicen: Amuleto 
impreciado”. (115) This is an enigmatic poem, in which Zulen translates his own name, 
Pedro, which means stone, back into an imaginary Oriental language. The poem ends 
with a question that Mayer took to have been directed at her, “¿Qué valdría yo sin ti?”  
but that, in the context of the poem, seems to actually be a reflection about the poet’s 
dependency on those that name him.  
 The chapter ends with Zulen in a cassandrist depression, wondering what could 
possibly save his country: “algo en su alegría me encoge el corazón … Me voy a pie a mi 
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casa, meneando la cabeza, tarareando cancioncitas de carnival, y pensando: ‘A este país, 
quién lo salva?’” (36) Although this chapter comes almost at the beginning of the novel, 
we know, because of the date, that Zulen has only months to live.  
 
Reflections 
 
Inspite of this lugubrious interlude, in Dora, Zulen never actually comes to feel that his 
death is imminent. In the last chapter that he narrates, the one in which he reflects on his 
sexual encounter with Mayer,  he feels a recovery from his intermittent illnesses is 
imminent. And shotly before this, he visits José Carlos Mariátegui for advice on what he 
should do about his losses, starting with the loss of his own name, to Mayer. Mariátegui’s 
advice might be Adolphs: Mariátegui warns Zulen that he cannot trust that time will 
overcome Mayer’s slander. Because, as a romantic poet says, love is like a flame, and 
time is like the wind. The wind puts out small flames, but gives renewed life to big ones. 
Here, Mariátegui might as well be talking about discourses. Mariátegui’s advice to Zulen 
is to run. But not to exile himself to another country; geographic distance is also like the 
wind. Rather, to flee into his work, that of the library, which is in service, of course, to 
the revolution. Only Zulen’s philological labor can save him from the overwhelming 
power of Mayer’s discourse: 
 
- Quienes creen en un alma inmortal, no tienen problema alguno en recomendar 
 paciencia. Yo no tengo esa suerte. Si usted no la ama, si no está dispuesto a 
 desposarla, y carece de piel de elefante, sólo se me ocurre una huida. Detesto 
 proponerlo, pero por el momento no tengo otra sugerencia. Dice algún poeta 
 romántico que el amor es como el fuego y el tiempo como el viento: el viento 
 apaga los fuegos pequeños, pero aviva los grandes.  
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- ¿Está usted seguro que la distancia no es también como el viento?  
Mariátegui sonríe:  
- Es cierto. Es cierto. Pero entonces, querido Zulen, sólo queda desarrollar esa piel 
 de elefante y hundirse en el trabajo. (88)  
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